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ABSTRACT  
   
The state of exception in Rwanda did not spontaneously occur in Rwanda, 
it was initially developed by German and Belgian colonizers, adopted by two 
successive Hutu regimes, and nurtured and fed for 35 years of Rwandan 
independence until its final realization in the 1994 genocide. Political theory 
regarding the development of the "space devoid of law" and necropolitics provide 
a framework with which to analyze the long pattern of state action that created a 
milieu in which genocide was an acceptable choice of action for a sovereign at risk 
of losing power. The study of little-known political theories such as Agamben's 
and Mbembe's is useful because it provides a lens through which we can analyze 
current state action throughout the world. As is true in many genocidal regimes, 
the Rwandan genocide did not just occur as a "descent into hell." Rather, state 
action over the course of decades in which the subjects of the state (People) were 
systematically converted into mere flesh beings (people), devoid of political or 
social value, creates the setting in which it is feasible to seek to eliminate those 
beings. A question to be posed to political actors and observers around the world 
today is at what point in the process of one nation's creation of the state of 
exception and adoption of necropolitics does the world have a right, and a duty, to 
intervene? Thus far, it has always occurred too late for the "people" in that 
sovereign to realize their political and social potential to be "People." 
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DEDICATION  
   
This work is dedicated to the nearly one million Rwandans killed in the summer of 
1994, and to the millions of Rwandans working to live today. May we learn. 
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PREFACE  
I am indebted to a number of people and institutions for assisting me in the 
process of gathering data about Rwanda’s genocide and the laws and policies 
implemented in Rwanda during the nearly 35 years prior to the genocide. In the 
summers of 2010 and 2011, I traveled to Rwanda, Tanzania, London, and Wales 
to locate documents relating to Rwanda’s political history. Here, I describe how I 
gained access to the documents utilized in this dissertation, as I was able to review 
documents not easily available to the general public. 
 On my first trip to Rwanda in August 2010, ASU professor John 
Johnson, chair of my committee, accompanied me.  We visited all of the seven 
major genocide memorial sites in the country during this trip, starting with the 
Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre and ending with the Bisesero site, home of the 
greatest Tutsi resistance movement in the country. Our visit to Murambi will be 
forever sealed in my memory; hundreds of Tutsi corpses lie stacked in rows in 
classrooms of the technical school, preserved in lime.  Over 45,000 Tutsis were 
killed at this site of refuge. Our guide was one of the two survivors from that 
massacre. These memorial site visits were a fitting, though difficult introduction to 
my research. While in Kigali, we met Honore Gatera, the manager of the Kigali 
Genocide Memorial Centre, who provided great assistance to me the following 
summer. We also spent hours poring over Rwandan presidential declarations and 
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acts of the National Assembly in the Rwandan Parliament library, thanks to 
Augustin Habimana. 
 In the fall of 2010, while I was assisting Teri Murphy, a former instructor 
Arizona State University’s School of Justice and Social Inquiry, she recommended 
an ASU West campus undergraduate student to me as a potential intern for the 
summer of 2011.  Chris Fowler had traveled in the summer of 2010 to South 
Africa as an intern for Teri. Chris decided to complete his ASU studies as an 
intern with me in Rwanda.  He spent his final semester of school in Rwanda, 
assisting me in researching Rwandan propaganda.  Chris’s work in analyzing and 
categorizing broadcasts from RTLM, Radio Rwanda, Kangura, and other 
propaganda publications helped form the basis for my findings in Chapter 2. 
Additionally, Chris pored over the criminal records of a number of gènocidaires 
facing charges at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and helped me 
prepare to conduct targeted research at the ICTR in Arusha in May 2011. 
 My friend Jill Hanauer, executive director of Project New West in Denver, 
Colorado, introduced me to her friend David Akerson. Another friend, Alice 
Madden, former state representative in Denver, also connected me to David. From 
1999-2000, David served as the Chief of the Information and Evidence Section at 
the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). David in 
turn generously referred me to Hassan Jallow, the Prosecutor for the ICTR and 
Richard Karegyesa, the Chief of Prosecution.  Richard treated me with the utmost 
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kindness and hospitality. He directed his staff to assist me in locating the 
documents I sought from the office of the OTP. The Office of the Prosecutor 
(OTP) has an office in Remera, Kigali, and I met with Stephen Thambikeni in 
early May 2011.  He graciously provided me with cds of all the propaganda 
utilized in the famed media trials at the ICTR.  These cds included transcripts of 
RTLM broadcasts and copies of Kangura translated into English. These 
translations were not available via the ICTR online database, and would have been 
incredibly difficult to locate without the OTP’s assistance. In addition, Jonas 
Mutwaza, the ICTR librarian in Kigali, granted me access to their facility and also 
shared a number of documents with me from the ICTR media trials. 
Further, Richard invited me to Arusha to spend a week at the ICTR in the 
Office of the Prosecutor, and I gladly went.  During that time, I received incredible 
assistance from Frederick Nyiti and his staff. The entire office treated me as a 
valued visitor, setting up an office for me to research and review documents, and 
granting me access to the ICTR building at my convenience. During my visit at the 
ICTR, I was permitted to witness the sentencing in the Military II trial, 
concerning Augustin Bizimungu, former chief of staff of the Rwandan Army; 
Augustin Ndindiliyimana, former chief of staff of the Rwandan police force; 
Francois-Xavier Nzuwonemeye, former commander of the reconnaissance 
battalion of the Rwandan Army; and Innocent Sagahutu, his deputy. Several days 
later, I attended the staff meeting where OTP team members involved in the 
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prosecution of the Military II trial discussed the case and celebrated the team’s 
work. This is an experience I could hardly have imagined, and I am incredibly 
grateful for the privilege to spend time with such quality attorneys and witness 
history in the making. 
 In Kigali, the capital city of Rwanda, I am indebted to Mr. Augustin 
Habimana, the Parliamentarian for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in the 
Rwanda Parliament.  Mr. Habimana granted me full access to the Parliament’s 
library in both August 2010 and May 2011, and graciously answered all my 
questions over those two summers.  Ms. Diane Uwimana, the documentalist in 
the Rwanda Parliament, not only assisted me by dragging out countless bound 
copies of the Rwandan national register day after day, but also provided me with 
hundreds of pages of copies upon my request. Her patience knows no boundaries. 
Her assistant, Kampire Angele, was also of great help to me in 2010 and 2011 as I 
slowly pored over decades of Rwanda’s national register in French. Much of the 
source material in Chapter 4 comes from the records I found in the Parliament 
library. 
 Honore Gatera, manager of the Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre, offered 
assistance to me in August 2010 and May 2011.  In May 2011, he graciously 
asked his staff to assist me in reviewing documents in their archive and granted 
Chris Fowler and I access to all propaganda materials the Centre had collected 
over the years.  In addition, Honore allowed us the liberal use of the Centre’s 
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library to review materials not accessible in the United States. A number of 
documents retrieved from the Centre are referenced in Chapters 1 and 2. 
 I am grateful to Ishmael, who works at the National Commission for the 
Fight Against Genocide in Kigali.  He met with me in August 2010 and May 2011 
and provided Chris and me with access to propaganda materials utilized in the 
Rwandan genocide. Some of these materials are referenced in Chapter 2. 
 While in Rwanda, I contacted Linda Melvern, a British journalist who has 
written two exhaustive books about the Rwandan genocide. She happened to be 
on her way to Rwanda at the time she received my email, and she graciously met 
with me on two occasions in Kigali.  During our second meeting, she invited me to 
London to visit her personal archives.  In July 2011, I spent several days at her 
home in London, reading over a number of her archived documents. I also visited 
the Linda Melvern Rwanda Archive, located at the University of Wales, 
Abersytwyth. This archive contains, among other things, documents detailing the 
Rwandan government’s purchase of weapons during the civil war of 1990-1993. 
These archives lay out a chilling case of a planned buildup of weaponry for the 
genocide to come. Much of what I learned while reviewing her archived documents 
is detailed in Chapter 1. 
While I feel extraordinarily lucky to have been granted access to documents 
in Rwanda, Tanzania, London and Wales, my position as an Arizona State 
Representative in 2010 and Arizona State Senator in 2011 likely allowed me to 
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gain access to people and places that I would have struggled to access as a private 
citizen. The privilege of holding public office allowed me to communicate readily 
and easily with both the Rwandan Parliament and the ICTR. In addition, my 
personal relationships with individuals connected to the ICTR allowed me to 
communicate directly with the OTP leadership. 
Chapter 1 
PRELUDE TO GENOCIDE  
September 29, 1990.  In New York City, the United Nations general 
assembly sat quietly as Juvenal Habyarimana, President of the tiny African 
country of Rwanda, announced that his country was too small and too poor to 
allow the Rwandan diaspora to return to the country.1 Less than twenty-four 
hours later, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a group of mostly Tutsi 
Rwandans2 living in Uganda, crossed the border from Uganda into Rwanda, 
traveled through the Akagera Park, and reached within 50 miles of Kigali, the 
capitol city of Rwanda before encountering major resistance from government 
forces.  Over the coming days, the Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF), aided by 
French, Belgian, and Zairean forces, fought the RPF rebels in central Rwanda, and 
eventually into the capitol city itself. 
 The October 1, 1990 incursion into Rwanda by the RPF wasn’t the first 
time that Tutsis living abroad had organized, planned or executed a military attack 
on the Rwandan government.  Ever since the Hutu revolution of 1959, after which 
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the Hutu elite, claiming to represent the majority people, led pogroms to massacre 
and push into exile many of the country’s Tutsis, elements of the diaspora had 
worked to re-enter the country and force an upheaval of the political system 
through military might.  The first incursion started in December 1963, with 
subsequent attempts in 1966 and 1972.  In each instance, reprisals against Tutsis 
living within the country occurred within days of the rebels’ incursions.  Thus 
began a pattern of targeted massacres of Tutsis dating from shortly after the 1959 
revolution through the 1970s, with casualties ranging from 13 Tutsis killed in 
Kibingo commune (October 1960) to 10,000 Tutsis killed in Bugesera (December 
1963).3 
From the late 1970s to 1990, massacres were halted and Rwandan Tutsis 
lived in relative calm, although severely restricted in their ability to participate in 
government, military service, or higher education.  In the late 1980s, political 
pressure from international sources began mounting on President Habyarimana to 
address the growing issue of Rwandan refugees living in exile, anxious to return.  
Neighboring countries such as Uganda, Burundi, and others had absorbed between 
600,000 and 700,000 Tutsis into their communities as a result of Rwandan 
political policies and repressive military action towards the minority population.4 
In 1988, President Habyarimana and President Museveni of Uganda formed a joint 
international ministerial committee to discuss the issue of Rwandan refugees living 
in Uganda.  
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By this time, Uganda was home to over one million Tutsis, some of whom 
had joined the Ugandan military in an effort to gain access to greater rights and 
benefits in Uganda, and for others, as a useful and free training opportunity to 
wage a military battle back home in Rwanda when the time was ripe.5  Over the 
thirty-plus years in which Rwandan Tutsis had lived in Uganda, Uganda denied 
citizenship, property ownership rights, and other benefits of Ugandan life to 
Rwandan refugees.  Naturally, many began to turn their thoughts towards 
returning to the homeland.  At the same time, political pressure was mounting on 
the Ugandan government to send Rwandans back to their country – Ugandans 
were souring on the refugees who’d lived in the country for so long, some of  
whom had risen to prominence within the state’s military structure.  In early 
1989, the joint ministerial committee held its first meeting to discuss the return of 
Rwandan refugees to their homeland. 
International pressure was also mounting on the President and his 
government to modernize the Rwandan political system by allowing the 
development of multiple political parties.  Just three weeks prior to the first 
Rwanda-Uganda meeting on refugees, President Habyarimana announced that he 
would transition the country’s political system from a one-party system in which 
all Rwandans were enrolled into upon birth, to an open system where multiple 
political parties would be free to organize and campaign. On July 5, 1990, 
President Habyarimana announced the implementation of multipartyism in 
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Rwanda.  Additionally, he abdicated his role as the President of the MRND, the 
party he established in a constitutional change instituted in 1978, while continuing 
his role as President of the country.6 
The dual pressures of the refugee crisis and the push for liberalization of 
laws regarding political activity, combined with economic struggles in the country 
due to the fast fall of the price of coffee, growing famine, and rapid population 
growth within a tiny country all weighed heavily on the government.  Tutsis 
outside the country, joined in some cases by Hutu opponents of the Habyarimana 
regime, continued to push hard against the government for reforms.  Meanwhile, 
the RPF continued preparations for a military solution, not believing that 
promised reforms would ever be implemented.  
President Habyarimana’s announcement at the United Nations that 
Rwanda couldn’t accommodate returning Tutsi refugees wasn’t the trigger for the 
RPF incursion on the night of September 30, 1990, but it surely added to the 
urgency felt by the region’s diaspora. The RPF force, largely comprised of Tutsis 
who served in the Ugandan army, entered the country with the intent of 
recapturing the capital city of Kigali, overthrowing the Habyarimana government, 
and installing a broad-based transitional government that would end the system of 
legalized discrimination against Tutsis within the country and provide immediate 
opportunity for all Rwandans living abroad to return to Rwanda.  The battle 
lasted only a week before the RPF retreated, with external military assistance 
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provided by Rwandan government allies France and Belgium, and some additional 
assistance from Zaire.   
 Rwandan authorities exacted retribution on Tutsis living within the 
country immediately following the RPF incursion in October 1990, and continued 
to commit targeted massacres of Tutsi and Hutu opponents from the fall of 1990 
through the spring of 1994.  Episodes of targeted killings corresponded with RPF 
military advancements and significant milestones in the process towards a peace 
agreement and enactment of political reforms that would shift power within the 
country.  Throughout this three and a half year period, the Rwandan government 
also executed a number of arms agreements with Egypt, France, South Africa, and 
China, diverting much of the foreign aid the country received into purchasing 
weapons and preparing for a civil war, and eventually, the genocide.   
The Rwandan government’s reaction to RPF advancement in the 
northeastern part of the country and the threat of a military and, therefore, 
political loss to the mostly-Tutsi rebels was one of intentional, targeted massacres 
of the Tutsi minority and Hutu moderates who opposed the Habyiramana regime, 
a ‘practice’ of the organization and execution of the genocide that would follow.  
The stockpiling of light arms and traditional weapons, along with the organization 
of ‘civilian self-defense’ teams laid the organizational structure for mass murder in 
April 1994. 
The Rwandan Patriotic Front 
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 The RPF was created in 1987, during the seventh congress of the 
Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU), a politically motivated group 
within the Rwandan diaspora.  Since 1980, RANU members had periodically 
discussed the diaspora’s desire to return to Rwanda, but without taking much 
action. However, during the early 1980s, Ugandan President Obote and his 
military personnel persecuted Rwandan refugees in the country, looting their 
camps, raping and killing people, and stealing cattle.  Tens of thousands of 
Rwandan Tutsis fled to the border, attempting to re-enter Rwanda.  They were 
repelled by Rwandan government forces, and thousands died in refugee camps on 
both sides of the border.  For the next several years, Tutsis living in Uganda were 
subject to periodic persecution.  Hatred of President Obote increased, as did 
support of Museveni, who led rebel forces in the country against the Obote 
regime.  Thousands of young Tutsis joined Museveni’s National Resistance Army 
(NRA) and successfully ousted Obote in 1986.  Museveni had long utilized Tutsi 
soldiers in his guerilla forces, with leaders like Paul Kagame (now president of 
Rwanda) and Fred Rwigyema rising to high ranks over the years.7   
In the early days of Museveni’s rule, Fred Rwigyeme held the post of 
deputy minister of defense and deputy army commander in chief, Kagame was 
promoted to deputy head of military intelligence,8 and promises were made to 
Rwandan Tutsis that naturalization and citizenship would be offered.  Those 
pledges were never kept, as powerful Ugandans resented the prominence of 
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Rwandan Tutsis in military, government, and economic spheres.  In the late 
1980s, President Museveni removed Fred Rwigyema from his positions in the 
government, blocked career advancement for Tutsis in the military, and withdrew 
much of his public support for Rwandans living in Uganda.  It was at this time 
that the RPF was formed, and talk of a military strategy to return to Rwanda 
became a reality.  From 1987 to 1990, the RPF recruited young Rwandans in 
Uganda into the military and began building a clandestine guerilla force within the 
ranks of the NRA.9 Shortly after President Habyarimana’s statement to the 
United Nations, the RPF launched their first attack. 
Politics and Pogroms, 1990 through 1994 
October-December 1990 
Immediately after the October 1 RPF incursion began, retribution in 
targeted areas by local Hutu government officials and residents followed.  On 
October 4, Rwandan authorities staged a fake attack in Kigali, complete with 
gunfire and explosions throughout the city.  It is believed that the government 
staged the fake attack to engender support for the government and encourage local 
Hutus to ‘turn in’ their Tutsi neighbors.  Over 8,000 Tutsis and Hutu opponents 
of the government were arrested in Kigali.10  The first reprisal attack occurred on 
October 5, five days into the fighting. Local Tutsis in the Kibilira area of Gisenyi 
(northern Rwanda) were massacred.  On October 7, twenty-eight people in the 
Murambi commune of Gisenyi were sent to the Myumba military camp and 
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burned.  On October 8, between 500 and 1,000 Tutsi and Hutu opponents of the 
government were killed in Mutara (in Myumba region) by the RAF military.  
Between October 11 and 13, 350 Tutsi were killed in Kibilira and 3,000 were 
evicted from their homes. 11 Rwandan authorities had told locals in Kibilira that 
the month’s umuganda12 would be devoted to massacring Tutsis.13 
By mid-October, the bulk of the fighting between government forces (FAR 
and international allied forces) and the RPF had ended. The RPF suffered major 
losses, including the early death of RPF leader Fred Rwigyema, and quickly 
retreated back into Uganda.  The Rwandan government declared the civil battle 
over at the end of October and massacres of local Tutsi in the northern region of 
Rwanda subsided for a short time. 
In mid-November, President Habyarimana repeated his intention to 
implement multipartyism and announced that the country would stop marking 
ethnicity on state issued identity cards. (The implementation of new identity 
cards never occurred; the cards were ordered and delivered, yet never distributed 
to the public.  At the time of the genocide, ethnicity-based identity cards were still 
in use).14  In mid-December, the RPF advanced back into the northern part of 
Rwanda, taking over Kaniga (north of Byumba) and then the border post of 
Kagima. 
Shortly after the RPF incursion, the government mandated civilian patrols 
in affected communities and instituted civilian-staffed roadblocks, as had occurred 
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in the 1960s when the inkotanyi had attempted incursions before.  However, these 
mandated civilian self-defense measures ended along with the fighting.  In 
December 1990, a group of professors from the Butare campus of the National 
University of Rwanda sent a memo to the Minister of Defense suggesting that a 
civilian self-defense program be established for all male adults in the country, 
particularly in the interior regions (as the military was preoccupied at the border 
regions).  The professors proposed that soldiers train civilians in the communes to 
utilize traditional weapons such as machetes, hammers, hoes and the like because 
rifles and warfare weapons were prohibitively expensive.15  The idea was 
discussed but not implemented.  It would be reintroduced just a few months later 
by high-ranking government officers. 
January – March 1991 
 On January 22, 1991, the RPF attacked the prison at Ruhengeri and freed 
nearly two thousand prisoners, many of whom had been jailed for political 
reasons.  That same day, Tutsis and Hutu opponents of the government were 
killed at Rwandan authorities’ direction in the prefectures of Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, 
Kibuye and Byumba.  Three days later, local authorities killed Tutsis in Bagogwe 
in retaliation for the prison action taken by the RPF.  And on January 27, the 
burgomaster of Kinigi, Thaddèe Gasana, took thirty Tutsis of Bagwoge descent to 
the main street of the commune and ordered them killed.16 
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 The following week, the killings of Tutsis in the Bagogwe region spread to 
Gisenyi, where seventeen people were killed.17 On that same day, February 2, 
1991 French Admiral Lanxade warns the President of a ‘new offensive’ by 
‘Ugandan Tutsis’ coming towards Ruhengeri the following day.  On February 3, 
Rwandan officials launched a fake attack on the Bigogwe military camp. The next 
day, over 300 Tutsis and members of the opposition were killed near the camp. 
On February 5, 1991, seven suspects of terrorism were condemned to death 
without evidence, 4,000 others were imprisoned without trial by Rwandan 
authorities.  For nearly a month after the spate of reprisals, skirmishes between 
the RPF and FAR continued, without local massacres.  However, on March 4, 
1991, in the middle of the night, local Rwandan authorities waged another attack 
against the Bagogwe. Two hundred seventy-seven Tutsis and Hutu opponents 
died during that attack.18 
June 1991 – February 1992 
 In the summer of 1991, Colonel Augustin Ndindiliymana, minister of 
defense and security (later during the genocide, he served as chief of staff of the 
gendarmerie, Rwanda’s state police force), proposed a civilian self-defense force 
be created, as compulsory military service was prohibitively expensive.19  In a 
seven-page memo to President Habyarimana, Ndindiliymana laid out the problem 
facing Rwanda after the October 1900 RPF incursion, the state’s limited finances 
to address the military deficit, and a proposal to mobilize targeted civilians in the 
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population to aid in self-defense.20  Shortly thereafter, Colonel Dëogratis 
Nsabimana proposed in a letter to the Minister of Defense that the military train 
and arm one adult male for every ten households in the country.  His proposal 
was detailed, including a proposal that the individuals be chosen by the communal 
council, be married, patriotic, between the ages of 25 and 45, and bear “high moral 
character.” Nsabimana believed the civilian self-defense forces should continue to 
live in their homes and communities and be ready to serve when ordered to do so 
by the gendarmerie or local militia.21 
On June 10, 1991, mulitpartyism was officially legalized in Rwanda, with 
the adoption of a revised constitution. Political parties quickly formalized, with a 
number of minority parties joining to create a ‘consultation committee’ that 
operated in opposition to the MRND, the President’s controlling party. On 
November 17, the first public demonstration by opposition parties occurred – 
over 10,000 people congregated in Kigali.  One week later, the MRND rallied 
20,000 in Kigali in support of the government.  A week after that, the RAF 
broadcast a notice on Radio Rwanda blaming the RPF for sowing discontent in the 
country and using newspapers and opposition parties to incite the population “to 
revolt against the current government.”22 Throughout the first half of December, 
the RPF engaged in attacks against the RAF in northern Rwanda, with limited 
casualties.   
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On December 30, a new government was formed, made up almost 
exclusively of MRND officials loyal to President Habyarimana and the one-party 
rule system. Protests in Kigali and Butare followed, boasting between 60,000 and 
100,000 participants against the new MRND-dominated government.  All 
opposition parties demanded that the President and the MRND resume 
negotiations to create a transitional government more representative of Rwandans’ 
political affiliations.  Negotiations resumed on February 11. 
Meanwhile, the Rwandan government met with RPF officials in Paris to 
seek an end to the continuing military affront.  During the course of the meetings, 
Paul Dijoud, French director of the Africa desk at the Quai d'Orsay, said to 
Kagame “if you do not stop this fight, if you take this country, you will not find 
your brothers and your families because they will all have been massacred.”23 One 
month after this meeting, President Habyarimana traveled to Egypt to negotiate an 
arms deal.24  
March-July 1992 
 On March 3, 1992, Radio Rwanda broadcast a warning from ORINFOR 
(Rwanda’s state media agency), supposedly sent from a human rights group based 
in Nairobi, Kenya, that Tutsi in Bugesera were planning to attack local Hutus.  
The communiqué was manufactured, as no attack was planned.  However, local 
Rwandan officials utilized the broadcast as a tool to organize local Hutus to attack 
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and murder Tutsis in the region.  Hundreds of Tutsis were killed, and nearly 
15,000 Tutsis and Hutu opponents of the government fled the area.25 
The RPF renewed attacks in Byumba and Ruhengeri, engaging with FAR 
soldiers.  The fighting spread to Gashenyi, Rukomo, and Mulindi from mid-May 
through early June.  The RPF took Byumba, Gashenyi and Rukomo, all in the 
northern part of the country.  RAF soldiers began to mutiny due to defeat and 
casualties, and they retreated in the face of RPF advances.  The RPF victories lead 
the Rwandan government to renew interest in pursing a cease-fire and peace 
agreement.  During the first week of June, peace negotiations between RPF and 
the coalition government resumed in Paris. An agreement including the MRND 
and opposition parties was made, and the Rwandan government and RPF signed a 
cease-fire agreement on July 12, 1992, intended to go into effect on August 1.26 
August-December 1992 
 The Rwandan government and RPF delegates signed a draft agreement 
regarding the rule of law in Arusha on August 18, which caused concern amongst 
Hutu extremists within Rwanda, as it represented yet another step towards a 
transition of power that would eventually include currently exiled Tutsis.  Two 
days later, MRND and CDR party members killed 85 Tutsis and Hutu opponents 
of the regime in Gishyita and Rwamatamu (in Kibuye), 200 people were injured, 
and homes are burned throughout the Kibuye region.27 
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 In mid-September, the President’s Chief of Staff wrote a letter to the 
Rwandan government’s delegation in Arusha, requesting that they return to 
Rwanda and abandon the peace process.  Several days later, Colonel Dëogratias 
Nsabimana, head of the armed forces in Rwanda, distributed a memo to all military 
personnel from the commission formed in December 1991 to develop a strategy to 
defeat the enemy.  The memo explicitly targeted Tutsis “within and outside” the 
country as the principal enemy.28 
 On October 26, President Habyarimana announced on Radio Rwanda that 
he supported the Arusha Accords.  Days later, the Rwandan government and RPF 
signed the first portion of the agreement concerning power-sharing in the 
transitional government. 
 By November 5, the President’s political party, the MRND, had 
denounced the power-sharing agreement signed by the government and alleged that 
the head of the Rwandan delegation to Arusha was “in league with the RPF.”29 
And during a speech in Ruhengeri on November 15, President Habyarimana 
declared the Arusha Accords “a scrap of paper” and approvingly talked of the 
Interahamwe and their recent actions.30  Exactly one week later, Lëon Mugesera 
called for the extermination of Tutsis and their accomplices during a speech to the 
Gisenyi MRND membership.  Mugesera served as the vice-president of the 
MRND at the time, and worked in the Ministry of the Family and the Promotion 
of Women.  This famous speech exhorted fellow MRND members that the 
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Tutsi’s home was in Ethiopia and that the Hutu “are going to send you back there 
quickly, by the Nyabarongo River.”31 
 On December 6, Martin Bucyana, president of the radically right party 
CDR, in a speech in Butare, said “the Tutsi and their accomplices will be 
exterminated.”32  At the end of the month, pogroms against the Tutsi and Hutu 
opponents occurred in Kibilira and the Gisenyi region. 
January-March 1993 
 On January 7, 1993, the International Federation for Human Rights 
(FIDH), an international non-profit organization that protects rights articulated in 
the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arrived in Rwanda to 
investigate alleged human rights violations.  Local government officials halted the 
killings of Tutsis while the commission visits, but the massacres resumed once the 
commission left around January 21.  During the commissioners’ visit, on January 
9, the second portion of the power sharing protocol was signed in Arusha, creating 
a timetable for the transition. One day prior to this agreement’s conclusion, 
Bagosora stormed out of the peace negotiations, packed his bags, and prepared to 
leave.  He remarked to fellow Arusha participants, “I am returning to prepare for 
the Apocalypse.”33  Several weeks later, in an official speech, President 
Habyarimana denounced the Arusha Accords which had just been signed in his 
name.  The next day, January 26, massacres were carried out against Tutsis in the 
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Bugesera region by MRND and CDR. Over 300 Tutsis were killed in massacres 
nearly identical to those committed in March 1992.34 
 On January 20, just after the signing of the Arusha Accords, an 
anonymous group of military leaders writing under the acronym AMASASU35 
sent an open letter to President Habyarimana, threatening all supporters of the 
RPF: “how do you expect to stop us from delivering an exemplary lesson to 
traitors inside the country? After all, we have already identified the most virulent 
of them and will strike them like lightning.” The AMASASU also call for the 
establishment of a civilian self-defense force, with a “battalion of robust young 
men” in each commune that would receive local military training.36  Around the 
same time, Colonel Thëoneste Bagosora began sketching out the plans for a 
civilian self-defense force in the country.  In his 1993 appointment book, he left 
pages of hand-written notes detailing his vision of a civilian self-defense force.  
Like other proposals, Bagosora proposed that civilians stay in their local 
communities after receiving training from local police.  He also proposed that the 
recruits be married men who are “reliable,” chosen by the local governing 
authorities.  He proposed sixty men to be trained in each commune (roughly 
similar to the one-to-ten ratio proposed earlier by Nsabimana).  To begin 
implementation of this plan, Bagosora ordered the distribution of 500 firearms in 
five northern communes between late January and early February 1993.  It 
appears that his orders were followed, as the burgomaster of Gituza commune 
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wrote Bagosora thanking him in early March 1993 for the delivery of weapons 
and praising the plan to implement a civilian self-defense force.37 
 On February 8, the RPF attacked Ruhengeri and Byumba in retaliation for 
the January massacres by government officials and soldiers.  The RPF advanced 
within 18 miles of capital city Kigali, taking over more than double the land mass 
they held prior to the incursion.  Roughly one million displaced persons 
descended on Kigali as a result of the RPF incursion.38  Two weeks later, 
Rwandan military killed 5 Tutsi in Tumba, and within days the Interahamwe and 
the CDR committed massacres of Tutsi and Hutu opponents in Kigali, Gisenyi, 
Ruhengeri, Kibuye, and Byumba.39 By the end of the month, all major opposition 
parties except the radical CDR begin negotiations with the RPF in Bujumbura. 
 With opposition parties negotiating directly with the RPF, the Rwandan 
government came back to the negotiating table and signed a new cease-fire 
agreement with the RPF on March 7, to be implemented on March 15, 1992.  The 
agreement called for the removal of French troops and for a neutral international 
peacekeeping force to be deployed by the United Nations.  Two days after the 
agreement was signed, the radical CDR party accused President Habyarimana of 
committing ‘high treason’ against the country for signing the agreement and called 
for the population to form a civil defense force to protect the country.40  By the 
end of the month, interim Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye sent a letter to 
the Minister of Defense, protesting the government’s recent practice of 
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distributing weapons to the general population, which had been happening quietly 
in several regions of the country. 
April-October 1993 
 In early April, the new government continued to appoint new local 
officials, burgomasters to manage communes throughout the country.  Almost all 
of the newly appointed officials hailed from the MRND and MDR parties. 
Between April 19 and 22, two bombs exploded in Butare and Kigali (the two 
largest urban centers in the country), wounding 20 and 15 people respectively.  
By early May, Mathieu Mgirumpatse had been chosen as the new president of 
the MRND, as President Habyarimana had resigned from the position in March as 
required by the new constitution instituting multipartyism.  Within five days, the 
Gikongo leader of the MDR, Emmanuel Gapyisi and Kayibanda’s son-in-law 
were assassinated.  Both had been working to unite opponents of both the RPF 
and President Habyarimana. 41 
 On June 9, the RPF and Rwandan government representatives signed an 
agreement at Arusha concerning the return of refugees and internally displaced 
persons.  Two days later, a joint delegation of the RPF and Rwandan government 
requested that the Secretary General of the United Nations send a neutral 
international force to Rwanda to implement the peace agreement.  Two weeks 
later, the Security Council approved a small international force to monitor the 
border between Uganda and Rwanda. 42 
  19 
 In early July, the opposition party leaders in Rwanda rejected a proposal 
by MDR leaders to reappoint Dismas Nsengiyaremye as Prime Minister.  The 
MDR, as the largest opposition party, held the Prime Minister position under the 
agreement made when the new government was formed.  Instead, the opposition 
parties lobbied for Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a moderate MDR member who had 
recently abolished the controversial quota policy in the education system.  
President Habyarimana appointed Agathe Uwilingiyimana; the MDR party then 
revoked her membership in retaliation.43  In response, the MDR sent a letter to 
President Habyarimana nominating Jean Kambanda as the future Prime Minister, 
to take office as outlined in the Arusha Accords when the broad-based transitional 
government (BBTG) was instituted. Unbeknownst to the MDR party, the former 
president of MDR, Faustin Twagiramungu, had previously informed President 
Habyarimana that he would assume the position of Prime Minister.  The MDR 
revoked his membership along with Agathe Uwilingiyimana’s.44 
On August 4, the RPF and Rwandan Foreign Affairs Minister Athanase 
Gasana signed the final Arusha Accords, including the planned integration of the 
armed forces, the establishment of the BBTG, shared representation among the 
ministries, and the appointment of Faustin Twagiramungu as the BBTG Prime 
Minister. By mid-September, the United Nations had not taken action, so the 
RPF and moderate Rwandan officials appeared at the United Nations in New 
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York and demanded a neutral international peacekeeping force be formed and 
rapidly deployed.   
Three weeks later, in early October 1993, the Security Council approved 
resolution 872 to create UNAMIR, a peacekeeping force of just over 4,000 
personnel to be deployed to Rwanda to ensure implementation of the Arusha 
Accords.45 On October 18, the CDR held a rally in Kigali to protest the Arusha 
Accords.  Three days later, the president of Burundi, a Hutu, was assassinated by 
Tutsi military officers. Melchior Ndadaye was the first Hutu elected to President 
in Burundi’s history, and his assassination prompted roughly 300,000 Burundians 
to flee to Rwanda.  On October 23, two days after the Burundi assassination, the 
MDR-Power wing of the party held a march and demonstration in support of the 
Burundian Hutu. Froduald Karamira, a leader of the Power wing of the MDR, 
declared at the rally that the “Hutu must unite against the danger presented by the 
anti-democratic Tutsi.”46 
November 1993 – January 1994 
 On November 1, the first UNAMIR troops are deployed to Rwanda.  
Within days, the MDR – Power wing demonstrated again in Kigali against the 
Arusha Accords and the presence of Belgian troops.  On November 17, forty 
people were killed in the Nkumba, Kidaho, Cyeru, and Nyamugali communes 
northeast of Ruhengeri. Lt. General Romèo Dallaire, UNAMIR commander, 
believed that the parachute commandos quartered at the Bigogwe camp committed 
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the murders, though no one was ever held responsible for the massacres.47  Five 
days later, President Habyarimana presided at a meeting at the Hotel Rebero in 
Kigali, where grenades, machetes, rifles, and other weapons are distributed to the 
Interahamwe and the CDR youth militia.48  On November 27, Monseigneur 
Phocas Nikwigize, Catholic Bishop of Ruhengeri, declared to President 
Habyarimana that “God would not accept that the minority rule the majority.” In 
the same meeting, Colonel Bagosora declared in a speech, “We cannot have peace 
in the country with a large number of Tutsis in the country. We must get rid of 
them, we must exterminate them.”49 Two days after Bagosora’s speech, twelve 
people were murdered in the Mutura commune of Gisenyi.50  
 During the first week of December, just a month into UNAMIR’s mission 
in Rwanda, moderate FAR officers met with Lt. General Dallaire and disclosed the 
‘Machiavellian plan’ of President Habyiramana, created by military officials from 
the north who shared the akazu’s51 extremist Hutu ideology.  The plan was to 
stop implementation of the Arusha Accords by provoking the RPF to resume 
fighting. They planned to provoke the RPF by massacring Tutsis, moderate Hutus 
who negotiated the peace agreement, and the future Prime Minister 
Twagiramungu.52 
 In early January, the Rwandan army began distributing weapons to Hutus 
in villages throughout the northwestern part of the country (where many 
massacres had occurred over the past several years).  On January 11, Dallaire sent 
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the infamous cable to New York, telling the United Nations that a former 
Interahamwe leader, ‘Jean-Pierre’ had warned of a plan for the systematic 
massacre of Rwandan Tutsi, and political opponents to Hutu Power extremists 
and the Habyarimana government. The informant disclosed that the militias 
formed by political parties over the past year were prepared to implement the 
massacres.53  On January 16, the MRND party held a meeting at the Nyamirambo 
Stadium in Kigali and distributed weapons to many of the nearly 5,000 people in 
attendance. Hutu Power factions of the MDR and PL also participated in the 
meeting.54  Three days later, interim Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyamana sent 
a letter to the MRND accusing Augustin Bizimana, Minister of Defense, of 
distributing arms to the population.  She received no response.55 
February – April 1994 
 On February 17, President Habyarimana met with a number of military 
officers. Several of them reported that they believed there would be a violation of 
the cease-fire agreement and that the war would resume.  The President 
responded, “if the RPF starts the war, we have plans to deal with their 
accomplices.”56 Between February 22 and 26, the Interahamwe assassinated 
seventy people in Kigali and destroyed Tutsi homes during accompanying riots.  
During the assassinations, Robert Kajuga, one of the leaders of the Interahamwe, 
gathered the leaders of the Interahamwe and ordered them to create lists of Tutsis 
and to begin cooperating with the CDR and MDR militia wings.  The day after the 
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assassinations end, government leaders gathered at the Hotel Rebero in Kigali and 
agreed to raise money to help the Interahamwe create a force capable of 
eliminating the Tutsi. Several days later, Major Stanislas Kinyoni convened all the 
heads of the army brigades throughout the country and instructed them to create 
lists of persons suspected to be accomplices of the RPF. 57 
 In mid-March, Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiymana announced the 
names of the deputy ministers for the transitional National Assembly, and the 
Prime Minister-designate Faustin Twagiramungu announces the names of the 
BBTG, to be sworn in on March 25.  However, the swearing-in ceremony was 
postponed due to the RPF’s non-attendance.  They had been warned of an 
ambush and chose not to travel to the ceremony.  Meanwhile, the extremist 
elements of the government continued to prepare for increased massacres.  On 
March 29, Deogratias Nsabimana, chief of staff for FAR, held a meeting to 
prepare and organize the elimination of Tutsi infiltrators and Hutu traitors within 
the country.  The following day, Tharcisse Renzaho, the prefect of Kigali, sent a 
memo to Nsabimana, listing the reservists and others whom he recruited to form 
the self-defense team in Kigali and the surrounding area.58 
 On April 4, Colonel Thëoneste Bagosora attended a reception organized 
by UNAMIR to celebrate the Senegalese national holiday (a number of the 
UNAMIR soldiers hailed from Senegal).  At the reception, in the presence of 
UNAMIR commander Romèo Dallaire and UN Special Representative Jacques-
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Roger Booh Booh, Bagosora stated that ‘the only plausible solution for Rwanda 
would be the extermination of the Tutsi.’59  Two days later, President 
Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on his return to Kigali.  Bagosora took 
control of the military shortly thereafter, and the genocide began within hours.  
Hutu extremists were ready for the ‘apocalypse’ promised earlier by Bagosora, as 
the government had spent three and half years purchasing and stockpiling 
weapons. 
Arms Deals, 1990 - 1994 
 After the October 1 incursion by the RPF, the Rwandan government began 
aggressively pursuing the purchase of arms from friendly countries.  While the 
government had begun talking to Egypt as early as August 1990, it wasn’t until 
after the surprising RPF advance in early October that acquisition of arms began in 
earnest.  France provided military weapons to Rwanda after the 1990 incursion by 
the RPF in the northwestern part of the country.60 Additional arms deals between 
Rwanda and the South African government occurred between the fall of 1990 and 
spring of 1991 with a large deal brokered in October 1992.  The government also 
purchased small arms and weapons from the Chinese government, and Rwandan 
businesses, exempt from import taxes and licensing requirements, imported 
traditional tools such as machetes, hoes, axes, and hammers in shockingly large 
quantities.61  These tools, particularly cheap machetes made in China, became a 
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visual symbol of the Rwandan genocide due to their widespread use throughout 
the country. 
From October 1990 through the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan government 
diverted millions of dollars provided to the country for aid into arms purchases, 
focusing on small artillery like rifles and grenades, supplemented by large 
purchases of traditional weapons such as machetes, hoes, and the like.62  Rwanda 
had recently been granted $216 million in international aid from western allies like 
the US, Germany, France, and Belgium.  While the funds were intended to fund 
Rwanda’s involvement in the Structural Adjustment Program (administered by the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), Rwanda instead diverted some 
of the funds for arms contracts.63 Over the course of three years, Rwanda spent 
$112 million on arms, not including the traditional weapons imported by the 
government and Rwandan businesses.64  The UN reported that 85 tons of 
weapons and munitions had been distributed in Rwanda prior to and during the 
genocide.65  These numbers become even more significant when compared to 
Rwanda’s history of arms spending – a mere $5 million between 1981 and 1988.66 
Arms Deals with Egypt 
As the fighting ebbed in mid-October 1990, the Rwandan government 
entered into its first of a number of arms contracts with the Egyptian government, 
eventually purchasing millions of dollars worth of mostly small arms.67  On 
October 16, the Rwandan ambassador to Egypt met with Boutros-Boutros Ghali, 
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who at the time served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Egypt. Ghali helped 
to secure the first arms deal with Egypt.68 This purchase included over 4,000 
rifles, 18,000 bombs, 60,000 grenades, millions of cartridges of ammunition, 1,600 
rockets, and more.69  The contract was for $6 million.70  The Egyptian government 
included two field ambulances in the deal, without charge. 
 At the end of December 1990, the Rwandan government ordered $3.5 
million worth of arms from Egypt, including over one million cartridges of 
ammunition, 15,000 mortar bombs, and 12,000 bombshells.71  The government 
spent $9.5 million in weapons contracts with Egypt in just three months.  By 
April 1991, that amount was up to $10.86 million.  In August 1991, another 
contract was made for 5,000 bombs and half a million cartridges of ammunition.72 
In November 1991, another order was placed for 5,000 grenades, 12,000 bombs, 
and additional cartridges.73 
As a result of the negotiations undertaken by President Habyiramana in 
February 1992, when he traveled to Egypt to personally request additional 
military support in the form of weaponry, the Republic of Rwanda signed a 
contract with Egypt for six million dollars worth of shipments of 450 
Kalashnikovs, 2,000 rockets, three million cartridges of ammunition, and other 
arms at the end of March 1992.74   In June 1992, another contract for $1.3 million 
was signed to pay for ‘technical military equipment,’ including 1,400,000 
cartridges and 22,000 bombshells.75  In July, a supplemental order was placed for 
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over 500,000 cartridges and 900 rocket propelled grenades.76  That November, 
another deal was made to provide Rwanda with 250 rifles and 25,000 cartridges of 
ammunition.77 
Negotiations began again in February 1993, when the Rwandan 
government purchased 3,000 automatic rifles for $750,000, and payed down a 
part of the March 1992 $6 million deal.78  Another deal made around the same 
time included 8,000 bombs, 1,000 bombshells, 1.6 million cartridges of 
ammunition, 10,000 grenades and 10,000 land mines.79  This contract cost the 
Rwandan government $2.6 million.  The next deal, made in November 1993, 
included materials to repair weapons and military vehicles.  The last recorded 
contract formed prior to the start of the genocide was in February 1994, when 
Egypt sold $1 million worth of cartridges and mortar bombs to Rwanda.80 
Arms Deals with France, South Africa, China and private corporations 
 In January 1994, just months before the start of the genocide, Human 
Rights Watch published a report on the rapid spike in arms imports in Rwanda 
since October 1990.  The report detailed Rwandan government purchases of arms 
from the French government, beginning just after the October 1990 incursion. An 
early contract included artillery guns and mortars, and replacement parts to 
French-made armored vehicles carrying machine guns and cannons.  The French 
also assumed responsibility for maintaining Rwandan-owned, French-made 
helicopters and armored personnel carriers for the Rwandan Armed Forces.81 
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In May of 1993, James Gasana, Minister of Defense, signed an arms 
contract worth $12.2 million with Dominique Lemonnier, company manager for 
DYL-INVEST in France.82  This private contract followed the government-to-
government purchases between Rwanda and France that occurred in 1992 and 
early 1993. 
On October 19, 1992, the Rwandan Ministry of Defense purchased $5.9 
million worth of arms from South Africa, including 20,000 rifles, 20,000 hand 
grenades, over a million cartridges of ammunition, machine guns, 20,000 grenades, 
and one hundred mortar bombs.83  At the time, South Africa was an apartheid 
country and was prohibited from exporting arms via the United Nations Security 
Council. 
The Rwandan government paid the Chinese government $1 million for 
machine guns, mortars, grenades, and rocket launchers.  Additionally, prominent 
Rwandan businessman Fëlicien Kabuga imported several tens of thousands of 
machetes, hoes, razors, and pickaxes into Rwanda through a contract with Oriental 
Machinery in China.84  Because Rwanda had recently relaxed its import licensing 
system (due to World Bank and IMF requirements), Rwandan businessmen could 
easily and cheaply import goods without purchasing costly import licenses, and 
were able to import traditional tools without much outside scrutiny.  Given the 
plethora of machetes utilized during the genocide (there were enough new 
machetes for one of every three adult males in the country to have received one), 
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this importation scheme was used fairly frequently.  And at rock bottom prices, 
costing about one dollar per machete, a reasonable sum could finance a very large 
stock of a tool used by farmers and their families throughout the countryside. 
After the genocide, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
funded an investigation into the pre-genocidal regime’s finances at the request of 
the new Rwandan President.  The investigators determined that, in 1993, $4.6 
million had been spent by the Rwandan government on agricultural tools such as 
machetes, hoes, axes, and hammers.  Nearly 600,000 machetes were imported into 
Rwanda from China in one 1993 order, in addition to the large stocks of machetes 
and traditional tools imported in 1992. 85 
Conclusion 
 In late 1990, the Rwandan government was struggling to protect its power 
structure under international political pressure to liberalize its political system and 
create a plan for the return of potentially millions of Rwandan Tutsis living 
abroad.  Pressure was increasing, and President Habyarimana found himself 
acquiescing to political demands that would unavoidably reduce his and the 
akazu’s hold on power.  The RPF, which had been organizing a military offensive 
in earnest since Rwandan’s fortunes in Uganda had soured significantly in recent 
years, took advantage of the opportune convergence of political uncertainty and 
invaded northern Rwanda.  From that date onward, the Rwandan government 
reverted to tactics and strategies used in the 1960s and 1970s – targeted massacres 
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and reprisals against innocent Tutsis and Hutu moderates living inside Rwanda 
and the inscription of local Rwandan civilians into a make-shift civilian self-
defense force.  However, the government added a new component not utilized 
during past disturbances – the redirection of internationally provided relief and 
structural adjustment funds for the purchase of weapons and traditional arms for 
warfare.  Over the course of just three years, the Rwandan government effectively 
‘practiced’ the genocide via targeted pogroms with no repercussions or 
accountability, all the while building a larger militia base via civilian recruitment 
and training, and arming the military, militias, and civilian forces in preparation for 
a larger war and mass murder. 
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Chapter 2 
RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND PROPAGANDA 
On December 4, 1991, President Habyarimana held a meeting of officers from the 
gendarmerie and the military.  Over 100 officers were present, and it was reported 
at the meeting that the President seemed at a loss in terms of leadership and 
direction for the country in response to the growing RPF threat.  There was 
widespread division amongst officers about the appropriate response to the RPF; 
hard-liners wanted a military solution, while moderates sought a political solution.  
Eventually, a military commission was created and the commission was tasked 
with creating policy to defeat the RPF “in the military, media, and political 
domains.”86  The following September, the commission made its report to 
President Habyarimana, including a memorandum written by Colonel Dëogratias 
Nsabimana outlining ‘the enemy.’  The memorandum ordered that recipients 
circulate its contents widely, “especially on the sections relating to the definition 
of the enemy, identification of the enemy, as well as the groups within which the 
enemy is recruited.”  The memo further instructed local leaders to inform the 
Colonel of the “impact made by the contents of this document on the men under 
your orders.”87  The Colonel then goes on in the memorandum to define the 
enemy.  The principal enemy is “the Tutsi inside or outside the country, extremist 
and nostalgic for power, who have NEVER recognized and will NEVER recognize 
the realities of the 1959 social revolution and who wish to reconquer power by all 
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means necessary, including arms.” It alleged that the enemy was being recruited 
among Tutsi refugees, Tutsi inside the country, foreigners married to Tutsi wives, 
among others. The memo noted that the enemy “predominated in business 
circles.” (Tutsis were largely banned from political and government positions, and 
had been largely excluded from the Catholic church’s leadership positions, so 
many had turned to private industry since the mid-1960s.)  However, the memo 
also warned that the enemy had ‘infiltrated’ government through the lure of 
lucrative business deals.  The memo used the term ‘Tutsi’ in the place of ‘enemy’ 
several times throughout the document, and made no effort to clarify that the RPF 
or the Tutsi public were two separate entities.  The government had begun to 
intensify its strategy of defeating the RPF in the media domain; it did so in part 
by equating all Tutsi and Hutu opponents of the Habyarimana regime with the 
RPF or ‘the enemy.’ 
 This strategy had already begun to be utilized in a local newspaper, 
Kangura, had been tested once on the state radio, Radio Rwanda, and quickly 
became standard operating procedure in the newly-created RTLM following the 
government’s directive in this memorandum.  
Radio Rwanda 
 Until June 1991, Rwanda functioned as a one-party state.  Under intense 
international pressure, President Habyarimana opened the state to multi-partyism 
by legalizing the formation of multiple political parties and abolishing the law he 
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had established in 1976 that automatically enrolled all Rwandans, at birth, in the 
MRND political party, formed and headed by the President.88  With the advent of 
multi-partyism in Rwanda, also came increased freedom of the press.  Prior to 
June 1991, Radio Rwanda, the state-owned radio station, was virtually the only 
medium for Rwandans to access information about government activity and local 
community news.  As such, it was largely used as a propaganda tool for President 
Habyarimana and the MRND. 
 On March 3, 1992, Radio Rwanda broadcast a warning, supposedly sent 
from a human rights group based in Nairobi, Kenya, that Tutsi in Bugesera were 
planning to attack local Hutus.  The communiqué was manufactured; no attack 
was planned.  However, local authorities used the communiqué as a tool to 
organize Hutu residents in striking a pre-emptive attack on local Tutsi in the area, 
killing hundreds of local Tutsis.  This attack marked the first time media had been 
used as a direct tool for soldiers, the Interahamwe, and local residents to organize 
and carry out mass murder of innocents.89  While internationals cried foul, 
eventually resulting in an international investigation,90 there were never any arrests 
or accountability for the government officials or local residents who carried out the 
massacre, or for Radio Rwanda for broadcasting false, inflammatory information. 
 After the installation of the multi-party coalition government in April 
1992 (a concession made by President Habyarimana and the MRND to continuing 
pressure from internationals to modernize and liberalize the country’s politics), 
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Radio Rwanda became less of the President’s mouthpiece.  The MRND stalwart 
running Radio Rwanda, Ferdinand Nahimana, was dismissed and replaced by a 
leader from one of the opposition parties.  No longer could Radio Rwanda be 
counted on to advance the hard-line political agenda of the MRND or Hutu 
extremists. 
RTLM 
 About the time that Radio Rwanda began to shift away from functioning 
as a tool of the President, the hard-liners worked to start a new, privately owned 
radio station.  As early as 1992, the planning for the creation of the station began.  
In April 1993, Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) was 
incorporated.  By August 1993, RTLM was broadcasting.91 
RTLM was envisioned by some Hutu government hard-liners as an 
integral part of a ‘self-defense’ plan to support the national army.  When Colonel 
Théoneste Bagosora outlined the self-defense theory and plan in 1993, he included 
the use of radio as a tool to engage the citizenry in turning against the ‘enemy,’ 
which he defined as including all Tutsis living inside and outside of Rwanda.  A 
notorious anti-Tutsi leader, he also suggested including Simon Bikindi, whose pro-
Hutu music extolled the virtues of Hutu patriotism and vilified Tutsis.92 
RTLM was constructed by Ferdinand Nahimana, the former head of Radio 
Rwanda, and Joseph Serugendo, a technician for Radio Rwanda.  The two men 
purchased equipment to create RTLM in Brussels, then returned to Kigali to set 
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up the transmitter and begin broadcasting. While RTLM was ostensibly privately 
owned, with shares purchased by President Habyarimana (the largest single 
investor in the corporation), MRND officials, prominent business leaders, high-
ranking government officials, and leaders from MRND and CRD political parties, 
it in reality was subsidized and supported by the government.93  From 8-11 am 
daily, RTLM broadcast from Radio Rwanda’s signal. In addition to Nahimana and 
Serugendo, announcer Noël Hitimana and editor-in-chief Gaspar Gahigi both came 
to RTLM from Radio Rwanda.  The radio station’s emergency source of power 
was said to come from the Presidential Residence, located across the street from 
RTLM’s headquarters.  In 1994, during the height of the genocide, RTLM 
actually broadcast from Radio Rwanda headquarters for some time after their 
station was bombed.  The government paid the salaries of RTLM broadcasters 
and employees during the genocide.94 
RTLM was designed to create a new style of radio in Rwanda; one less 
formal, and more connected to ordinary Rwandans.  The broadcasts were mostly 
in Kinyarwandan, with only one broadcast per day in French (by Belgian Georges 
Ruggiu).  RTLM interspersed news with popular music from Rwanda and 
neighboring countries.  During broadcasts, RTLM eschewed Radio Rwanda’s 
formal style of delivery, instead adopting a conversational, talk-show host style.  
The radio station encouraged listeners to call in to the show and report on local 
happenings, ask questions, and offer their opinions.  The show regularly held 
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contests to keep listeners engaged.  One contest included a quiz, with questions 
and answers corresponding to past issues of Kangura, the virulently anti-Tutsi 
publication (discussed below).  RTLM allowed callers to share information, local 
gossip, and news from their communes, and the station’s broadcasters never 
questioned the accuracy of claims professed on the station.  In this way, RTLM 
became a highly popular source of gossip and an easy way to pass on false 
information to the public. 
Kangura 
 Kangura (meaning ‘wake it up’) was financed by MRND officers and 
members, military personnel, and one of the government’s intelligence units.95 
Hassan Ngeze, the editor and owner of the magazine, began printing stories, 
headlines, and cartoons and pictures against the Tutsi in earnest following the 
October 1990 incursion by the RPF in northern Rwanda.  A northerner from 
Gisenyi himself and an advisor to the extremist political party DCR, Ngeze 
published anti-Tutsi propaganda with a vengeance.96  In what is perhaps 
Kangura’s most famous edition, its December1990 number six issue, Ngeze 
published the Hutu Ten Commandments.  The Hutu Ten Commandments were a 
virtual manifesto of Hutu Power.  The Commandments covered most of the anti-
Tutsi thematic messages of the day, from vilifying Tutsi women to admonishing 
Hutus to not engage in business with Tutsis, recommending that Tutsis not be 
allowed to serve in the military or armed forces, reminding Hutus of the 1959 
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Hutu revolution and Hutu ideology, and exhorting Hutus to ìstop having mercy on 
the Tutsi.î97 
 Kangura also utilized cartoons, photographs, and drawings to make 
political points, often depicting Tutsis as cockroaches, snakes, hyenas, or gorillas.  
One issue pictured a machete next to the first post-colonial president Kayibanda 
(and leader of the 1959 Hutu revolution), with a caption saying “what arms can be 
used to defeat the cockroaches once and for all?”98  Other images depicted the 
moderate interim Prime Minister in bed, as a prostitute, or Tutsis killing their 
Hutu neighbors. 
 Kangura sought to erase the passage of time from the emergence of Hutu 
Power in 1957 to the present time.  By hearkening back to the end of the colonial 
regime and the nascent start of the Hutu Revolution, the paper argued that 1990-
1994 Rwanda faced the same political struggles as it did in 1957-1961.  Its articles, 
editorials, and cartoons/photos focused on this thematic message throughout its 
four years of publication prior to and during the genocide.99 
Propaganda Theories 
 In the National University of Rwanda library in Butare lies a text by 
Parisian psychologist Roger Muchielli, entitled Psychologie de la Publicité et de la 
Propagande: Connaissance  de Problème, Applications Practiques.100  Published 
in 1972, the text is essentially a handbook that explains mass conditioning and the 
work required to create a mass movement.  It discusses how to create indignation 
  38 
amongst the public against the target, who becomes the scapegoat.  Second, the 
text teaches the propagandist technique called ‘accusations in a mirror’ – the 
technique of blaming a target population for the actions which one is preparing to 
do him/herself. Hutu extremists were attracted to Muchielli’s text and adopted 
these techniques in disseminating propaganda via RTLM, Kangura, and other 
media mediums in the two years preceding the genocide. 
 In an undated memo found in Butare after the genocide, the author 
instructs others in the methods culled from Muchielli, Lenin, and Goebbels. The 
memo, entitled “Note Relative: la Progagande d’Expansion et de Recrutement,”101 
first argues that propagandists must have two aims: (1) to win over the 
uncommitted, and (2) create divisions amongst the opposition. He supports 
utilizing lies, ridicule, exaggeration, and innuendo in messaging against the targeted 
scapegoat.  He argues that propaganda must convince the public that the 
opposition supports “war, death, slavery, repression, injustice, and sadistic 
cruelty.”102 
 Perhaps most importantly, the author of the memo proposes two methods 
later utilized by RTLM, Kangura, and other hard-line media outlets.  One 
technique, from Muchielli’s work, was the ‘accusation in the mirror’ technique.  In 
this technique, the propagandist accuses the scapegoat of engaging in the very 
activities that he and his allies intend to carry out.  “In this way, the party which 
is using terror will accuse the enemy of using terror.”103 The purpose of this 
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technique is to convince the public that they are under siege and therefore are 
justified in taking extreme actions to defend themselves.  This strategy was used in 
the Bugesera massacre in 1992 and in the months leading up to the genocide in 
RTLM and Kangura. 
 The other technique discussed in the memo is to create events that support 
the propagandist message.  For instance, media would tell Hutus in Rwanda that 
the enemy – RPF and Tutsi supporters – were planning to bomb an area, hiding 
weapons in urban areas to be used in warfare, etc.  There was no evidence to 
support any of these claims, but the repeated reporting of such fictional events 
served to support the propagandist message that the Hutu people of Rwanda 
were under constant threat from the RPF and Tutsis who sought to re-establish an 
elitist hierarchy in the country via civil war or invasion.104 
 While the propaganda memo is undated and unsigned, it is clear that the 
tactics outlined and promoted in this memo were utilized effectively throughout 
Rwanda, starting in 1990 with Kangura and continuing through the genocide on 
the airwaves of RTLM and in the pages of Kangura and other extremist 
newspapers.  An analysis of RTLM broadcasts and printed editions of Kangura 
show a pattern of propagandist messages intended to ‘prime’ the Hutu population 
for the resumption of civil war and ultimately to support the elimination of the 
Tutsi population within Rwanda.  As has been shown above, RTLM and 
Kangura, while nominally privately-owned, were actually controlled financially 
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by the President himself, members of his cabinet, high-ranking government and 
military officials, and wealthy business leaders closely connected with the 
President, the administration, and the akazu. 
Messages Utilized 
 Kangura often printed the most obvious anti-Tutsi propaganda.  Starting 
in December 1990, the Hutu Ten Commandments lumped all Tutsi together and 
posited them as a threat, like the rebel troops of the RPF, to the entire country of 
Rwanda.  For example, Commandment Nine included a phrase that “The Hutu 
must be firm and vigilant against their common Tutsi enemy.”105  While Kangura 
spoke in often quite direct terms, advocating for the complete subjugation and 
exclusion of Tutsis from political and social life in Rwanda, RTLM often used 
euphemisms and coded language, as was customary in Rwandan culture.  Anti-
Tutsi propaganda tended to coalesce around several major themes and messages, 
often utilized in tandem to set the stage for broad suspicion, jealousy, and outright 
hostility and hatred towards Tutsis by their Hutu countrymen. 
Tutsis seek to restore the old regime 
 Kangura focused on recalling the pre-colonial and colonial periods, when 
Tutsis reigned and Hutus were subjugated, abused, and excluded from 
participation in government, military, political, educational, and religious 
leadership positions.  Prior to the 1957 Bahutu Manifesto, authored and 
championed by President Kayibanda, and the resulting Hutu revolution, Hutus 
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had indeed been maligned and oppressed, largely via the machinations of the 
reigning colonial Belgians (see Chapter 3).  During the waning years of the colonial 
period, the Belgians shifted their support from the Tutsis to the majority Hutus, 
and ushered in democratic elections.  The elections resulted in a rapid and massive 
shift in the balance of power, with almost all elected positions going to Hutus in 
the 1960s elections.  Massacres of Tutsis quickly followed, with an exodus of 
Tutsis from the country over the next eleven years.106  Once in power, President 
Kayibanda firmly implemented anti-Tutsi policies, excluding Tutsis from the very 
power structures that Hutus had historically been denied.  During the four years 
leading up to the genocide, Rwandans were constantly reminded in Kangura of the 
hardship endured prior to the 1959 revolution, and the supposed Tutsi aim of 
restoring the Tutsi monarchy of years past.  By hearkening to history, Kangura 
effectively reframed current issues as a repeat of past conflicts, erasing all 
differences of status, wealth acquisition, diffusion of power, and economic 
prowess that had developed in the intervening 40 years. 
 For Hutus who had lived through the colonial period and the 1959 
revolution, the thought of Tutsis reclaiming the old regime and power structure 
was frightening.  Kangura effectively negated Rwanda’s current political economic 
reality in the minds of Rwandan Hutus by claiming that Tutsis, as they had in 
colonial times, controlled government, the economy, and educational access and 
that the RPF and Tutsi’s goal was to re-establish the complete control of these 
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institutions.  For a country in dire economic straits, with increasing levels of 
hunger, drought, poverty, and lack of access to education, the message was an 
easy one for Rwandans to buy. 
 In 1990, Radio Rwanda broadcast an interview with Professor Anaste 
Gasana, in which he reinforced the idea that Tutsis sought only to reinstate the 
historical feudal regime.  This broadcast was played shortly after the October 
1990 RPF incursion in the northern part of the country.  In the interview, 
Professor Gasana alleges 
In order to justify the attack they launched in Mutara, the enemies 
of Rwanda are in the habit of dramatizing the refugees’ living 
conditions abroad.  The actual reasons for the attack are not, 
however, the living conditions abroad.  The actual reasons are 
rather political, based on monarchic and feudal regime that certain 
Rwandan refugees want to have restored in Rwanda whereas the 
majority of the people have objected to that regime . . . the 
Rwandan refugees never acknowledge the 1959 revolution, the 
democracy installed on 28 January 1961 . . . the Rwandan 
government has established since 1960 a ministry in charge of 
refugees; it has urged them to return, but they have of their own 
volition chosen to betray Rwanda and attack it since that year up 
until 1967.107 
 
 In 1993, Kangura evoked the history of the Tutsi regime in an article 
entitled “A cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly.” In this article, Ngeze 
evokes the Tutsi rebels of the early 1960s and equates them with the RPF rebels 
of the early 1990s. The article states 
We began by saying that a cockroach cannot give birth to a 
butterfly.  It is true.  A cockroach gives birth to another cockroach . 
. . The history of the Rwanda shows us clearly that a Tutsi stays 
always exactly the same, that he has never changed.  The malice, 
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the evil are just as we knew them in the history of our country.  
We are not wrong in saying that a cockroach gives birth to another 
cockroach. Who could tell the difference between the inyenzi who 
attacked in October 1990 and those of the 1960s.  They are all 
linked . . . their evilness is the same.108 
 
 RTLM repeatedly played one infamous Simon Bikindi song, “Father of 
the Cultivators.”  In this song, Bikindi lauds the 1959 Hutu revolution, singing 
that it was “a heritage that should be carefully maintained . . . and transmitted to 
posterity” and that the “servitude, the whip, the lash, the forced work that 
exhausted the people, that has disappeared forever.  You, the great majority, pay 
attention, and . . . remember this evil that should be driven as far away as possible, 
so that it never returns to Rwanda.”109  This message clearly evokes the hardships 
endured by Hutus under the Tutsi monarchy and warns of it returning in the 
future.   Similarly, a Kangura editorial in a 1990 edition argued that  
the fact that the Batutsi are fighting to restore monarchy should 
incite a number of Bahutu to fight for democracy, to remember the 
roots of the 1959 revolution.  If they do not fully appreciate this 
fact, then the revolution loses its purpose.  And, as the majority 
people well know, the revolution was justified.  They will have to 
live with the consequences.110   
 
In the same paper, the editor claimed “Since the revolution of 1959, the Batutsi 
have not for one moment relinquished the notion of reconquering power in 
Rwanda, of exterminating intellectuals and of dominating Bahutu farmers.” 
In February 1994, RTLM spent significant time on the radio disparaging 
the Arusha Accords, and the power and stature that had been granted to the RPF 
in the agreement.  Kantano Habimana tells the listeners that the RPF rebels, who 
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call themselves Inkotanyi, (a historical term for fighters) are also inyenzi, (which 
means cockroaches) and that they are seeking to take power from the Hutus and 
will ‘completely ignore’ the Hutus.111 
 On April 1, just several days prior to the start of the genocide, Noël 
Hitimana from RTLM read a letter from a Hutu on the air, who argued “that under 
no circumstances shall we allow our country to be ruled by the Inkotanyi, who 
unjustifiably massacred the majority and now want to come back and rule the 
country.”112 
During the course of the genocide, this history was repeated over and over.  
In late May, a Hutu doctor was interviewed on state radio, Radio Rwanda.  He 
stated 
in reality, Rwanda, before it became what it is today, the majority 
of the population had lived through dictatorship and monarchy. 
For a long time, feudal leaders mistreated and oppressed people; 
they were at a loss as to what to do.  Gradually, thanks to the then 
leadership, this stopped, as [the] feudal regime came to an end 
when the shared system was put in place. However, the monarchy 
continued to oppress people. The children of oppressed people 
subsequently got the opportunity to go to school and learn world 
history.  They thus found out what goes on elsewhere and decided 
to fight for human freedom.113 
 
 These stories of Rwandan history and historic Tutsi rule were designed to 
remind the public of the past and fear the return of Tutsis to Rwanda.  The stories 
served to perpetuate a myth that the Tutsis sought to re-establish the feudal 
regime and the monarchy. 
Tutsis are foreigners and do not belong in Rwanda 
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Part of the mythology espoused by the Hutu extremists from 1979 
through the 1994 genocide was built on the so-called Hamitic theory created by 
Belgian colonizers in 1933-1934 when they conducted a census, instituted the 
identity card system and transformed the cultural and occupational designations of 
Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa into ethnic and racial designations.  The Belgians ascribed to 
John Hanning Speke’s theory of the African man – namely that the taller, sharper-
featured Africans were the harbingers of culture and civilization, descending from 
Ethiopia’s King David.  Speke’s ‘race science’ posited that these Africans were 
superior in intellect, worth, and inherent ability than the ‘native’ Negroids.  Upon 
Belgium’s ‘acquisition’ of Rwanda, the people of Rwanda were subjected to 
Speke’s race science, and heads, noses, and heights were measured to determine 
who the ‘nobler’ race was.  As such, the Belgians argued that the Tutsis had 
migrated to Rwanda from Ethiopia and were a foreign, superior race to the 
Hutus.114  This history was appropriated by Hutu elites during the 1957-1959 
uprising; rather than seeking to dismantle the colonists’ narrative about Rwanda’s 
history and the people of the country, Hutu extremists adopted the narrative and 
used it as a tool to discriminate against and justify massacres of Tutsis.  
Throughout the four years leading up to the genocide, speeches from the late 1950 
through the 1970s were recycled, reminding Rwandans about this version of 
history.  Contemporary political speakers also evoked the Hamitic theory in 
painting Tutsis as foreigners who didn’t belong in Rwanda. 
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For example, Rwanda is connected to Ethiopia via the Nyabarongo River; 
comments about Tutsi and the River hearkened back to the notion that Tutsis 
were foreigners in Rwanda, hailing from other places outside the country.  As 
such, two years prior to the genocide, Léon Mugesera applied the ‘river’ 
statement to the Tutsis when he gave his infamous speech, saying “I am telling 
you (Tutsis) that your home is in Ethiopia, that we are going to send you back 
there quickly, by the Nyabarongo River.”115 
In 1990, Radio Rwanda conducted an interview with Professor Anastase 
Gasana, in which he argued that the RPF incursion that occurred in October 1990 
wasn’t led by Rwandan refugees living in Uganda, but indeed by Ugandans. 
Throughout the interview, he seeks to de-Rwandize the Tutsi rebels attempting to 
regain access and participation in Rwanda through military action. 
If we go deeply into these issues, we will realize that Rwanda was 
attacked in reality by Uganda because the enemies who attacked it 
are members of the Ugandan army who receive their monthly 
salary from the Ugandan government, wear Ugandan army 
uniforms, use Uganda’s equipment like weapons, vehicles, and 
others, and are supplied weapons and provisions by the same 
country.  . . . Considering the fact that they belong to the Ugandan 
army, we may wonder if they are Rwandans.  We know that you 
first have to be a citizen of a country before you can join the army; 
I wonder, therefore, if the people who constitute, within the 
Ugandan national army, the group called Inkotanyi are still 
Rwandans if they belong to the Ugandan army.116 
 
As early as February 1994, RTLM commentators referred to Tutsis as 
“com[ing] from the outside” to take power in Rwanda.117  Within days of the start 
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of the genocide, RTLM continued the attack against the Tutsi as being foreigners 
from Uganda.  In particular, commentator Kantano Habimana said 
they are wrong to believe that people who in the country will be 
chased by people from other countries such as Uganda.  We can 
never accept that a young man of 20, 23 years who has never been 
in Rwanda, comes with a gun to take what Rwandans have 
achieved.  And never shall we accept that someone who has spent 
40 years abroad, comes running to take our assets.118   
 
Later, as the genocide wore on and the RPF came closer to seizing Kigali, the 
claims of their foreign heritage included references to the 1959 revolution.  In late 
May, RTLM commentators argued that there is no country for the Tutsi, as they 
left in 1959 and do not belong in Rwanda.119 
Towards the end of the genocide, RTLM commentators continued their 
discussion of Tutsis’ foreign origins, stating that “no foreigners will ever rule 
Rwanda,” that no true Rwandese have ever been excluded from participating in 
Rwandan government, and that no proof exists that the RPF or rebel fighters are 
Rwandan.120  
Tutsis control money and power in Rwanda 
Although the 1959 Hutu Revolution and legal mandates instituted by 
Kayibanda and Habyarimana blocked Tutsi participation in most government, 
political, military, and educational institutions, the Hutu extremists continued to 
tell the stereotyped story of Tutsi elitism, where Tutsis controlled all branches of 
government, civil service, education, the military, and economic life in Rwanda.  
While laws mandated that no more than 10% of public positions be granted to 
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Tutsis (including access to higher education), Kangura and RTLM continued to 
convince ordinary Hutus that Tutsis had sucked up all the prime positions of 
power in the country, encouraging envy and resentment amongst rural and 
impoverished Hutus.  In 1991, Kangura printed an editorial in which it claimed 
that the Tutsi had taken over all these aspects of Rwandan life and community. 
The Batutsi comprise 50 per cent of government officials, 70 per 
cent of private business employees, 90 per cent of staff in 
embassies and international organizations, and they hold prominent 
positions everywhere. However, this ethnic group comprises 10 
per cent of the population. National wealth, trade and industry are 
in the hands of the Batutsi, who often use civil and military 
authorities as cover-up. It is to the Batutsi that banks award 
substantial loans, it is them who benefit from considerable tax 
exemptions, import and export licenses, etc.121 
  
Kangura also argued that Tutsis had a monopoly in educational 
institutions in Rwanda, despite the 10% law that existed to prevent Tutsis from 
fully participating in secondary or higher education in the country. In a 1992 
edition, the editor argues: 
 Supposing that statistics relative to teaching at all levels of 
secondary and superior education were carefully recorded, one 
would unfortunately be surprised to recognize that the Tutsi is 
omnipresent.  Those who are in establishments of higher education 
well know the actual situation.  Ethnic proportions are unequal and 
crystal-clear. In public and private affairs, power is undoubtedly 
secured.  The minority managed to seduce Rwandan society and it 
is now clustered around its core.  Some areas have become Tutsi 
strongholds, namely the Rwandan clergy.122 
 
In another 1992 issue, the paper claims again that 
regarding completed education, the minority remains in the lead. . . 
Through their cold and calculated expansion, the Tutsi managed to 
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so condition the Second Republic (Habyarimana’s regime) that 
policies now privatized foreign student scholarships.  It is obvious 
that it was not privatization of scholarships per se, but rather the 
unprecedented and official award of scholarships to the 
minority.123 
 
 Even when statistics and records refuted Kangura’s claims, the magazine 
had an answer: Tutsis were falsifying their identity cards to appear to be Hutus in 
order to gain access to prominent positions.  In 1991, the paper claimed 
Due to the practice of identity falsification, the policy aiming for 
ethnic balance has failed.  This explains why the Tutsi – those who 
kept their identity and those who modified it – now make up 80 
per cent of staff in our schools.  But who would be surprised by 
this? Those who should implement this policy are themselves 
Tutsi, pretending they are Hutu.124 
 
Hutus must be unified and stand in solidarity 
 In June 1991, President Habyarimana was forced to accept a multi-party 
system in Rwanda, thanks to a constitutional amendment that had been pressed 
by a national commission of reform formed at the urging of international 
supporters.  Over the next year, a plethora of political parties had formed, 
including the CDR (the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic - even more 
extremist than the President’s MRND party), the MDR (Democratic Republican 
Movement - chief threat to the ruling MRND party), and a number of more 
moderate parties: the PL (Liberal Party), PSD (Social Democratic Party), and the 
PDC (Democratic Christian Party).  After the formation of political parties, 
President Habyarimana was forced to accept minority parties into the leadership 
of the interim government in April 1992, which increased factions and weakened 
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his and the akazu’s power grip over the country.  To combat this potential 
weakening of political and military power against the RPF and Tutsi minority, the 
government and its agents began intensifying propaganda messages that stressed 
Hutu solidarity and unity against the external enemy, the Tutsi.   
 Kangura often referred to the importance of remaining unified as a Hutu 
majority, exhorting the public that “your unity, your mutual understanding, your 
solidarity are the certain weapons of your victory,” and “you understand that 
when the majority people is divided, the minority becomes the majority.”125  The 
Hutu Ten Commandments, published in December 1990 in Kangura, evoke the 
need for Hutu solidarity by instructing Hutus not to marry Tutsi women, hire 
them as secretaries, not to engage in business deals with Tutsis, to exclude Tutsis 
from schools and military service, and more.  One Kangura excerpt stated flatly 
“the war is between the Tutsis and the Hutus and the only solution is public 
awakening.”126  Finally, Léon Mugesera’s famous 1992 speech included allegations 
that members of rival political parties were traitors for engaging in the peace 
process, negotiating with the RPF, and not supporting the MRND leadership 
structure.127 
Hutus will be exterminated by the Tutsis 
 Kangura continually argued in its pages that the Tutsi sought to eliminate 
the Hutu population and regain control of the country and region.  In its 1990 
edition, one editorial said 
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Remember also, at the beginning of November 1959, the Batutsi 
provoked inter-ethnic massacres in trying to eliminate the Hutu 
elite who were calling for democracy and social justice for the 
benefit of the Bahutu masses, until then crushed under the feudal 
and minority power of the Batutsi . . . Since the revolution of 1959, 
the Batutsi have not for one minute relinquished the notion of 
reconquering power in Rwanda, of exterminating intellectuals and 
of dominating Bahutu farmers . . . The war declared against Rwanda 
in October 1990 is undoubtedly aimed at achieving what the 
Batutsi had attempted to accomplish through guerilla warfare and 
terrorism, from 1962 to 1967, harassing the Hutu population 
through nocturnal Inyenzi (cockroaches) attacks.128 
  
In 1993, an argument was made that “we know that they have attacked us 
with the intention of massacring and exterminating 4.5 million Hutu and especially 
those who have gone to school.”129  Propagandists sought to instill fear in Hutus 
by claiming that, unless they killed the Tutsis, all Tutsis would seek to kill them.  
The 1992 Radio Rwanda missive in Bugesera provides an excellent example – by 
claiming that Tutsi rebels planned an attack in the region, local officials were able 
to rally Hutus together to kill their innocent Tutsi neighbors in a pre-emptive 
move. In the midst of the genocide, RTLM commentators claimed that the RPF 
was killing everyone they met in Rwanda, except Tutsis.130   
Radio Rwanda, having changed hands from opposition control to 
government control during the genocide, became a ‘sister’ organization to RTLM 
and often joined in the hate speech and rhetoric found on RTLM.  In April 1994, 
during the second week of the genocide, Radio Rwanda broadcast a live debate 
between two political leaders.  One leader claimed that Tutsis returning to Rwanda 
from the diaspora would “exterminate, exterminate, exterminate, exterminate.” He 
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claimed the Tutsi would “exterminate you until they are the only ones left in the 
country so that they can keep for a thousand years the power that their fathers 
had kept for four hundred years. . . You must not let up in your efforts.”131  In 
early June 1994, near the end of the genocide, the RTLM claimed that the RPF are 
‘decimating’ the Hutu population and that local communities must step up and 
fight back.132  In these ways, the Hutu elite of Rwandan government effectively 
utilized the ‘accusation in a mirror’ strategy, convincing local Hutus that Tutsis 
were planning attacks against them, in order to incite those very attacks against 
Tutsis.   
 In early 1994, Frodouald Karuhije, a Hutu living in Gitarama, spent weeks 
digging large trenches on his land after having been told via RTLM and local 
leaders that the RPF were coming to massacre Hutus.  Once the genocide began, 
Karuhije recognized that the massacre was one of the government and local Hutus 
against the minority Tutsi, the exact opposite of what he had been warned would 
happen. Karuhije used his trenches to hide fourteen Tutsis from his neighborhood 
throughout the genocide.133 
 From fall 1991 to the time of the genocide, local propaganda newspapers 
reported that the Tutsi sought to “clean up Rwanda . . . by throwing Hutu in the 
Nyabarongo,” that RPF soldiers had reported to Hutu government officials that 
they had come to “clean the country of the filth of Hutu” and that the RPF had 
begin distributing arms to the youth wings of their political party supporters.134  
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Prior to the genocide, Léon Mugesera applied the ‘river’ statement to the Tutsis 
when he gave his infamous speech, saying “I am telling you (Tutsis) that your 
home is in Ethiopia, that we are going to send you back there quickly, by the 
Nyabarongo River.”135  During the genocide, the talk on the popular RTLM often 
included coded language for massacring Tutsis, including ‘cleaning the filth.’ 
Finally, the Hutu extremists provided military training for and distributed arms to 
the youth wings of the various parties, most famously the Interahamwe, the 
youth wing of the MRND.136   
Negative Imagery or Stereotypes of Tutsi 
In November 1993, RTLM commentator Noel Hitimana discussed the 
Arusha Accords and the mistake that he believes the government made when it 
signed the accords.  He claimed that when the inyenzi catch a Hutu member of the 
local government, “they skin him alive.”137 
Nearly four months before the genocide, RTLM broadcaster Kantano 
discussed the impending return of Tutsi soldiers to Rwanda as a result of the 
implementation of the Arusha Accords.  He claimed that the inkotanyi were 
“getting ready to come here.” Kantano said that the prior day, the Minister of 
Defense, Bizimana, had said 
get ready to live with inkotanyi soldiers in this town, Kigali. In 
reality, they are our brothers, but I don’t know whether those who 
have disemboweled women, hanged people, and killed with blunt 
hoes . . . for goodness’ sake, the inkotanyi should leave them in 
Uganda. They should pity us and demobilize them. Let only 
people of good behavior and morals come here, people with good 
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heart who have decided to live together with other people, but not 
with the aim of killing people with blunt hoes.138 
 
In the same broadcast, Kantano alleged that Hutus are poor and Tutsis are, 
and have always, been very wealthy.  He recalled the meeting of investors to set 
up the RTLM radio station, noting that there were more than one hundred people 
at the meeting to raise two million francs, but that setting up a Tutsi radio station 
would take only five Tutsis to raise one hundred million francs. 
Just days before the start of the genocide, a RTLM broadcast discussed 
recent murders of two high profile Rwandans.  The commentator alleged that the 
inkotanyi have murdered the men via disemboweling one man and severing the 
head of the other victim.139  Gahigi Gaspard, the broadcaster, also argued that the 
president of the PSD party, a Tutsi, was stealing the land of local Hutus and 
utilizing it for his own benefit. 
Less than a week after the start of the genocide, RTLM discusses the 
“fight against the cockroaches,” claiming that the RPF rebels started a war against 
the country and that the inkotanyi are using humans as shields to protect 
themselves during fighting.  They also claimed that Tutsis hide inside houses after 
killing the Hutus within the house via machete and that they are thieves. The 
commentator claims that the RPF burns Hutu homes and starve the homeowners 
inside the house.140 Later in the broadcast, the commentator discusses the Arusha 
Accords and discussions between the Hutu government and the RPF to implement 
the accords and stop the war.  The commentator alleges that the RPF will bring 
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with them ibizungerezi (Tutsi women whose beauty drives men crazy) to control 
the meeting. 
Before and during the genocide, extremist Hutus would remind the public 
of historic myths propagated by the Belgian colonialists about Tutsi superiority, 
sowing and nurturing discord and resentment among the public.  One common 
refrain was to remind Hutus that Tutsis believed they were intellectually superior 
and “were born only to rule.”141  Immediately after April 6 and throughout the 
genocide, RTLM broadcasters continued to allege, without evidence, that the RPF 
and Tutsis assassinated President Habyarimana by shooting down his plane in 
order to start the war again. 
Hutu extremists argued throughout the genocide that the RPF rebels 
recruited young children, particularly street children, to assist in the war.  One 
RTLM commentator said “it is indeed sad for the inkotanyi to drag twelve-year 
old kids to the frontline.”142 In the same broadcast, RTLM commentators 
compared RPF soldiers to stray dogs and pigs, because they hide in holes and 
bushes throughout Rwanda.   
The next day, an RTLM broadcaster claimed that Kagame had sought the 
advice of a soothsayer prior to attacking Rwanda in early April.  The 
commentator also claims that Kagame and his soldiers were “disemboweling the 
survivors, killing them, [and] cutting off their breasts and genitals.”143 
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In mid-May, during the height of the genocide, Radio Rwanda, the official 
government radio station, broadcast an interview with a ten-year old Hutu child 
from Kimironko.  The child and local residents had fled to Holy Family Church 
when the RPF arrived in the course of the civil war.  The interviewer asks the 
child about the RPF, whom he called inkotanyi.  The child tells this story 
the inkotanyi came to our home, got hold of a female neighbor, split 
her womb open, removed a fetus, put it in a mortar, pounded it, 
and told the woman to go look for spices to fry it with the 
intention of making her eat it.  She went to bring onions, but upon 
her return, when they tried to feed with the fetus, she instantly 
died. 
 
The child then describes the RPF soldiers by saying “they looked like tar. . . they 
were wearing overalls and boots . . . very dark complexion . . . they were very tall.  
And their eyes were red burning like charcoal. . . They are like animals.”144 
In late May, Gaspard Gahigi, a RTLM commentator, encouraged Hutus 
not to flee their homes from the approaching RPF soldiers, arguing that the Tutsi 
would loot and rob their homes if they left.145  During the same broadcast, RTLM 
alleges that RPF soldiers are raping women, and that some soldiers carry AIDS. 
In early June, RTLM commentator Valerie Bekeremi accuses RPF soldiers 
of raping small children, that they violate human rights generally, and that they are 
murdering unarmed Hutu citizens in the country.146  She also claims that all Tutsi 
in the country are cockroaches, accomplices of the RPF rebels and that they have 
‘decimated’ the Hutu population.  Later in the same month, she claims that they 
were “created to drink Rwandan blood and to kill.”147 
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Towards the end of the genocide, RTLM broadcaster Habimana Kantano 
stated that the Tutsis cannot manage the country after killing Hutus and pushing 
them out of their land. He said, “we know it, Tutsis are lazy. You do not know 
how to farm.”148 
Advocating violence towards the RPF and Tutsi 
Perhaps the first recorded instance in the 1990s of a Hutu government 
official equating Tutsi Rwandans with the RPF rebels was shortly after the 
October 1990 invasion by the RPF.  The Minister of Justice “declared that the 
Tutsi were ibyitso, or accomplices” of the RPF rebels.149 Later in the fall of 1992, 
Léon Mugesera, in a speech in Gisenyi, in northern Rwanda, said to MRND 
supporters gathered for a party meeting and rally, “know that the person whose 
throat you do not cut now will be the one who will cut yours.”150  And in 
Kangura edition 40, published in 1993, the editors recounted a story about 
interim Minister Twagiramungu differentiating between a deal signed with the 
RPF (self-named inkotanyi) and the negative slang term inyenzi (cockroach) in 
which the final line ends, “As you wish.  But in reality, is there a difference 
between the inkotanyi and the inyenzi?”151 
Seven months after the signing of the Arusha Accords, Ngeze published an 
editorial in Kangura claiming that 
Those who reject the Accords will take it out on those soldiers and 
will massacre them; they will throw grenades at them and they will 
die each day.  And it is after their departure that the blood will 
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really flow.  All the Tutsis and the cowardly Hutus will be 
exterminated.152 
 
In January 1994, Hassan Ngeze, editor of Kangura, published an editorial 
in which he stated 
We … say to the inyenzi that if they lift up their heads again, it will 
no longer be necessary to go to fight the enemy in the bush.  We 
will … start by eliminating the internal enemy … they will 
disappear … if they make the mistake of attacking again, there will 
be none of them left in Rwanda, not even a single accomplice.153 
 
In March 1994, Kangura published an article claiming that the RPF 
(whom Ngeze always referred to as inyenzi, had compiled a list of 1,600 people 
who opposed the RPF rebels and who would be killed during the Tutsi takeover 
of the country.  Ngeze claimed that the RPF called this document and plan ‘the 
Final Plan.’  The paper says “Moreover, the accomplices of the enemy are well 
known.  Therefore the inyenzi should have the courage to understand that they are 
making a slight error, they shall be exterminated.  They should realize that if they 
strike again, none of the accomplices will survive.”154 
Shortly after the start of the genocide, RTLM broadcasters advised 
listeners to ‘flush’ out their Tutsi neighbors from their hiding places.155  In the 
same broadcast, listeners are also instructed to find local Tutsis hiding in houses in 
the area and to carefully distinguish between Hutus and Tutsis.  Finally, the 
commentators urged Hutus in Kigali to detain people at roadblocks who do not 
have identity cards, since they are likely Tutsis. 
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One week into the genocide, RTLM noted that the government was 
recruiting young men and women into the army to fight against the inkotanyi 
“until we defeat them completely.”  The commentators noted that the RPF was 
headed towards Kigali to fight for the capitol – the response from the 
commentator was “let them come; we will finish them up; not one of them will 
survive. In any case Rwandans are waiting for them with their machetes and other 
kinds of arms available to them.”156 
Two weeks into the genocide, RTLM broadcasters called for the RPF to 
surrender or their supporters (Tutsis) in Rwanda would be exterminated.157  This 
of course, was what was already occurring throughout the country.  On May 28, 
Kantano Habimana, the most popular RTLM personality, said 
Wait until we get enough bullets to chase them away, they will 
regret what brought them here.  They said they will kill all Hutus 
but what can they use to decimate Hutus? One Tutsi may kill one 
Hutu, but in the end 6 million Hutus can survive, then what ethnic 
group would be injured the most?158 
 
In a RTLM broadcast towards the end of the genocide, in late May 1994, 
one commentator argued that all inyenzi must be killed and that loyal Rwandans 
should provide no exceptions, or accept bribes to keep Tutsis alive.159  Gaspard 
Gahigi exhorts local Hutus to stay in their communes and fight to kill RPF and 
Tutsi, saying that they will “present and give medals to people who, in each 
sector, cell, will have stayed in town.  We must continue fighting.”  Shortly 
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thereafter, Kantano Habimana accuses Tutsi soldiers of raping women and killing 
children, then says to the listeners 
If you are a cockroach you must be killed, you cannot change 
anything.  If you are Inkotanyi you cannot change anything.  No 
one can say that he has captured a cockroach and the latter give him 
money, as a price for his life, this cannot be accepted. If someone 
has a false identity card, if he is inkotanyi, a known accomplice of 
RPF don’t accept anything in exchange, he must be killed. 
 
This advice to the public followed a story Kantano told of an Interahamwe soldier 
who arrested a Tutsi merchant in the market who held a Hutu identity card.  The 
man admitted that his mother was Tutsi, so they planned to kill him.  Here, the 
Hutu extremists have demonstrated that they conflate all Tutsis or those with at 
least one Tutsi parent with the RPF and advocate killing all of them. (Historically, 
identification classification followed the father’s designation, not the mother’s.  
During the genocide, any person with a Tutsi mother or grandparent was in grave 
danger, regardless of the law regarding identity classification). 
And on June 4, 1994, RTLM commentator Kantano Habimana exhorted 
Hutus in Rwanda to “look at one person, at his height and physical features, look 
closely at his cute little nose and then break it.”160  He stated “the proof that we 
will exterminate them is that they represent only one ethnic group.” Coded 
references to the appearance of the Tutsi (considered by the Belgians to be taller, 
thinner, lighter skinned, with thin, small noses) were commonly used by media 
commentators in identifying the Tutsi ‘enemy.’   
Advocating the extermination of the Tutsis 
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 Prior to the start of the genocide, there was an attack on Justin Mugenzi’s 
life.  At the time Mugenzi was the president of the Liberal Party, a party largely 
aligned with the RPF and seen as a Tutsi party.  Mugenzi transformed from an 
ally of the RPF to a virulently anti-Tutsi activist during the course of the months 
leading up to the genocide. After the attempt on his life in January 1994, RTLM 
discussed the failed attack.  During the broadcast, the commentator Gahigi 
Gaspard read a statement by a Mugenzi ally in which he stated “we, all the 
Rwandans, have found out the truth.  We found out who the enemies of Rwanda 
are and we all undertake to revenge all the innocent victims. Learn from what 
happened in Burundi.”161 
In mid-May, Simon Bikindi, the famous songwriter and singer aligned with 
Hutu extremists, and hired by RTLM to support the Hutu government’s 
positions regarding the minority Tusti, gave some ‘advice’ to the inkotanyi.  The 
commentator remarked 
He is warning them that they will all be wiped out, come what 
may, because all the sons of Sebahinzi (the historical father of the 
Hutus) are closely watching whatever has to do with the inkotanyi, 
fighting them and hunting them down. That is what is happening 
now, and the inkotanyi are on the verge of extinction.162 
 
By the end of May, RTLM broadcaster Kantano Habimana stated that 
when the inkotanyi enter Kigali 
they will all be exterminated there. . . You understand that we are in 
the process of exterminating the inkotanyi in Kigali village.  Come 
and assist us in exterminating them so that the population will be 
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rid of this plague at all cost, for in Kigali-ville, we shall exterminate 
them.  There is nothing else to do.163   
 
In the same broadcast, he reiterates that Hutus are 90% of the population and 
Tutsis are only 10% of the population, and that 
if all the Rwandans, if 90% of the Rwandans can rise like one 
person against everything that the inkotanyi represent, they will 
disappear forever and will no longer think of returning to Rwanda.  
If they maintain this suicidal behavior, they will completely die 
out. 
 
In late June, RTLM commentators, preparing to flee the country as the 
RPF claimed victory, warned the Tutsis that they “will be exterminated” when the 
French arrive (for the implementation of Operation Turquoise).  In predicting that 
Tutsis will flee the country at that time, Habimana claims that the countries 
Tutsis flee to will “hunt you in all the countries you live in – they will mistreat 
you.  They will send you to us and we will strangle you and kill you.  So, you will 
be exterminated.”164  Around the same time, RTLM broadcaster Valerie Bekeremi 
said “we must take our revenge on the nyenzi inkotanyi and exterminate them as 
the whole youth is ready to do and has proved to us.”165 
Directing the public to engage in violence in a specific area 
 The RTLM often passed on information to the public given to them by 
government officials, soldiers, party leaders, or the Interahamwe, regarding 
specific people to target for death, or specific areas where they wanted the Hutu 
population to join with the armed forces and Interahamwe to kill local Tutsi and 
fight the RPF. 
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On April 13, one week after the start of the genocide, RTLM announcers 
urged residents of Kigali to go into neighbor’s houses to find Tutsis hiding within 
and to “flush them out.” They warned Hutus to carefully distinguish between 
Hutus and Tutsis so as to catch only the Tutis, and to “open those houses; track 
them down.”  They also encouraged the persons manning the roadblocks to 
“redouble your zeal; wait firmly for these Inkotanyi . . . they need to regret having 
come.”166 
 In mid-May, RTLM urged Hutus in the Rugunga valley to go to Tutsi 
huts “next to the horse stables” and that the people tending the horses are 
inkotanyi.  The broadcaster urges listeners to quickly surround the Tutsi in the 
horse stables and kill them before they listen to the RTLM broadcast and 
escape.167  Around the same time, Kantano Habimana warned listeners that there 
was an impending attack on Nyamirambo, and encouraged local Hutus to take up 
arms and “be very vigilant at the roadblocks.”168 
 At the end of May, RTLM encouraged listeners to “exterminate” the Tutsi 
living in Muhima, and the RPF who entered the area during the war.169  The 
broadcaster then told the youth that weapons are now available, and that they 
should continue with their training and expect to get weapons “tomorrow or the 
day after at the latest.”  He then said  
We would then go and flush out the inyenzi wherever they may be 
hiding.  We will free Gatsata and chase out the small inyenzi there, 
those cowards.  Yesterday, I saw them in a church I do not know 
what they were doing there. . . When the weapons are available, 
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tomorrow or the day after, we shall fight these inyenzi and drive 
them as far as the Rusine (a body of water near Kigali). And then 
we shall return to our town. 
 
In early June, Valerie Bekeremi invited a Hutu extremist from Byumba to 
join the broadcast, and together they encouraged people of Rwanda to go to 
Byumba. 
We urge you to unite, come out of wherever you are … committees 
have been formed for the purpose of gathering together all the 
civilians who have fled. These committees will gather all the young 
people who have fled, train the willing ones among them to defend 
themselves so they can collaborate with the armed forces. 
 
They go on to say that this same organizing has already started and that 300 
young people from the community have already joined the Interahamwe and have 
started training.170 
One day later, RTLM encouraged the people of Mgobo commune to stay 
and fight in the same way that they encouraged people in Byumba to fight Tutsis 
and the RPF.171  In this broadcast, the commentators urged all people to take up 
arms and fight, and to eliminate all RPF collaborators (Tutsis).  The government of 
this community asked Hutus to sign up for training so that they can engage in 
‘self-defense.’ 
Even once a cease-fire had been called, RTLM announcers continued to call 
for Hutu extremists to engage in violence.  On June 15, RTLM told the Hutus 
working at roadblocks to beware of people heading back to Kigali, and to stop 
those who do not have Hutu identity cards.  The commentator stated “Any 
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person who wishes to return to Kigali must be an individual whose identification 
is not dubious and not an RPF member trying to infiltrate.”172 
On June 19, RTLM announcer Gaspard Gahigi encouraged the people of 
the Gisozi area to go to the Kabakene cellule and the “armed forces, the 
Interahamwe, you the youth” and kill all the inkotanyi there, “do not allow any 
inkotanyi to escape.” Gaspard also reminds that the commanders of the armed 
forces “must turn their minds to the same direction; they should think of nothing 
else but the war and ways of repelling those inkotanyi or even exterminating 
them.”173 
Accusations in the Mirror 
During and prior to the genocide and civil war, RTLM continually 
broadcast ‘accusation in the mirror’ stories and reports from the field, claiming 
that RPF rebels and Tutsis were slaughtering innocent Hutus throughout the 
country.  In reality, government soldiers and gendarmerie, aided by the 
interahamwe and local Hutus were committing the very crimes alleged on the 
radio.  Thus, the propaganda strategy of ‘accusation in the mirror’ continued 
throughout the war and genocide, to great effect on the Hutu public. 
Shortly before the start of the genocide, RTLM interviewed an extremist 
Hutu, Mrs. Gaudence Nyirahabimana.  She predicted that the RPF would  
cause troubles on an ethnic basis. . . You really see that currently, 
RPF wants to launch the ethnic war, killing Hutu officials who 
have got constructive ideas in order to accuse the Tutsis of that. 
Then, Hutus will get angry and Hutus and Tutsis will exterminate 
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each other. So, RPF will alert the international community that the 
Tutsis have been exterminated while it is the one that started 
that.174 
 
In Mid-May, after much of the killing of Tutsis and moderate Hutus had 
occurred within the country, RTLM reported that “all the people who were killed 
in the country are the victims of the RPF. It is the inyenzi inkotanyi who killed 
them and nobody else.”175 
In late May, Radio Rwanda’s Hyacinthe Bicamumpaka interviewed a 
Hutu doctor who had recently returned from Kicukiro, where the genocide was no 
longer active, due to the RPF advance in the region.  He told a lengthy account of 
the interaction between Hutu and Tutsi RPF in that region.  In the story, he 
alleges that RPF soldiers and Tutsi sympathizers fired indiscriminately on over 
100,000 innocent civilians, ‘unarmed refugees’ according to the doctor.  He also 
alleged that the RPF dismembered people, and that the RAF soldiers who were 
shooting their guns in the region were doing so only to “simulate an attack to 
enable the people below to proceed.”176 
On June 8, RTLM announced that a burgomaster in the Muhazi commune 
reported to the broadcasters that the  
inyenzi inkotanyi killed people with small hoes after having tied 
their arms by behind. He revealed this and said ‘Even if we went 
now , I will show you how wicked the inyenzi are, how they are 
killers.’ We were told how the inyenzi struck on the heads of 
pregnant women with small hoes and then cut through their wombs 
and removed the babies. After, they would lay down the baby and 
kill it too, cutting it through. They would do this in front of other 
women to make them feel that the same fate was awaiting them.  
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You heard how they threw in Muhazi Lake women with their 
babies on their backs and their dead babies are reported to be 
flowing on that lake even now.  I even told you that some dead 
bodies were carried by rivers especially by Akagera River which 
took them into Victoria Lake in Uganda. Some may even continue 
to flow in Nile River in such a way that European people may see 
them in the Mediterranean. So you understand that the wickedness 
of the inyenzi is unlimited.  The inyenzi’s wickedness can only 
finish with their own end.  It could only finish if all of them died.177 
 
On June 20, as most Hutus were fleeing the country and the government 
was stationed in Gitarama, RTLM continued to allege that the RPF was 
massacring Hutus throughout the country.  One commentator said “all those 
young men they want to throw into the Kivu.  They will surely retaliate.”178 
Anti-Tutsi Propaganda Was Carefully Planned and Executed 
 While RTLM and Kangura were nominally privately-owned, it is clear 
that they and other anti-Tutsi publications were owned, operated, and controlled 
by President Habyarimana, the akazu, high-ranking government and military 
officials, and wealthy businessmen close to the President, the MRND and the 
CDR. From October 1990 up to and throughout the genocide, these media outlets, 
along with occasional assistance from the state-owned radio station, Radio 
Rwanda, aggressively marketed propaganda that sought to desensitize Hutu 
Rwandans to their Tutsi neighbors, friends, and even relatives.   
Through the use of a variety of tactics and messaging strategies outlined in this 
chapter, the Hutu Power extremists controlling Rwandan government steadily 
built a sophisticated web of stereotypes and caricatures of Tutsis founded on 
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history, fear, and even hysteria.  Their effective messaging dehumanized Tutsis 
both within and without Rwanda, creating a callousness, even hostility, in Rwanda 
towards the value of Tutsi life.  As in other genocidal regimes, the use of 
propaganda was a critical element in creating the foundation for genocide to occur. 
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Chapter 3 
PRE-COLONIAL RWANDA MEETS BELGIAN RULE 
Understanding the origins and the making and remaking of the meanings 
attached to the designations Tutsi and Hutu are critical to understanding the 1994 
genocide.  While there is ample evidence that the designations Tutsi and Hutu 
existed in Rwanda long before the advent of colonialism, the meaning of each was 
drastically changed by colonialist powers.  What in the past had been a 
designation largely associated with power, class, and profession, with the 
definition of what it meant to be a Tutsi or Hutu shifting and changing over time, 
became a racialized descriptor attached to a calcified system of privilege and 
deprivation under the Belgian colonizers.  Prior to colonization, individuals in 
what is today Rwanda lived in a highly complex system of clientship and power-
sharing, with flexibility to move between the designation of Tutsi and Hutu based 
on marriage, acquisition of wealth, cattle, or land, or by ‘gift.’  Indeed, as the pre-
colonial state developed and increased in complexity, the meanings of Tutsi and 
Hutu also evolved.  Belgian colonialists arrested that evolution and calcified the 
terms Tutsi and Hutu into a simplified, race-based immutable designation that 
profoundly impacted subsequent social and political life in Rwanda.  Colonialist 
definitions of Tutsi and Hutu persisted in various forms through Rwanda’s first 
thirty-five years of independence and had a major impact on both Hutu 
presidents’ rule, and the 1994 genocide. 
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The Origins of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa 
 No clear agreement exists on the origins of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa.  Most 
scholars agree that at some point in history, the people now categorized as Hutu 
and Tutsi migrated from different places, as different peoples, probably at 
different times, to the Great Lakes region.  It is generally believed that the Tutsi 
migrated to the region, arriving either after the Hutu (Bantu) peoples, or at least 
increasing in numbers via migration in the 15th century after the Hutu had largely 
completed migration to the area. The Twa, who make up one percent of the 
population, were hunters and gatherers; very little research or data is available on 
their origins.  While Tutsis and Hutus intermarried, neither group mixed socially or 
intermarried with the Twa.179  After this general consensus, various theories 
abound as to the development of the designations Hutu and Tutsi, and the 
meanings attached to those designations.   
 A famous Rwandan myth tells the history of Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa in 
terms designed to cement Tutsi superiority, but without distinction of origin.  The 
myth starts with Kigwa, the son of Nkuba, the god of thunder.  According to 
Rwandan mythology, Kigwa was the first God to live on earth.  He had three 
sons: Gatutsi, Gahutu and Gatwa.  One day Kigwa entrusted each of his sons 
with a jug of milk to watch over during the night.  The next day, Kigwa visited 
each of his sons to learn of the milk’s disposition.  Gatwa drank his milk, Gahutu 
spilled him milk upon the ground, but Gatutsi kept his milk safe.  Kigwa then 
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granted Gatutsi the power of dominion over his gluttonous and clumsy brothers, 
thus establishing the Tutsi dynasty. This myth, often told in Rwandan history, 
assumes the relationship between the three categories of Rwandans as 
homogenous, separated only by a divine ordination of superiority in 
governance.180 While this popular myth makes a point about historical Rwandans’ 
interpretation of their origins, data concerning the differences and similarities of 
the Tutsi and Hutu peoples tells a more complex story. 
For the purposes of this chapter, we shall dispense with further discussion 
about the Twa, as they are a very small minority of the population and were not 
central to the development of the societal structure in Rwanda prior to the 
genocide.  Instead, this chapter will focus on the development of the terms and 
meanings attached to Tutsi and Hutu, and the lasting impact that colonialism had 
on the country as a result. 
 There is some evidence to suggest that the Tutsi differ from the Hutu in 
genotype and phenotype – if not entirely or neatly, at least in an average sense.  
As one Sudanese official remarked in the mid-1990s when meeting with 
intellectual audiences in Rwanda, he “saw a few who were clearly Tutsis and a 
few who were clearly Hutus,” but most people appeared to be “somewhere in 
between.” When he asked a government official if the official could tell the 
difference between Hutus and Tutsis, the official responded, “yes but with a 
margin of error of 35 percent.”181 Thus, any genotypal and phenotypal differences 
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that existed at one point in history faded over time through evolution, 
cohabitation, and intermarriage. 
Phenotypal evidence 
Early colonialists found that there was an average 12 centimeter height 
difference between those designated Tutsi and the shorter peoples designated as 
Hutu.182  Other differences noted included width of noses, broadness of the face, 
etc.  Some concluded that these phenotypal differences proved that the Tutsi and 
Hutu were descended from distinct peoples.  Others concluded that the 
differences, in particular of height, resulted from the very different lifestyles that 
Tutsi and Hutu led at the advent of colonization.  Specifically, most Tutsi did not 
till the land; they were pastoralists whose diet depended on meat and milk from 
their herds of cattle.  Hutus largely worked as agriculturalists, subsisting on more 
restricted diets.  One social geographer noted the 12 centimeter height difference 
between Tutsi and Hutu matched the height difference between French nobility 
and serfs during the same period, implying that the difference was due to life 
circumstances rather than genetics.183  While theories abound as to the genesis of 
phenotypal differences, many are based on the belief that Tutsis’ lifestyles and 
eating patterns account for their height and that marriage and childrearing within 
the community maintained that difference over time. 
Genotypal evidence 
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 Other, more recent studies have pointed to genotypal differences between 
the Tutsi and Hutu to support a claim that both groups migrated to what is now 
Rwanda from different areas of Africa. For example, Hutus are generally more 
likely to be lactose intolerant, while four of five Tutsis are able to digest lactose in 
great quantities.  Throughout the continent, communities which are most likely to 
tolerate large amounts of lactose include the dairy-dependent nomadic desert 
populations in Africa.  This evidence suggests that the Tutsis were at one time a 
nomadic peoples who migrated to the Great Lakes region, then began intermarry 
with Hutus over time.  The intermarriage of Tustis and Hutus potentially explains 
why lactose intolerance amongst Hutus is less prevalent than other peoples within 
the Great Lakes region.184   
 Hutus in Rwanda contain the sickle cell trait at a rate commensurate with 
other populations in the Great Lakes region, while Tutsis are less likely to carry 
the trait.  The presence of the sickle cell trait amongst a population is believed to 
indicate that the peoples of the community had survived malaria over many 
generations.  The almost complete absence of sickle cell anemia amongst Tutsis 
suggests that Tutsi ancestors originated in an area of Africa not affected by malaria 
(a dry, desert area).185  These two examples tend to suggest that, at one time, at 
least, the Tutsi and Hutu were two distinct peoples.  Over time, however, those 
distinctions lessened as Hutu and Tutsi intermarried and reared children. 
Marriage and Children 
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 Historically, designation of Hutu and Tutsi flowed patrilineally – a Hutu 
man and a Tutsi woman’s children were considered Hutu, and a Tutsi man and 
Hutu woman’s children were Tutsi.  Children born out of wedlock were assigned 
the designation of the mother, though children born in a cohabitating family were 
assigned Hutu or Tutsi according to their father’s designation.  There existed no 
mixed-status designation in pre-colonial Rwanda.186 As intermarriage became more 
prevalent, more and more children of ìmixedî marriages claimed singular identities, 
regardless of their mother’s identity. 
While children were assigned an identity according to marriage and 
relationship rules, a Hutu woman’s marriage to a Tutsi man allowed her to re-
designate herself as Tutsi.  It appears that intermarriage was common in pre-
colonial times, particularly amongst women to men of higher social status (Hutu 
to Tutsi).  As such, the designation of Tutsi and Hutu was more connected to the 
community’s patrilineal societal structure than to a biological structure.  As 
intermarriage and cohabitation were quite common, the genotypical and 
phenotypical differences between early Hutus and Tutsis lessened over time, 
while the determination of who was Tutsi and who was Hutu, and why they were 
designated as such evolved as the social structure developed. 
Social Designation and Re-designation 
 Just as a Hutu woman could become Tutsi by marrying a Tutsi man, so 
could a Hutu man become a Tutsi man, albeit not via marriage.  Men could adjust 
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their status from Hutu to Tutsi via acquisition of wealth and cattle.  While not 
frequent, this happened often enough for the community to define the process in 
Kinyarwandan – kwihutura.  Conversely, a Tutsi who lost cattle and wealth could 
be ‘downgraded’ in social status and de-Tutsified.  Rwandans called this process 
gucupira, to denote the loss of one’s Tutsi (class-based) identity.  The designation 
and re-designation of a person (and his lineage) based on wealth, acquisition of 
cattle, and resulting social status supports an argument that the connotations of 
Tutsi and Hutu were complex and not strictly based on physical or genetic 
characteristics.  Indeed, through marriage (social mobility) and acquisition or loss 
of cattle (a sign of social status in Rwanda), Rwandans could adopt a new social 
identity in the community.  This process of redefining wealthy Hutu as Tutsi also 
prevented the development of an elite Hutu population – by definition, wealthy 
Hutus were transformed into Tutsis and thus lost all motivation to identify with 
other, less wealthy or privileged Hutus.187  Thus, classification as Hutu and Tutsi 
preserved a class distinction that operated separate and apart from distinctions of 
birth, ethnicity, or physical characteristics.  In later years, European colonizers 
ignored the complexity with which Rwandans identified members of the 
community and created a calcified, highly simplistic and stratified system that 
denied Rwandans opportunities for social mobility. 
Clans (not Tribes) 
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 While most African communities were organized by tribes, connecting 
people of similar heritage, cultural practices, religion, language, Rwanda’s Hutu 
and Tutsi are not, and were never tribal communities.  All Rwandans have 
historically shared the same cultural and religious practices, and speak the same 
language, Kinyarwandan. While Hutu and Tutsi denoted difference in the 
community, that difference was not one of tribe.  As defined throughout this 
chapter, the difference was a social, economic, and political difference.188 
 Early Rwanda was organized loosely by clan rather than by tribe.  Yet clan 
membership in Rwanda was unique as well, based on lineage for Tutsis and 
clientship and economic relationships for Hutu and Twa. Eighteen major clans 
existed throughout the country, and each clan included Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa in 
their respective memberships.   For the most part, Hutus who worked for Tutsis 
either as clients working the land and/or tending to cattle, or as servants for 
wealthy Tutsi were considered members of the same clan as their patron.189  As 
wealthy Tutsi would relocate within the country, the Hutu families in their 
employment would move with them. Additionally, Hutus who had a clientship 
relationship with a Tutsi family (where the powerful Tutsi would provide 
patronage and protection in exchange for a gift of cows) were also included in the 
clan. 
The famous colonial-era Rwandan historian Alexis Kagame believed clans 
to be ‘purely political’ organizations, and most historians believe that the clans 
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were dynastic in nature (headed by a wealthy patron, comprising his lineage 
(exclusively designated as Tutsi, according to marriage and lineage customs 
described earlier) and their (usually Hutu) staff, clients and servants organized 
therein).  While the wealthy and powerful heads of clans were Tutsi, the 
organization of the clan was not one of racial or ethnic division, but rather one of 
economic ‘belonging.’  Once colonialists arrived in Rwanda, however, the clan 
system gave way to a racialized definition of Tutsi versus Hutu within the 
country. 
Division of Labor 
 Many believe that the terms Tutsi and Hutu denoted, at least in part, 
status and job description prior to colonization.  Tutsi, meaning ‘rich in cattle,’ 
originally denoted powerful pastoralists but later came to describe the “elite group 
as a whole.” Conversely, Hutu originally meant a person in a subordinate position 
to another; later it was used to describe all ordinary people in the area, who were 
typically agriculturists.190  While not all Tutsis were pastoralists and not all Hutu 
were farmers, it is true that the division of labor roughly hewed along these lines.  
However, there have always been so-called petit Tutsis, Tutsis who were poor, did 
not own cattle, and either farmed or subsisted via other means (working for others, 
etc.). It appears that the original meanings of the terms morphed over time to be a 
rough generalization, and then tracked the population largely via patrilineal 
inheritance. 
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 Over time, Rwandans utilized three successive systems of clientship, with 
the changes between each system indicating the changing nature of relationships 
between the rich and the poor, Tutsis and Hutus.  While clientship was typical in 
the region, Rwandan styles of clientship were unique and evolved over time.  
None of these systems were egalitarian, and the last one in place prior to the 
advent of colonialism deeply widened the divide between wealthy Tutsis and 
poorer Hutus. 
Umuheto 
First utilized in a northern region of the Rwandan kingdom, in which there 
existed a looser system of control and greater autonomy, umuheto was a clientship 
system in which clients gifted cattle to their patrons in return for protection for 
themselves, their family, and their lineage.  This system demonstrated that cattle 
were not always reserved for the very wealthy and powerful – but the patronage 
system did exclude the poor who owned no cattle at all.  The system also 
transferred wealth from the less wealthy to the more wealthy in regular intervals, 
increasing the disparity between peoples providing the protection and those 
receiving it.  Over time, this system was replaced by ubuhake.191 
Ubuhake 
 Ubuhake was a system of clientship wherein the patron (usually Tutsi) 
gave a cow to his client (usually Hutu).  At the time, Hutu were generally not 
allowed to own cattle, as cattle denoted wealth and power.  Thus, the gift of a cow 
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signified an increase in social and political status.  As the cow matured, the client 
was required to share the largess of the gift (subsequent calves) with his patron.  
Over time, the Hutu who owned cows and subsequent calves could transform his 
status from Hutu to Tutsi (the Kinyarwandan term of Tutsification was called 
kwihutura).192  Prior to the implementation of ubuhake, Hutu were not prohibited 
from owning cattle, but many did not have the wealth to acquire them.  Hutu were 
often granted cows as gifts, for acts of bravery in battle, or for other service to the 
mwami or local authorities; these cows were ‘pure’ gifts, without any reciprocity 
required or expected in the future.  Only with the implementation of ubuhake did 
the prohibition of cattle ownership by Hutu come into existence.  Ubuhake would 
not work effectively if Hutu could simultaneously gain cattle through pure gifts, 
after all.  There was no lasting benefit to the patron in a ‘pure’ gifting relationship.  
The ubuhake clientship system involved the enrichment of the patron via the 
‘gift’ of the cow to the client, but wealthy Tutsi patrons would only agree to such 
a system if the ‘free’ option were disallowed. 
While this system granted cows (which translated to power and wealth) to 
Hutus, it was applied unevenly and capriciously.  A generous Tutsi patron could 
grant his Hutu client a cow without extracting much in return, creating a path to 
independence, status and wealth for the Hutu.  Conversely, a more truculent Tutsi 
could utilize the gift of a cow as a form of labor or other promissory extraction 
from his Hutu client, furthering the disparity of wealth and status between them. 
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Prunier posits that the original ubukake relationships existed between Tutsis, not 
between Tutsi and Hutu, but over time the systems altered and became 
relationships of power, privilege and class, impacting Tutsis positively and Hutus 
negatively.193  
Ubureetwa 
 Sometime in the first half of the nineteenth century, the mwami Rwabuguri 
altered the system governing possession and ownership of land, which resulted in 
a change to the country’s clientship relationship. Prior to Rwabuguri’s reign, land 
was passed from father to son via lineage, without interference or interruption 
from the monarchy.  During Rwabuguri’s reign, control of land was transferred to 
the mwami, who then passed control of the land to his designated authority 
figures at the local level.  Lineage heads (often Hutu) no longer were guaranteed 
control over the lands in their respective communities, and power was transferred 
to the political allies of the mwami.  As a result, clientship changed.  The 
ubureetwa system permitted the landless to live and work on the land (that 
formerly was considered their property), but required a contribution of free 
manual labor for the chief, as ‘payment’ of the use of the government’s land.  
Moreover, Rwabuguri imposed this requirement of forced labor on Hutus only, 
thus intensifying societal differences already in existence between the two groups.  
Hutus lost ownership of land, and simultaneously had less opportunity to grow 
wealth and prosperity, as they had to contribute more of their work to the ruling 
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chief.  As Tutsis were exempt from ubureetwa, they had no such impediments to 
production and accumulation of wealth.194 
 Clientship evolved over time from a system that, at its start, largely 
existed between wealthy and middle class families, then between Tutsis and other 
Tutsis, and finally between Tutsi patrons and Hutu clients, with increasing 
disparity between the status of the patron and the client.  These changes 
exacerbated differences of job status, power, and economic wealth between Tutsi 
and Hutu over time.  While Hutu could at times become re-designated at Tutsi 
either through wealth and cattle acquisition or through marriage, such re-
designation became more difficult during the final form of clientship (ubureetwa) 
prior to the arrival of Europeans. 
Organization and Diffusion of Power 
 Pre-colonial Rwanda was a community of highly organized, yet diffuse 
power sharing.  Historically a monarchy, the mwami, or king, played the central 
role.  He was considered to be divinely appointed, and his power extended over 
the country in physical, social, and political forms. 195  The mwami was an 
inherited position, descending from the enthroned king to his designated son.  
While the mwami exercised great power, particularly militarily, there existed 
portions of Rwanda that were less subject to the monarchy’s power than others.  
Historically, northern and southwestern Rwanda, and other smaller communities 
in the peripheral regions of Rwanda, operated only loosely within the monarchist 
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structure; they largely existed without paying taxes, participating in proscribed 
communal labor, or utilizing local authority structures as the rest of the country 
did.  These areas maintained their own complex systems of authority and power, 
similar to the structure created and maintained by the mwami, but without the 
centralized control mechanisms in place. 
Beneath the mwami’s authority, there existed a complex, internally 
competing leadership and authority structure for local communities.  Each local 
area was governed by three chiefs, who controlled different aspects of life.  The 
chief of the landholdings managed the distribution of land, collection of taxes, and 
production of agricultural products.  The chief of men ruled the population in the 
area, managing disputes and enforcing rules of behavior.  This chief also managed 
local recruitment for the mwami’s army.  The third chief, chief of the pastures, 
controlled the lands reserved for grazing of cattle.  These positions were often held 
by different individuals within one community, and the chief of the landholdings 
was often Hutu (due to the fact that most farmers were Hutu).  The other two 
positions were typically held by Tutsis.  In some instances, one person would 
hold all three positions simultaneously.  More often, however, power and 
authority was diffused between a number of people.  Additionally, each ‘hill’ was 
assigned a hill chief, who ruled over the daily life and functions in that small area.  
In certain instances, the overlap between the three positions varied by hill, with 
one chief of men covering an area simultaneously governed by multiple chiefs of 
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the land.  This system was incredibly complex and ensured that competing 
factions and interests never gained an inordinate amount of power.196  Chiefs were 
chosen by the mwami or by local authorities at a higher level, and positions at the 
local level were held by both Tutsi and Hutu men.  At higher levels of authority, 
closer to the mwami, it was more difficult for a Hutu man to attain a powerful 
position; these were reserved for the Tutsis closest to the mwami. 
 Chiefs were tasked with managing and taxing the local population in their 
area of authority.  Because there was no currency in pre-colonial Rwanda, taxation 
involved contributing to the chiefs’ livelihood through a variety of measures: 
maintaining the properties of the three local chiefs, contributing a portion of one’s 
agricultural product or working the chief’s land to produce foodstuffs, and 
minding the chief’s cattle.  However, in stark contrast to western notions of 
conscription and taxation, none of the duties required of the populace were 
individual obligations.  Instead, local communities were required to do a certain 
amount of work or produce a certain amount of product, and the members of the 
hill (umusozi) collectively determined how to fulfill the requirement.  This changed 
dramatically with colonization, transforming from a collective requirement to an 
individual one.197 
The Germans 
 In 1885, Europe ‘gave’ Rwanda to Germany at the Berlin Conference.198  
At the time, no European had ever set foot in Rwanda. A German count, Gustav 
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Aldolf von Götzen, was appointed as Governor of the eastern region of Africa. 
Meanwhile, Rwandans were unaware of the colonial action until 1894, when the 
Governor first presented himself to King Rwabugiri.  The German colonial reign 
began shortly there after in 1897, with a policy of indirect rule and a very light 
presence in the country.  For most of the German colonial period, less than one 
hundred non-Rwandan Europeans resided in the country,199 and only thirty of 
those Europeans represented the German government.200  Instead, the Germans 
chose to reinforce existing power structures within the Rwandan monarchy.  This 
afforded greater power to the mwami and the Queen Mother, a powerful and 
politically astute leader who amassed power behind her weak figurehead son to 
her own political advantage.  The Queen Mother, who assumed power upon her 
husband Rutalindwa’s death, first led a coup of the mwami’s son who had been 
bequeathed official title, and then installed her own birth son as a figurehead.201  
The Queen Mother carried on her late husband’s strategy of centralization of 
power, and the German colonialists relied on this power structure to implement 
their own priorities in the country.  As such, elite Tutsi leaders throughout the 
country became associated with colonialist power, and the centralization of power 
intensified with Germany’s tacit support of the existing monarchy.   
 During the German colonial period, perhaps the greatest impact the 
colonialists had on cementing the division between Tutsis and Hutus was the 
establishment of elite educational institutions reserved for the Tutsi ruling powers.  
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Germans, like the Belgian colonialists who followed them, subscribed to so-called 
‘Hamitic’ theories, postulating that Tutsis were ‘less Negroid’ and therefore closer 
to Aryans than the Hutu people.  The German Duke of Mecklenburg once said 
“[The Watutsi] ways and their language were very distinguished. One had the 
impression of facing another class of men who had only their skin color in 
common with the ‘Negroes’.”202  In line with their beliefs regarding Tutsi 
superiority in Rwanda, the White Fathers opened the first western educational 
institution in 1905, recruiting and admitting sons of Tutsi chiefs.  Over the next 
several years, additional schools were opened throughout the country to 
accommodate more Tutsi chiefs’ children.  Father Lèon Classe, the eventual 
bishop of the Catholic Church in Rwanda, believed that the establishment of 
schools for the sons of Tutsi chiefs was a tool to train the Tutsi sons, whom he 
considered “born rulers,” to become leaders within the church as well as the 
government.  School construction for Tutsi elite increased throughout the early 
1900s, cementing opportunities for wealthy and elite Tutsi youth in the future 
colonial administration.203 
While education systems established for Tutsi elite certainly shaped the 
future of the country’s power structure and imbalance between Tutsi and Hutu 
communities, the Germans’ impact on Rwanda’s monarchic structure was much 
lighter than what followed during the Belgian colonial period. By 1916, the 
Germans lost colonial power of the country to the Belgians via military conquest.  
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The Belgians’ approach to colonial power was much more direct, with long-
reaching impact on the country’s future. 
The Belgians 
 After the defeat of Germany in World War I, a number of African 
provinces previously controlled by Germany were ‘reassigned’ to Belgium in the 
League of Nations mandate of 1919.  During the first several years of Belgian 
colonialism, the Belgian administrators essentially continued the German strategy 
of supporting the existing monarchy structure via indirect rule.  However, the 
Belgians began to implement a number of changes starting in 1922.  First, Belgian 
colonialists appointed a ‘special representative’ to the mwami, which eroded the 
monarchy’s independence and decision-making power.  One year later, Belgians 
took over the mwami’s power to select chiefs to govern the various regions within 
Rwanda.204  A series of small steps such as this continued until 1926, when 
Belgian administrators began to more forcefully transition from an indirect to a 
direct rule system in Rwanda.  Between 1926 and 1929, Belgians eliminated the 
historical system of multiple chiefs ruling the same hill in a variety of arenas.  This 
historically complex system divided power between Tutsi and Hutu communities, 
allowing residents an opportunity to maintain some access to power and justice 
regardless of social status.205  The consolidation of the chiefs’ positions assisted 
Belgian colonialists in concentrating power. 
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 Altering the historic forms of clientship and gradual increases in 
requirements by Hutu Rwandans in forced labor also increased the imbalance of 
wealth and power between Tutsis and Hutus, and allowed Belgian administrators 
to garner support from the Tutsi population.  Finally, the census of 1933-1934 
cemented the designations of Tutsi and Hutu into calcified, inflexible designations 
that permitted the Belgians to further elevate Tutsis in civil service, education, and 
military service.  The census also facilitated the administration’s effort to 
concentrate power lines and divisions within the population, thus granting them 
more control over the economic production within the country. 
Speke’s Race Science Theory 
 John Hanning Speke, the famous explorer of the Nile, developed a race 
science theory to explain the difference between African peoples throughout the 
continent. Entirely without evidence, Speke wrote in his 1863 publication, 
Journey of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile, that the Tutsi monarchists in 
what is today Rwanda were ‘carriers of a superior civilisation,’ descended from 
the Galla of southern Ethiopia.206  His ‘theory of conquest of inferior by superior 
races’ indicated that the Tutsi were a ‘conquering superior race’ over the Hutu.  
Other explorers of the time postulated that the Tutsis originated in Egypt, India, 
Tibet, or Asia Minor.  All these men shared one core belief in their postulation of 
the ‘Hamitic’ theory – that Tutsis were superior to the Hutus because of their 
taller, finer features and supposed greater intellect.  Further, they believed that the 
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foreign Tutsis had invaded the region and subjugated the less refined Hutus, 
largely due to the characteristics Europeans associated with their appearance and 
then-current status in Rwanda as the holders of the monarchy.207  
Speke derived his racist views from a Biblical interpretation of the story of 
Noah and his son Ham.  As the biblical narrative goes, Noah became drunk and 
passed out.  His obedient sons Shem and Japhet sought to cover Noah’s 
nakedness while not looking at their father, Ham failed to look away.  Thus, God 
cursed him for this lack of fealty and respect, and he and his progeny were dark-
skinned. In the nineteenth century, racist scholars adjusted the historical narrative 
to define Hamites as Caucusians under a black skin (on account of their heritage 
from Noah), while the descendants of Ham’s brothers were Aryans (Japhet’s 
progeny) and Semites (Shem’s progeny). This adjustment allowed for the 
acknowledgement of similar ancestry, to accommodate Egyptians and other similar 
African peoples who were considered by the Europeans to be greatly superior to 
other Africans.208 
Speke’s theory of race science and the ‘Hamite’ designation of ‘superior’ 
Africans heavily influenced colonialists’ assessment of the Tutsis and Hutus in 
Rwanda. Early missionaries such as Father Classe claimed in 1902 that the Tutsis 
were “superb humans,” while Father François Menard remarked in 1917 that the 
Tutsis were “European[s] under a black skin.”  Around the time of Father 
Menard’s reflection, the White Fathers of the Catholic Church in Rwanda created 
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a treatise on race science in Rwanda that served as a critical guide to the Belgian 
colonialists’ attitudes towards and treatment of the Tutsis and Hutus.209 And 
Canon Louis de Lacger wrote in 1939 that the Tutsis belonged to the white race, 
by virtue of their Hamitic roots: 
Their supremacy is not to be contested. What does it rely on? 
Three elements: the first, racial, which is their physical superiority: 
they are tall and imposing people; with simple and semi-civilized 
people, height, bearing, and nobility of features are generators of 
prestige and ascendancy; the second is economic: they are magnates 
whose richness is constituted by herds of cattle; the third is 
political: they are men born for command, like the Roman in 
Virgil.210 
 
The Census and Identity Cards 
While race science defined the Belgian’s view of Rwandan civilization, the 
administration had difficulty enforcing their discriminatory policies for over a 
decade.  While the Rwandan population knew who was Tutsi and who was Hutu 
based on family history and personal familiarity, Belgians were not able to always 
distinguish between the two classes of persons.  The administration first started 
with a series of official decrees distinguishing between Tutsis and Hutus as early 
as 1917,211 but were unable to implement differential treatment in all cases because 
of the lack of documented distinction between Tutsis and Hutus.  The Belgians 
instituted a national census in 1933 and 1934. This census marked the formal 
calcification of Tutsi and Hutu classification, and later led to a series of colonial 
policies that permanently elevated the Tutsi population above the Hutus in 
Rwanda. 
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 It is generally accepted that the Belgians differentiated between Hutu, 
Tutsi and Twa based on a variety of factors.  The first factor was an analysis of 
physical characteristics, á la Speke’s theory of race science.  The Twa were easiest 
to classify; the pygmy people were easily distinguishable from the rest of the 
population, and there was little confusion because the Twa had never intermarried 
with the Hutu or Tutsi people.  The Twa at the time (and still today) make up 
less than one percent of the population.212   
However, Speke’s theory didn’t lend itself cleanly to the classification of 
Tutsi versus Hutu.  There had been generations of intermarrying between Tutsis 
and Hutus, so physical characteristics were often less pronounced than Speke’s 
theory would prefer. Additionally, the historic social classification system that 
allowed individuals to be re-designated as Tutsi or Hutu based on acquisition of 
wealth and status, or loss thereof, muddied the European’s theories regarding 
‘Hamitic’ superiority. And as noted earlier, marriage also led to the potential re-
designation of women from Hutu to Tutsi and vice versa. Therefore, simple 
designation of the population as Tutsi or Hutu based on appearance was not 
feasible in many cases.  The Belgian colonialists therefore also relied on a class 
structure – ownership of cattle, to determine who was Tutsi.  This classification 
system recognized the historic practice of re-designation based on class status 
(kwihutura – a wealthy Hutu becoming Tutsi and gucupira – a Tutsi falling from 
social status to Hutu) by classifying those with more than ten cows as Tutsi.   
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Finally, the Belgians relied on the local Catholic church leaders and 
employees to help determine who, historically, was Tutsi and who was Hutu.  
Thus, the ultimate classification system combined race science with history and 
local knowledge.  At the end of the census, the Belgians had classified roughly 85 
percent of the population as Hutu, 14 percent as Tutsi, and one percent as Twa.  
These classifications were calcified; the Belgians eliminated the historic fluidity 
between the Tutsi and Hutu.  From 1934 onward, Rwandans were unable to 
utilize job classification or acquisition (or loss) of social status to reclassify as 
either Tutsi or Hutu.213 
Once the Belgians classified the population as Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa, the 
government issued identity cards to all Rwandans and required that all adults carry 
the cards in daily life.214  Hutus and Tutsis continued to intermarry, but wives no 
longer adopted the designation of their husbands.  Children continued to carry the 
designation of their father.  The historically complex system of classifying and 
reclassifying Tutsis and Hutus ended, and the Belgians’ treatment of Tutsis as 
superior cemented an imbalanced relationship between Tutsis and Hutus in the 
country. 
Power - consolidation of leadership positions 
 Between 1926 and 1929, the colonial Governor Charles Voisin, as part of 
‘les rèformes Voisin’ instituted a consolidation of local chiefly positions from the 
traditional three seats to one person.  In the traditional three-chief system, the 
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Chief of the Land was usually a Hutu farmer.  Under the consolidation scheme, 
the chiefs were almost exclusively Tutsi.215 This change allowed Belgians to 
exercise greater control over local governance structures and circumvented Hutus’ 
ability to utilize the three-chief system to their advantage. As the Belgians 
unilaterally removed and appointed new chiefs, they created an elite system of 
governance based on their own standards of acceptable leadership.  Chiefs who 
failed to convert to Christianity (Catholicism) or readily follow the wishes of the 
colonialists were swiftly removed and replaced with more pliant community 
leaders.  Many of the newly installed chiefs were the young Tutsi men who were 
sons of previous chiefs, educated in colonial educational institutions designed 
solely to prepare them for sub-colonial governance.216 
 By 1936, the transition regarding chief’s power was nearly complete.  A 
final change cemented the consolidation of power when the Belgians introduced 
the Native Tribunals.  The Tribunals granted the local chief executive power not 
only to implement laws from the central government, but also the legislative 
power to create new local ordinances and laws.  Thus, chiefs held near absolute 
power in a community to create new laws and exact compliance to existing laws 
with impunity.  No process existed for community members to seek recourse if 
unhappy with a given law or its method of implementation.217 
 In 1931, Belgian colonialists took a significant step in consolidating their 
power over Rwandans; they deposed the king and installed his son in his place. 
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Mwami Musingi had resisted Catholicism and previously fought with the 
Germans against the Belgians.  Under Mwami Musinga, most chiefs had also 
resisted conversion.  While the king had been compelled by the colonialists to sign 
a law permitting the “liberty of conscience,” he made it difficult for the Church to 
gain access to elite Tutsis.  Therefore, the Church found early success with Hutus 
and resistance from Tutsis. To deal with unruly or noncompliant chiefs, the 
Belgians had removed many chiefs for failure to convert, in some cases 
temporarily replacing them with Hutu converts (although the Church’s pressure 
caused the Belgians to quickly rectify those actions by installing Tutsi adherents 
who were considered superior and ‘well-born’).218   
The colonial government and Church had long before determined that the 
king represented a threat to them, both due to his resistance to colonization and 
Christianization of the country.  The Belgians removed him from office, exiled him 
to Congo, and summarily installed his son Mutara Rudahigwa as the new king.  In 
doing so, the colonialists ignored the traditional Rwandan system regarding 
monarchic succession and simply pronounced him king.  In due course, King 
Rudahigwa converted to Christianity, and the country largely followed suit.219  
Many elite Tutsis had noted with alarm the government’s commitment to the 
Catholic White Fathers and saw adherence to Christian principles as a path to 
success in the evolving colonial regime. The rapid conversion of the elite 
population to Catholicism, along with the compliance of a pro-western king, 
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allowed the Belgian colonialists and the fathers of the Catholic church to exercise 
extraordinary control over a population, both via laws and through the moral 
teachings and requirements of the church. 
Traditional Systems – ubuletwa, ubureetwa, and ubuhake  
 In the latter portion of the nineteenth century, King Rwabugiri instituted a 
new form of mandatory labor, called ubuletwa.  This program compelled 
Rwandans to contribute labor to ‘public works’ programs.  This form of labor-
taxation was frequently abused by the King and his centralized power structure, 
and it was widely disliked by Rwandans.  As the Belgian colonizers learned of the 
system, its use and abuse increased.220 The Belgians also altered the utilization of 
the system; where it had been a duty placed on a community residing on a given 
hill, with the residents of that hill determining collectively whom amongst the 
residents would complete the service requirement, the Belgians individualized the 
requirement, sometimes even including a requirement that women and children 
perform the ‘public service’ work.  This transformation from a collective sense of 
responsibility and duty to an individual sense was foreign to Rwandans, and 
clearly a product of western values imposed by the Belgian colonialists.   
 In 1924, the Belgians codified the ubureetwa system, previously 
implemented by King Rwabugiri.  The new law required 42 days per year of 
forced service by all Rwandan Hutus, with all Tutsis exempted from the 
requirement. This forced labor ranged from compulsory work on roads, ditches, 
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and clearing public lands, to working on a chief’s private coffee plantation or in 
their fields growing and tending to crops.221 
 In a strange reversal of roles, but with a telling replication of the colonial 
structure regarding ubuletwa, President Habyarimana created a system of 
compulsory service to the state in February 1974 when he introduced compulsory 
umuganda.  Umuganda required every Rwandan to work for the state on 
government projects like tilling government land, cleaning brush areas, building 
bridges, and reforestation.  The program continued, despite opposition from poor 
farmers and workers throughout the country, until the early 1990s.222  The 
President’s requirement for public service was an individual requirement, not a 
communal requirement.  While the opposition to and resentment of umuganda 
paralleled that of the ubuletwa system, there doesn’t appear to be any record of 
citizens or dissidents noting the colonial roots of the umuganda system.  Even 
more interesting is the fact that individual compulsory umuganda remains in place 
in Rwanda today, under the leadership of Tutsi president Paul Kagame. 
 Another shift implemented by Belgian colonialists involved the ownership 
of land and clientship between landowners and landworkers.  Between 1926 and 
1931, the colonialists created increased privatization of land via ibinkigi, grazing 
lands.  Colonialists permitted those owning ten cattle or more to apply for 
ibinkingi, or private ownership of land marked for grazing. Often, the land that 
cattle-owning Tutsis acquired was land previously held collectively by lineages of 
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Hutu.  The Belgian state nationalized the land, then redistributed it to Tutsis 
grazing cattle.  This redesignation of land from collective ownership to private 
ownership also impacted the traditional ubuhake system of clientship, by 
changing the relationship between patrons who granted cattle to clients.   
Tutsis in government and education 
 Shortly after gaining control of Rwanda’s governance, the Belgian 
colonialists began a systematic replacement of all local Hutu chiefs.  In the 1920s, 
the administration removed literally hundreds of local chiefs and replaced them 
with Tutsis raised in the Catholic missionary schools, until virtually every chief 
position in the country was held by a Tutsi who was both educated by the White 
Fathers and who had adopted the Hamitic theories of superiority.223  Due to the 
consolidation of power, chiefs now held inordinate levels of power and control 
over local populations, and abused this power via clientship systems that required 
Hutus to engage in forced labor, forced growth of crops for local leaders and the 
administration, and the forced sale of goods.224 
 While the Belgian administration instituted forms of monetary taxation 
upon individuals for governance and the church, local leaders exacted additional, 
arbitrary monetary taxation in their spheres of influence.  The administration 
required local Tutsi leaders to enforce exactions of forced labor (corvèe) for 
colonialists’ benefit, such as work on local government projects such as forest 
clearing and road creation.  Local Tutsi chiefs often added their own requirements 
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for Hutus to work on the chief’s own land.  And during the 1920s, when Rwanda 
faced a famine, both Belgian colonialists and local Tutsi leaders required Hutu 
farmers to grow famine-resistant crops such as potatoes, then forced to sell the 
food at fixed prices, set by the government.  Often, Tutsi leaders appropriated 
portions of the crops cultivated by the Hutus for their own personal use and 
financial benefit.225 Thus, the installation of Tutsis in government via privatized 
education and undemocratic installation not only created political power for 
Tutsis, but led to aggrandizement of personal wealth by powerful Tutsis in 
government positions. 
Once the replacement of chiefs was complete, the administration focused 
on hiring only educated Tutsis for civil service positions within the colonial 
administration.  Thanks to the Belgian’s dominance over education and the system 
in which Rwandan children and young people were educated, only Tutsis were 
eligible and qualified to serve in the civil service positions throughout the country. 
The Catholic White Fathers created an educational system in Rwanda to 
train the sons of Tutsi chiefs. Within several years, these schools expanded to 
include additional Tutsis throughout the country, culminating in a large school in 
Rwanda’s capital city (then called Astrida).  In the Groupe Scolaire, enrollment 
was almost exclusively limited to Tutsi children.  In some cases, Hutu children 
were allowed to enroll, but admission was tightly restricted and controlled, with 
less than half a percent of enrollment open to Hutu students.226 Over time, the 
  98 
government turned over complete control of the school system to the missions.  
Mission leaders permitted Hutu enrollment in limited instances, but created a 
bifurcated education system in those schools in which Hutus were allowed to 
enroll.  Tutsi children were taught in French in separate classes from Hutus, and 
prepared specifically for roles in government.  Hutu children were taught in the 
native language and not prepared (or allowed) for a future in civic service.227 
Hutus flock to the church 
 Because educational systems were privatized and run by the Catholic 
Church, enrollment was limited almost exclusively to wealthy Tutsi children.  As 
such, Hutus who sought educational opportunities for their children faced only 
one realistic option: enrollment in theology schools.  The cities of Kabgayi and 
Nyikibanda both boasted seminary education, and Hutus were permitted to 
attend.  However, after completing their theological education, these Hutus 
struggled to find appropriate employment.228  Many Hutus continued their adult 
years in church life, as they were effectively barred from civil service or 
meaningful participation in the private economic sphere within Rwanda.  
 In later colonial years, the Catholic church and Belgian administration 
abruptly switched their loyalty and support to Hutus, supporting discriminatory 
action on the part of politically active Hutus against the historically powerful and 
elite Tutsis.  Ironically, the very Tutsis targeted for retribution during the Hutu 
Revolution were the Tutsis supported during early years by the Catholic Church 
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and the Belgian administration.  Hutus engaged in the revolution failed to hold the 
Catholic Church accountable for their role in creating decades of inequity, 
however, and continued their allegiance to the Catholic Church. 
The lasting legacy of the Belgians 
 While the Belgian colonial regime officially ended in the early 1960s, the 
legacy of the government’s actions left a lasting impression in the country. The 
Hutu Revolution brought an almost complete reversal in the Rwandan power 
structure, with most Tutsis either losing their local government and civil service 
positions or being undemocratically removed or ejected from said positions.  
When Hutus took control of the government structure, they maintained the use of 
identity cards and began to systematically deny Tutsi children opportunities to 
attend schools, secure civil service positions for Hutus, and close off private 
economic opportunities for Tutsi businessmen.  While the Hutus turned the 
structure upside down, they adopted the essential elements of the system created 
by the Belgian colonialists.  Rather than dismantle the systems of discrimination 
and oppression created by the outsiders who spent decades marginalizing them, 
the Hutus instead chose to make it their own. 
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Chapter 4 
FROM KAYIBANDA TO HABYIRAMANA 
Belgian rule had transformed the political and social structure in Rwanda 
over the course of just three decades.  From the early years of reorganizing and 
restructuring the political hierarchy, to altering traditional structures of clientship, 
to finally instituting and enforcing a racialized, bifurcated classification system, 
the colonizers had fundamentally impacted Rwandan life.  Between 1916 and 
1945, the Belgian administration transformed a complex traditional governance 
structure with diffuse power by both Tutsis and Hutus in the country to a highly 
efficient and centralized government that elevated a chosen minority while 
systematically oppressing the majority of Rwandan peoples.  As World War II 
ended, the international community began to view colonization projects in Africa 
with skepticism and an eye towards independence.  But while a change towards 
independence was on the agenda for Rwanda, the institutional beliefs about power 
and race in Rwanda instilled by the Belgians were not. 
Transition towards independence 
 While Belgium had controlled Rwanda via power granted by the League of 
Nations’ charter of 1918, the United Nations in 1945 altered the League of 
Nations mandate and instead declared Rwanda a ‘trust territory.’ The United 
Nations granted management responsibility of the country to the Belgian 
administration in Rwanda, but pressed the Belgians to end the colonialist structure 
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within Rwanda and to modernize Rwanda’s economic structure.229 The slow push 
towards independence started. 
Beginning in 1948 and continuing periodically through 1962, the UN 
Trusteeship Council sent missions to Rwanda and published a series of reports 
criticizing the Belgian colonial administration for their management of the 
Rwandan people.230  The Belgians pledged to the UN trustees that they would 
enact a series of reforms, beginning with the abolishment of the dreaded and 
discriminatory practice of ubuleetwa.  The Belgian administration began phasing 
out the clientship system of ubuhake in 1954, in the stated expectation that these 
reforms would right the imbalance of power between Tutsi and Hutu populations 
in the country.  However, the gradual elimination of these two systems did not 
equalize power between the two social (now racialized groups).  Whereas Hutu 
were formerly bound to their Tutsi patrons via clientship, now they were subject 
to renting access to pastoral and grazing lands from wealthy Tutsis.  Thus, the 
imbalance of power and shift of resources from the lower socioeconomic classes to 
the wealthy classes continued.231 
 In 1952, the Belgian administrators announced elections for local positions 
throughout Rwanda.  While couched as a move towards democracy, the elections 
were merely ‘advisory’ votes with a choice of candidates proposed by existing 
chiefs and subchiefs, who were almost all Tutsi elite.  Thus, the result of the so-
called elections merely cemented the power held by a small group of Tutsi elite: 
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the Hutus elevated to subchief positions were almost exclusively Hutus in former 
clientship relationships with powerful Tutsis. This farce of an electoral process 
merely led the Hutu intelligentsia to cement their growing consensus of opinion 
that revolution was required to create a democratic society where Hutu Rwandans 
could fully participate in civic and economic life.232 
 In 1956, Belgian authorities authorized another round of elections, claiming 
to institute greater self-determination for Rwandan peoples.  However, in this 
round of elections, Belgian colonialists created a two-tier system for the elections, 
granting Hutus the right to vote directly for low-level subchiefs while reserving 
elections for higher level positions to the powerful Tutsi serving as chiefs 
throughout the country. The result was not surprising: Hutus dominated the 
subchief elections, while only Tutsis were elected to the higher councils (where 
real decision-making took place).233 
 The Hutu counter-elite found these pseudo-reforms disingenuous.  
Powerful Tutsi continued to hold the highest positions in the country, while Hutu 
were relegated to minor and often powerless positions in rural parts of Rwanda. A 
growing number of seminary-educated Hutu began agitating for a change to the 
colonial regime, and advocated for a reversal of roles amongst Tutsi and Hutu 
within the administrative and civil service structure. Interestingly, Hutu elites did 
not request independence. Tutsi leadership, including the mwami Rutahigwa, were 
discussing the desire for independence and the end of colonial rule.234 Perhaps as a 
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response to the Tutsi monarchy’s desire for independence (and thus a 
maintenance of monarchic rule), Hutus began to find common cause with those 
Belgians who preferred a distorted version of democratic rule to a continued Tutsi 
monarchic rule. 
Hutu Manifesto of 1957 and the advent of political parties 
 In July 1933, the Catholic ministry created the first Kinyarwandan 
publication in Rwanda, called Kinyamateka.  By 1956, the publication had hired 
GrÈgoire Kayibanda as its chief editor.  Kayibanda was educated at the Catholic 
seminary in Nyakibanda, one of a handful of Hutu elite driven to seminary 
education due to the lack of educational opportunities through the privatized 
education system in Rwanda. He simultaneously was elected to run the 
agricultural cooperative TRAFIPRO, a structure focused on supporting the Hutu 
elite. Over the next three years, this network allowed educated Hutu to coalesce 
and organize for social revolution.  Backed by increasing support from Flemish 
church leaders and a changing Belgian administration, a group of nine Hutu elite 
men published the infamous ‘Hutu Manifesto’ in March 1957, just one month 
after the Tutsi monarchists’ High Council published their Mise en Point, arguing 
for immediate transfer of power to the Rwandan king and his council.235 
 The Hutu Manifesto argued against independence, which monarchic Tutsi 
elite were pushing for, along with the support of the United Nations Trusteeship. 
Educated Hutus saw independence as a step backwards. While they had recently 
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gained some support from Flemish church leaders and had begun to win over 
Belgian authorities wary of Tutsi agitation for independence, they saw 
independence as an immediate reversal to total Tutsi control over government, 
civil life, and the economic system in the country. The authors of the Hutu 
Manifesto argued against the repressive and imbalanced control that Tutsi elite 
wielded in Rwandan society, but couched their arguments in racialized terms, bred 
by years of Belgian rule based on Speke’s race science.  Indeed, the Hutu elite 
preferred not to dismantle the racial system created by Belgian colonizers; they 
sought instead to adopt and use that same bifurcated system to establish their 
own dominance over the minority Tutsi.  Kayibanda thus wrote in the Manifesto: 
 The problem is above all a problem of political monopoly which is 
held by one race, the Tutsi; political monopoly which, given the 
totality of current structures becomes an economic and social 
monopoly; political, economic and social monopoly which, given 
the de facto discrimination in education, ends up being a cultural 
monopoly, to the great despair of the Hutu which see themselves 
condemned to remain for ever subaltern manual laborers and still 
worse, in the context of an independence which they will have 
helped to win without knowing what they are doing.236 The 
ubuhake has been legislated away, but these monopolies have 
replaced it with an even stronger oppression.237 
 
 Hutu leaders had adopted and internalized the racialization of their society 
by Belgian colonizers.  Rather than seek to dismantle the colonization’s 
manufactured racial dichotomization of the population, Hutus instead planned to 
utilize the very tools created to oppress them over the past three decades in their 
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planned reversal of oppression towards the minority Tutsi.  To wit, the Hutu 
Manifesto argued against the abolition of Belgian-instituted identity cards: 
In order to monitor this race monopoly we are strongly opposed, 
at least for the time being, to removing the labels ‘Mututsi’, 
‘Muhutu’ and ‘Mutwa’ from identity papers. Their suppression 
would create a risk of preventing the statistical law from 
establishing the reality of facts.238 
 
 The Hutu Manifesto provided the genesis for Kayibanda and 
Habyarimana’s future quota systems, which prevented Tutsis from gaining access 
to education, government service, military positions, and opportunity within civil 
life. 
Political Parties in Rwanda 
 Shortly after the issuance of the Hutu Manifesto, political parties were 
formed within Rwanda.  Kayibanda, the chief architect of the Manifesto, founded 
the MSM (Hutu Social Movement) in June 1957. Within five months, a Hutu 
business leader named Joseph Gitera created APROSOMA, Association for the 
Social Promotion of the Masses. This political party was not Hutu-specific, as 
Kayibanda’s was, but because it focused on class distinction, it attracted Hutus 
and served as a coded reminder that Tutsi were elite.239 
 The Tutsi ruling party responded within a number of months, forming the 
UNAR political party (Rwandese National Union), a monarchic institution 
comprised solely of elite Tutsis agitating for immediate independence and the 
expulsion of the Belgian colonizers. The Belgians viewed UNAR as a direct threat 
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to their colonial rule, and the fact that UNAR accepted financial support and 
assistance from communist regimes only added to their hostility.  In response, the 
Belgians supported the development of RADER (Rwandese Democratic Union) 
just one month later, in September 1959. RADER was a centrist party of mostly 
Tutsi moderates.  RADER never gained much traction, as monarchist Tutsi saw 
the party as a Belgian plant and Hutus didn’t trust Tutsis at all.240 
 In October 1959, Kayibanda transformed his MSM party to become the 
PARMEHUTU party. This party was based in Gitarama and Ruhengeri, and 
continued to focus on Hutu emancipation. APROSOMA continued to grow as 
well, but was focused in the Astrida region (capitol city).241 The development of 
factional political parties throughout the country increased political tensions 
between Tutsi and Hutu elite, and created an incredibly tense climate in Rwanda. 
Guy Logiest and the Belgian Switch 
 While early church leaders had been firmly committed to the superiority of 
the Tutsi people, later Belgian faith leaders identified with the Hutu peasants.  
Reflecting a change within the White Fathers themselves, who over time sent more 
working-class fathers to Rwanda of Flemish origin, the church’s leaders in Rwanda 
began to express sympathy with the oppressed Hutu.  At the same time, the 
Tutsi elite expressed increasing desires to be free of colonial rule, which threatened 
the position of both Belgian colonial leaders and the Belgian church leaders 
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simultaneously.  Creepingly, both the Belgian administrators and the church tilted 
their support from the Tutsi elite to the Hutu counter-elite.242 
 While the Belgian administrators had switched their support to Hutu 
intellectuals while creating and supporting pseudo-Tutsi political organizations 
such as RADER, the potential firestorm in Rwanda continued to build.  Hutu 
agitators within APROSOMA and PARMEHUTU sought a ‘democratic’ regime 
in which a ‘majority rules’ philosophy would surely result in Hutu elite 
dominance and Tutsi subjugation.  Tutsi monarchists sought to protect their 
wealth, status, and tight control over governance, civil life, and power.  Apart 
from quietly supporting the anti-monarchist forces on the ground, the Belgians did 
little to address the mounting pressure cooker that had become Rwanda.  It was 
virtually inevitable that political conflict would transform to physical violence. 
 The tensions began to mount when King Mutara Rudahigwa suddenly died 
in Bujumbura, allegedly as a result of an allergic reaction to an antibiotic injection 
given by a Belgian doctor to treat a venereal disease. Tutsi elitists in Rwanda 
maintained that the King had been poisoned in a plot devised by the Belgians and 
Hutu counter-elite.243 The monarchists immediately appointed the King’s half-
brother, a weak-minded monarchist named Kigeri Ndahindurwa.244 This transfer of 
monarchic power, handled in secret without consultation of the Belgian authorities 
or standard ritualistic practices, prompted Kayibanda and his supporters to 
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transform the MSM movement into the PARMEHUTU party and to prepare for 
a revolution.245 
On the first day of November in 1959, one of the Hutu sub-administrators 
in Rwanda, a member of the PARMEHUTU party, was beaten by Tutsi political 
agitators from UNAR.  A rumor that the sub-chief, Dominique Mbonyumutwa, 
had been killed in that attack quickly spread throughout the country, and Hutus 
retaliated by attacking Tutsi officials, burning Tutsi homes, and engaging in target 
murders of Tutsis.246 Belgian authorities took no action, allowing Hutu radical 
factions to engage in a spree of violence. The UN later published a report detailing 
the deaths of 200 Tutsis within Rwanda.  By November 6, the Tutsi-dominated 
court retaliated by arresting and torturing Hutu leaders of the uprising.247 
Belgian colonel Guy Logiest arrived in Rwanda three days after the beating 
of Hutu Dominique Mbonyumutwa.  Colonel Logiest stood firmly in support of 
the Hutu people, and instructed Belgian troops to stand silently by as massacres, 
home torching, and attacks against Tutsi elite occurred.  Logiest later defended his 
decision not to protect Tutsis murdered during the Hutu-led attack by stating 
ì[t]he time was crucial for Rwanda. Its people needed support and protection.î248 
By November 11, Belgian placed Rwanda under military rule. And on November 
14, the Belgians arrested over 900 Tutsi and 300 Hutu for their participation in 
the dual attacks of violence.249 
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Logiest began replacing Tutsi chiefs with Hutu counter-elites, and 
announced to Belgium that the colonialist administration’s position would be to 
favor Hutu from that point forward.  Logiest believed that support of the Tutsi 
was support of independence from colonial rule – and Hutu support instead 
created a democratic regime under Belgian control.250 In January 1960, he said 
“because of the force of circumstances, we have to take sides. We cannot remain 
neutral and passive.”251 He later stated 
Some among my assistants thought I was wrong in being so partial 
against the Tutsi and that I was leading Rwanda on a road towards 
democratisation whose end was distant and uncertain. … No, the 
time was crucial for Rwanda. Its people needed support and 
protection. My role was essential and it was important that I could 
play it till the final verdict which would come from the communal 
elections. Today, twenty-fine years later, I was myself what was it 
that made me act with such resolution. It was without a doubt the 
will to give the people back their dignity. And it was probably just 
as much the desire to put down the morgue and expose the 
duplicity of a basically oppressive and unjust aristocracy.252  
 
Neither Logiest nor his Belgian compatriots ever noted the irony in their 
opposition to the very elite that colonial policies had created. It was Logiest’s 
predecessors who created a lopsided aristocracy favoring Tutsis over Hutus, 
eliminating all traditional systems which allowed for socioeconomic fluidity 
between the two social groups. Decades later, during the 1994 genocide, the 
rigidity with which Belgians had classified Rwandans – the identity cards – would 
be used as a primary tool to eliminate the Tutsi minority population.  Even more 
disastrous was the racialization of the Hutu population, which created the 
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political framework for institutional discrimination between the two groups of, 
essentially, the same people. 
Democratic Elections and the Hutu Revolution 
Logiest stood firmly on the side of Hutu people, even during outright 
massacres and political confusion and unrest throughout the countryside. In July 
1960, Logiest organized communal elections, for the first time granting direct 
democracy to the Rwandan public.  UNAR, the monarchist party, officially 
boycotted the elections, and PARMEHUTU dominated, winning over 70 percent 
of the seats nation-wide.  Meanwhile, Tutsis continued to face sporadic killing and 
home burning.  Massive numbers of elite Tutsis fled the country to neighboring 
Uganda, Congo, and Burundi, amounting to over 130,000 people by the end of 
1963.253  
The UN Trusteeship favored granting outright control of the country to 
the Tutsi leadership that had ‘ruled’ under the Belgian colonial regime, but Logiest 
resisted the UN’s direction.  In December 1960, the United Nations issued two 
resolutions directing the Belgian colonizers to engage in a process of national 
reconciliation, a process that Logiest opposed. A failed National Reconciliation 
Conference held in January 1961 confirmed the Tutsi and Hutu factions were so 
polarized that reconciliation was impossible.  Within weeks, newly elected Hutu 
leaders gathered in Gitarama and reorganized the country’s government, with quiet 
support from Logiest, who sought to end the United Nation’s interference. The 
  111 
monarchy was dissolved and Rwanda proclaimed a republic. A president was duly 
elected, GrÈgoire Kayibanda was elected as prime minister, and the President 
promptly tasked Kayibanda with forming the next government.254  
The United Nations Trusteeship Commission issued a report within 
months of the January 1961 rogue political reorganization of the country.  The 
authors of the report concluded, with a foreshadowing of future events 
The development of these last eighteen months have brought about 
the racial dictatorship of one party. … An oppressive system has 
been replaced by another one. … It is quite possible that some day 
we will witness violent reactions on the part of the Tutsi.255 
 
In September 1961, a round of legislative elections were held, in which the 
PARMEHUTU increased their support to 78%. In this same election, over 80 
percent of Rwandans voted to end the monarchy and declared Rwanda a 
republic.256 This vote of confidence supported the Gitarama ìcoupî enacted 
months earlier.  The Belgian colonel Logiest noted that the 1961 elections served 
as ìthe consecration without appeal of the November 1959 revolution, the total 
and definitive victory of the Rwandese people.î257 The Hutu Revolution had been 
successfully completed. 
The United Nations General Assembly established a commission in 
February 1962 to assist Rwanda in both establishing an authentic independent 
state and create an opportunity for (mostly Tutsi) refugees to return to the 
country, after fleeing due to violence enacted during the two year Hutu 
Revolution. The UN estimated over 135,000 Rwandans were living in Congo, 
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Burundi, Uganda, and Tanganyika. On a site visit to Rwanda, the commission 
determined that Tutsis were subject to social and political exile, that roadblocks 
existed to prevent free travel between provinces in the country, and that racism 
against the Tutsi minority was rampart.  The commission warned Kayibanda, the 
acting Prime Minister, that the regime’s behavior jeopardized fundamental human 
rights. A few months later, on July 1, 1962, Rwanda was formally declared an 
independent nation and Kayibanda declared president. The deposed King 
Ndahindurwa decamped to Uganda, never to return to Rwanda.258 
The next local elections were held in August 1963, one year after President 
Kayibanda and his coalition government took control of the country.  Kayibanda’s 
party, the PARMEHUTU, dominated the communal elections, earning 97.9% of 
the vote.259  The dominance of the Hutu Power party in Rwanda was cemented. 
Tutsi Massacres, 1959 to 1962 – Necropolitics in Rwanda 
 At the heart of the Hutu Revolution lay violence.  From the fall of 
November 1959, when PARMEHUTU leader Dominique Mbonyumutwa was 
beaten, until shortly before independence was formally declared on July 1, 1962, a 
series of massacres against Tutsi people (elite Tutsi and petit tutsi alike) occurred 
throughout the country. Logiest and the Belgian regime chose, as a matter of 
policy favoring the Hutu population, to stand by and do nothing to protect either 
the Tutsi elite or petit tutsi targeted in these massacres.  
Necropolitics 
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 Mbembe has defined necropolitics as 
The ultimate expression of sovereignty resides, to a large degree, in 
the power and the capacity to dictate who may live and who must 
die. Hence, to kill or allow to live constitute the limits of 
sovereignty, its fundamental attributes. To exercise sovereignty is 
to exercise control over mortality and to define life as the 
deployment and manifestation of power.260 
 
In the period of the Hutu Revolution, the Belgian colonialists did not engage in the 
individual, physical act of killing Tutsi citizens. Instead, Colonel Logiest 
instructed his Belgian staff to watch passively as Hutu elite, the soon-to-be 
leaders of the country, orchestrated and carried out, sometimes with their own 
hands, more often via supervision of local leaders, massacres against Tutsi 
residents.  
Prior to colonialism, targeted pogroms such as this did not exist. Physical 
skirmishes and even small wars had occurred in pre-colonial times, usually 
revolving around land, cattle, and local control. Never before the Hutu Revolution 
had targeted, unprovoked killings occurred – and never targeted towards a 
racialized minority. In racializing the Hutu and Tutsi people in the 1920s, the 
Belgians created a race distinction between two peoples where none had 
previously existed. Speke’s race theory in action forty years later led to a 
manufactured race struggle. 
 Foucault has argued that race struggle defines one race, the superrace, as 
ìthe race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is 
entitled to define the normî and the subrace as those whom the superrace must 
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defend society against.261 In post-colonial Rwanda, the Hutu elite defined 
themselves as the one true race, having internalized the Belgian ‘story’ of Tutsis 
being non-indigenous peoples from other regions of Africa. After years of 
subjugation from the Tutsis at the hand of the Belgians, Hutu elites seeking power 
adopted the belief that Hutus and Tutsis were indeed separate races and that the 
Tutsi race presented a threat to the sanctity of the future state of Rwanda.  
Necropolitics in action – Massacres of Tutsi in Rwanda 
Over the course of nearly three years, Hutus sought a revolution – not to 
be free from the Belgian colonialists – but to be free from domination by the 
Tutsis and to invert that relationship so the Hutus would take on the attributes of 
Foucault’s superrace and the Tutsi the subrace, considered a threat to the state 
and therefore fair game for subjugation and persecution. 
In Gitarama, on November 2, 1959, one day after the beating of 
PARMEHUTU leader Dominique Mbonyumutwa, a number of Tutsi local 
leaders were killed, and thousands of Tutsi homes were burned in the surrounding 
area.  Within two days, the attacks had spread to Nyanza, where looting and 
burning of homes continued.  By November 5, the fires and rampant looting 
extended to Ruhengeri and then Gisenyi and Kibuye the following day. On 
November 7, nearly 200 Hutus traveled from the northern part of the country to 
Rubengera and engaged in massive looting and home burning. The violence spread 
to Byumba and Kigali that same day. The next day, the violence spread to the 
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northern end of the Ruhengeri region, including Mulera and Rwankeri. Tutsis were 
killed and a number were injured. The fighting continued to spread to Butare by 
November 10.  On November 11, Colonel Logiest declared a state of emergency 
and placed Rwanda under military rule.262 After the declaration of a military state, 
the Belgian authorities restricted Rwandans’ movement and exercise of civil 
liberties.  The massacres, looting, and burning of Tutsi homes stopped for over six 
months. 
Shortly before the summer local elections of 1960, targeted violence and 
massacres of Tutsis started once again.  On June 6, 1960, 70 Tutsi homes were 
burned down in the Gikongoro region. Within one week, 70 additional Tutsi 
homes in Kigali were burned, while 1,165 Tutsi homes were burned in Gikongoro 
and Ciyanika. Two weeks later, the Beglian administration sent central security 
forces to the Bufundu area prior to the local election.  The forces killed 10 Tutsi 
members of UNAR, the monarchist political party.263 Later that fall, in October, 
local authorities killed 13 Tutsis in Kibingo commune after a local Tutsi man 
refused to present his identity pass to a local police officer.264 And in Astrida 
(now Butare) between September and October 1961, around 150 Tutsi were 
killed, 3,000 houses burned and 22,000 Tutsis were displaced.265 
In February and March of 1962, shortly before the Kayibanda coalition 
government assumed office, Tutsi monarchists who had fled the country during 
earlier progroms conducted two raids in the Byumba prefecture (the northeastern 
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border region of Rwanda).  These raids were swiftly followed by severe 
government reprisals on local Tutsi populations. Somewhere between 1,000 and 
2,000 Tutsi residents were killed in the day following the inyenzi266 March raid.  
Witnesses reported that women and children were massacred in broad daylight, 
huts burned, and personal property of the deceased shared amongst the local Hutu 
population.267 
 During the violence of the revolution, Tutsis fled the country in masses.  
Intellectuals, priests, students, civil servants, wealthy business leaders, and those 
with financial means left for neighboring Burundi, Uganda, and other countries in 
the Great Lakes region by the hundreds of thousands.  By 1962, over 135,000 
Tutsis had left Rwanda.  By 1964, this number had grown to nearly 340,000.268 
The Hutu Revolution’s violence had succeeded in reducing the Tutsis to an even 
smaller minority, and had firmly established the Hutu the superrace within 
Rwanda. Necropolitics would remain the order of government for the next 30 
years. 
The Kayibanda regime – a state of exception 
 President Kayibanda assumed official control of Rwanda on July 1, 
1962, the day independence was recognized by the Belgian colonialists. Within 
three months of independence, Kayibanda orchestrated the creation and 
implementation of a national constitution, granting himself executive power over 
the legislative and judicial branches of government. A newly established National 
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Assembly, in which only PARMEHUTU members were allowed to run for office, 
was subject to his veto power. The Council of Ministers were similarly under his 
jurisdiction. Kayibanda’s government granted him exclusive control to nominate 
and remove judicial officers, military officers, ministers, and state agency heads.269 
Several years into the First Republic’s regime, legislative elections were held. On 
October 3, 1965, the PARMEHUTU candidates won all 47 seats on the ballot.270 
They were the only party allowed to run candidates.  Kayibanda was 
overwhelmingly elected President in 1965, as he was the only candidate on the 
ballot. In 1969, he was re-elected with 100% of the vote. Once again, the single-
party state did not allow other parties to form or run for office. Several years 
later, in May 1973, the Rwandan constitution was amended so that President 
Kayibanda could serve seven years per term, and to permit him to stand for a 
third term.271 In the First Republic, Kayibanda’s will ruled supreme. 
The State of Exception 
 Agamben has stated that “the state of exception appears as a threshold of 
indeterminacy between democracy and absolutism.”272 Kayibanda’s newly 
established regime, billed as a democracy to the world, was in actuality structured 
to allow Kayibanda to wield concentrated power over the state. Every branch of 
government, every agency, every function of the state, was subject to his will. 
While Kaybianda was democratically elected by a majority of the Rwandan 
people (although it was not legal to run candidates against him), his government 
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was one of absolute control, one that eschewed the checks and balances necessary 
to a functioning democracy. Carl Schmitt famously stated the “sovereign is he 
who decides on the exception.”273 In this respect, Kayibanda himself served as the 
sovereign of Rwanda, as he alone was vested with the power to ultimately 
determine the law. 
The “state of exception” describes a sovereign’s suspension of the rule of 
law, often via the “provisional abolition of the distinction among legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers.”274 First articulated in 1922 by Schmitt, the state 
of exception referred to a sovereign’s power to suspend law in “a case of extreme 
peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like.”275 More recently, 
Agamben has argued that the state of exception has become the norm – that rather 
than used solely in times of emergency or threat to the state, sovereigns have 
declared a state of exception, then continued the suspension of the juridical order 
indeterminately in order to make the suspension of law the norm.276 The First 
Republic established a state of exception at the inception; this carried on through 
the regime’s duration.  
Amnesty for Hutu extremists 
 One of Kayibanda’s first acts as President was to grant amnesty to 
civilians who had engaged in ‘political infractions’ between April 1 and December 
1, 1961.  Shortly before official independence was declared, Belgian Colonel 
Logiest had granted amnesty for political crimes committed between October 1959 
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and April 1961.277 Kayibanda’s National Assembly established a Political 
Amnesty Commission to grant amnesty for crimes committed from October 1959 
(the start of the Hutu Revolution) to December 1961.278  
The amnesty decrees permitted Hutu extremists who had committed 
crimes of murder, pillaging, arson, and theft to escape accountability. Many of 
these individuals continued to serve in local and state positions in the Kayibanda 
regime. While the legal system created in Kayibanda’s constitution established a 
penal code, the President’s grant of amnesty exempted Hutu extremists from the 
penalties and responsibilities attached to that code. The sovereign suspended the 
rule of law to grant them freedom from that law; the extremists acted with 
impunity. The periodic grant of amnesty to those Rwandans who had engaged in 
clearly unlawful activity – murder, looting, arson, theft, and more – maintained the 
suspension of law for Hutus supporting the regime’s hostile views towards the 
minority Tutsi. 
Education, Government and Civil Life 
In the early years of Kayibanda’s regime, the higher education system, 
controlled by the Catholic church, continued to enroll and matriculate mostly 
Tutsi students.  Prior to the revolution, wealthy Tutsis were the only people in 
the country who could afford the private education, and the Church had long 
shown a preference for educating elite Tutsi.  While Church leaders had shifted 
their loyalty to Hutu political leaders and had ensured that primary and secondary 
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schools were enrolling mostly Hutu students, the university system had remained 
largely unchanged since the 1920s.279 
 In August 1966, Kayibanda instituted a major change in Rwandan 
educational law. In response to growing criticism that the university system was 
too partial to Tutsi students, the President altered the entire education system by 
placing it under state control.  The law first stated that all school buildings 
constructed with the use of state dollars were now owned by the state.  The state 
took over control of hiring and firing all school employees, and granted the state 
oversight for admissions, expulsion, and promotion of students in the school 
system.  The state also asserted authority to determine curriculum and choose 
textbooks. Catholic-led schools now submitted to Rwandan state control and 
oversight. This change allowed the state to ensure that Hutu students dominated 
in all levels of education in Rwanda.280 
 Several years later, Kayibanda established a strict quota system for Tutsi 
participation in government and civil life.  In 1969, the PARMEHUTU Congress 
established a law creating ‘ethnic equilibrium’ in secondary schools, universities, 
and civil service.281 Enrollment in schools was limited to 9% for Tutsi children, 
based on the census conducted around the time of independence. Within civil 
service, no more than 9% of employees were allowed to be Tutsi.  The 9% quota 
was even implemented within private industry and other sectors of 
employment.282 The effect was immediate.  In the 1972-73 school year, no Tutsi 
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students were accepted to any secondary schools in the nation, and not one Tutsi 
student was admitted into the National University of Rwanda.283 
Committees of Public Safety  
While the new policies were certainly effective in isolating Tutsis within 
the country, the outbreak of violence in Burundi in early 1972 exacerbated the 
peril in which Rwandan Tutsi lived. On April 20, 1972, the neighboring Tutsi-led 
Burundi government engaged in a brutal series of killings of Hutu Burundians.  
Over 200,000 Hutus were killed by the government, including every Hutu cabinet 
member, half of the Hutu teachers, many civil servants, and all of the Hutu army 
officers. The government sought to kill every Hutu male over the age of fourteen. 
Over 200,000 Hutu survivors fled Burundi and settled in Rwanda, seeking 
protection from the heavily pro-Hutu Rwandan government.284 President 
Kayibanda utilized this situation as an opportunity to start a crackdown in the 
country against Tutsis within the education, government and private industry 
systems. 
From the fall of 1972 through the spring of 1973, educated Hutu groups 
conducted evaluations of these sectors to ensure that the ethnic quota system was 
being followed.285 Calling themselves ‘Committees of Public Safety’, future 
genocide leaders Pasteur Bizimungu, Ferdinand Nahimana, and Lèon Mugesera 
(among others) posted lists of Tutsi students in all secondary schools and 
universities throughout the country to purge them from the institutions.  Their 
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movement was replicated in government and private industry, and wealthy Hutus 
and European expats were instructed to fire their Tutsi house help.286 
Several hundred Tutsis were killed and their huts burned down in Gitarama 
around this same time (Gitarama was President Kayibanda’s home region). As the 
violence spread, President Kayibanda established a commission to inspect schools 
and enforce the quota system on March 22, 1973.287 The violence ended at that 
time, but the purging of Tutsis from industry, education, and government 
continued. It is widely believed that the government orchestrated and supported 
the Committees of Public Safety, as the lists were posted – and Tutsis expelled -  
in government-controlled areas such as schools, government agencies, and civil 
services sectors such as state-owned hospitals. 
 In the state of exception, “the state continues to exist, while law 
recedes.”288 Kayibanda’s First Republic existed for eleven years, while law was 
routinely suspended, ignored, or adjusted to meet the sovereign’s desire to retain 
ultimate power and control over its people. Moreover, Kayibanda’s regime sought 
to redefine the concept of its people via a process of political dehumanization. 
People v. people 
 In Kayibanda’s sovereign, Tutsi Rwandans were members of Foucault’s 
subrace – the lesser race that the superrace must defend society against. As a 
people who had been artificially separated from the population as a whole by the 
Belgian colonialists, and over time seen as a threat to the political and social 
  123 
success of the Hutu population, the First Republic sought to maintain the 
distinction between Hutu and Tutsi. Specifically, the sovereign sought to maintain 
a distinction that defined the Tutsi as a threat to the Republic. To achieve this 
distinction, the First Republic began the process of removing political and social 
rights from the Tutsi subrace in Rwanda. In effect, the sovereign sought to 
transform the Tutsi from People to people. 
Agamben articulates the biopolitical split between People and people. 
People are juridical beings, those who have social, political and legal rights within a 
society. People are the humans who retain their biopolitical selves, with the power 
and ability to engage in civil and political life.  They have the ability to influence 
the social life in which they reside and interact. On the other hand, people are the 
naked life, individuals who have only their physical body and life.  They live 
without social, legal or political value. people are those human individuals without 
the ability to exercise political or social agency within the community.289 
Under this theory, people, once rendered as such by the sovereign, are 
subject to the state of exception without recourse. The sovereign can act with 
impunity towards the people because they have no biopolitical value or power.  
As Agamben says, “The state of exception, which is what the sovereign each and 
every time decides, takes place precisely when naked life . . . is explicitly put into 
question and revoked as the ultimate foundation of political power.”290 
Kayibanda’s First Republic enacted laws and policies that, over time, sought to 
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reduce the Tutsi to people – bodies with human life, but no political, social, or 
civic power. 
During the 1959 revolution, Kaybianda, then the leader of the Hutu power 
movement, declared that Rwanda should be segregated into two separate sub-
countries.  He believed that the Hutu and Tutsi should live as “two nations in a 
single state” and that the Hutu and Tutsi should live in Rwanda with “no 
intercourse and no sympathy, who are as ignorant of each other’s habits, 
thoughts, and feelings as if they were dwellers of different zones, or inhabitants of 
different planets.”291  While he later softened his rhetoric in response to the 
United Nations’ intervention and the creation of the New York Accord, his beliefs 
about segregation between the two communities certainly formed his practices as 
the first Rwandan president; he enacted a series of reforms, presidential decrees, 
and policies and practices that separated the Tutsi people from the majority Hutu 
in political, social, and civic spheres. 
 The New York Accord, signed by Kayibanda and Tutsi leaders shortly 
before formal independence, had created a framework for a coalition government 
that shared power between Hutus and Tutsis.  Many Tutsis who fled during the 
Hutu Revolution returned to Rwanda after the signing of the Accord in order to 
serve in the coalition government. For a short time, the Accord appeared to be in 
place, although power rested almost exclusively in the hands of President 
Kayibanda. While violence against Tutsis occurred in Ruhengeri during 1962, the 
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rest of the country was fairly peaceful during this short period. However, after the 
Tutsi invasion from Burundi in late 1963, Kayibanda abandoned 
accommodationist behavior and returned to a state position of the active 
persecution of Tutsis.292 
Threats of Extermination  
In a March 1964 speech in Kigali directed to Rwandan refugees living in 
neighboring Burundi, Uganda, and other neighboring countries, President 
Kayibanda announced that if Rwandan rebel troops were to invade the capital, 
their actions would lead to “the total and sudden end of the Tutsi race.”293 It was 
clear that Kayibanda intended to return to his earlier views of the Tutsi subrace, as 
articulated in the Hutu Manifesto and pre-presidential statements about the Tutsi 
minority. It was at this time President Kayibanda moved quickly to designate 
Tutsi as people in Rwanda via the successive passage of decrees, laws, and 
policies that stripped the Tutsi population of the ability to hold positions of 
power in government, civil service, or education. 
In the same March 1964 speech, President Kayibanda answered charges 
that his administration had committed a genocide against the Tutsi people in the 
reprisals of late 1963 by blaming the government’s massacres on the Tutsi refugee 
attackers. Kayibanda claimed that the Tutsi refugee attackers ‘knew’ that their 
incursions into Rwanda would prompt a violent response by Rwandan Hutus 
against local Tutsi residents.  He said “Who is guilty of genocide? Who organized 
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genocide? Who came looking for genocide? Who wants genocide?”294 It was during 
this seminal speech that the sovereign’s belief about the biopolitical power of the 
Tutsis was made clear; the First Republic saw the Tutsi minority as people – 
those without value in the political and social sphere. As a perceived threat to the 
integrity of the Republic, the Tutsi were categorized (identity cards), marginalized 
(quotas, removal from positions), and prevented from political participation (one-
party rule, limited to Hutu members of PARMEHUTU). 
Camps (forced relocation and restriction of movement) 
 As noted earlier, a key platform of the Hutu Manifesto was the retention 
and utilization of identity cards. Established by the Belgians to differentiate 
between the ‘Hamitic’ Tutsi and the ‘Negroid’ Hutu, and used as a tool of 
repression against Hutu for over 40 years, the Hutu elite who ascended to power 
in the early 1960s sought to utilize the very system of oppression used against 
themselves as a tool of oppression against the Tutsi. The cards were swiftly put 
into use as a tool for the First Republic to marginalize the Tutsi in education, 
government, and civil life. As such, they were an extremely useful tool in the 
process of dehumanizing the Tutsi and transforming their status in Rwanda from 
People to people. In 1964, President Kayibanda increased the utilization of the 
identity cards to include Rwandans’ domicile, further restricting the biopolitical 
power of the Tutsi people. 
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In the early 1960s, Kayibanda enacted the practice of paysannat, a policy 
that required ‘compulsory villagization’ within less densely populated portions of 
the country.295 The system granted land to nuclear families living in a specific 
village area, with a grant of land for agriculture surrounding their habitation. For 
peasants, this was often the only way to get access to land and, thus, 
livelihood.296  Paysannat was only implemented in parts of the country, but its 
impact was the concentration of Tutsi communities in certain regions.  
The policy forced Tutsis to relocate from the northern part of the country 
in Ruhengeri (where land was fertile and drought and famine less likely to strike) 
to the Bugesera region, south of Kigali. The Bugesera region is arid and infested 
with the tsetse fly, so it was sparsely inhabited until the government’s forced 
relocations during the 1960s. It is said that the Kaybianda regime forced Tutsis to 
this region in the hopes that they would be unable to find arable land on which to 
live, and would not survive.297  
Kayibanda enacted a law in 1964 that required Rwandans to register their 
domicile on their identity cards. If a Rwandan wished to move his or her residence, 
the state required that s/he notify the local communal authorities prior to moving, 
and inform the authorities the precise location of the new domicile. Citizens were 
also required to provide proof that the communal authorities in the Rwandan’s 
new domicile had granted permission for them to move into the new 
community.298 This practice allowed the Republic to restrict movement within the 
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country; Tutsis who had been forcibly relocated to the least habitable areas of the 
country were not permitted to leave. 
For Agamben, the camp is the essence of the state of exception – it 
embodies the state of exception in its purest and strongest form.  In a camp, the 
sovereign can commit any act it chooses and engage in any behavior it wants to, 
without any recourse from the people – because the people have ceased being 
People and exist as only people, the naked life. He states that “[t]he camp is the 
space that opens up when the state of exception starts to become the rule. … In 
other words, if sovereign power is founded on the ability to decide on the state of 
exception, the camp is the structure in which the state of exception is permanently 
realized.”299 Kayibanda’s policies that displaced, restricted, and monitored the 
movements of the Tutsi minority in Rwanda created a sort of camp within the 
country; people who were neither free to move nor make decisions about their 
livelihood. 
Pogroms of 1962-1973 – Necropolitics continued 
 Much of the violence occurring during Kayibanda’s regime followed the 
pattern established in the Hutu Revolution years, as the President and 
PARMEHUTU party leaders were consolidating power and preparing to 
monopolize government after independence.  The regime’s use of necropolitics 
continued. 
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During the First Republic, the sovereign utilized the power of death as a 
tool of control and repression over the minority Tutsi, as they had begun during 
the revolutionary years. As Mbembe said, “the ultimate expression of sovereignty 
resides, to a large degree, in the power and the capacity to dictate who may live 
and who must die. … To exercise sovereignty is to exercise control over mortality 
and to define life as the deployment and manifestation of power.”300 And for 
Mbembe, like Foucault, that decision-making power on the part of the sovereign is 
regulated by racism. “In the economy of biopower, the function of racism is to 
regulate the distribution of death and to make possible the murderous functions of 
the state. It is, he says, ‘the condition for the acceptability of putting to 
death.’”301 As the superrace, the Hutu elite of the Kayibanda regime utilized the 
ultimate power of the state to determine who lives and who dies. In every case of 
violence over the eleven years of the First Republic, the Tutsi died. 
The violence began in Kayibanda’s home region of Gitarama (in central 
Rwanda, south of capitol city Kigali) and was strongest in PARMEHUTU 
strongholds such as Ruhengeri and Gisenyi in the northwestern portion of the 
country. Ruhengeri was a particularly active region for Hutu oppression in 1962. 
On July 4, the Ruhengeri local government executed 100 young Tutsi men.  On 
December 1, 1962, the same government enacted a summary execution of 14 
young Tutsi men suspected of being inyenzi activists.  And on Christmas Eve that 
year, all opposition parties in Ruhengeri were executed. The local government 
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leader in Ruhengeri, Barthazar Bicamumpaka, was a PARMEHUTU leader and 
ally of President Kayibanda.302 
 In November and December 1963, Tutsi refugees living in Burundi invaded 
the Bugesera region, coming within twenty miles of the capitol city of Kigali. 
Burundi, home to 50,000 Tutsi refugees, was the most common staging ground for 
military attacks in Rwanda.  In addition to its proximity and large refugee 
population of Tutsi refugees, Burundi was already home to a large and powerful 
Burundian Tutsi population.303  The invasion was not well planned and the Tutsi 
soldiers lacked proper equipment and weaponry (they were mostly bearing 
spears, bows and arrows),304 but they advanced quickly due to the surprise nature 
of the attack and the Rwandan government’s lack of preparedness. However, the 
Kayibanda government quickly regrouped and pushed back the invasion. The 
retaliation against local Tutsi was swift and brutal.   
In Cyangugu, over 80 Tutsi were shot in the woods.305 In Gikongoro and 
Nyanza, 10,000 Tutsi were killed.306  Over the course of four days, families were 
killed with clubs, bodies were thrown into the local river; local government 
officials had encouraged the residents of the region to engage in the mass killing.307 
The local prefect, Andrè Nkeramugabe, reportedly speaking at a rally of 
PARMEHUTU party members and burgomasters (local appointed officials), said 
“we are expected to defend ourselves. The only way to go about it is to paralyze 
the Tutsi.  How? They must be killed.”308 After decimating the local Tutsi 
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population, the government then executed all remaining Tutsi politicians in the 
country.309 
 Between 1964 and the fall of 1966, local prefectures engaged in sporadic 
violence against the Tutsi population.  On January 18-19, 1964, local Tutsis were 
massacred in retaliation after Tutsi refugees from Burundi attempted to enter the 
country.310 It is unclear whether these massacres were initiated by Kayibanda’s 
central government structure, or if they were merely tolerated by the President’s 
office as a part of the government’s overall hostility towards Tutsi and support of 
vigilante violence as a tool of repression.  However, in November 1996, a series of 
summary executions were held in Cyangugu, Gisenyi, and Kibungo, and a number 
of additional Tutsis were arrested, including women and children.311  Following 
this round of summary executions, pogroms faded.  By this time, more than 
20,000 Tutsis had been killed at the hands of state and local government actors, 
and over 300,000 Tutsis were living abroad as refugees.312  
 Between 1966 and February 1973, local communities continued the 
intermittent killing of Tutsis.  These incidents were small, infrequent, and yet no 
one was ever held accountable for the killings.  In February 1973, attacks on petit 
Tutsis began once again in the countryside.  Tutsi priests and nuns were killed, 
Tutsis were killed, their houses burned, and their belongings shared by Hutus in 
the community.313  These killings continued through March 1973, at which time 
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President Kayibanda established formal commissions (Committees of Public 
Safety) to purge Tutsis from education and civil life. 
Habyarimana coup 
 Taking advantage of the confusion, division, and civil unrest in the 
country, army chief General Juvènal Habyarimana staged a ‘bloodless coup’ on 
July 5, 1973, unseating President Kayibanda.314 Because Habyarimana had been 
the chief architect of the 1972-1973 Committees on Public Safety, it is widely 
believed that he instigated the civil unrest in order to create a climate conducive to 
a coup.315  
Kayibanda and his wife were imprisoned and starved to death, allegedly 
because Habyarimana harbored a superstitious belief that murdering his former 
boss would bring him harm.316 Kayibanda died on December 15, 1976.317 
Habyarimana’s chief of security, Thèoneste Lizinde, orchestrated the murder of 
sixty-five former officials in the Kayibanda government.318 In 1974, Lizinde 
oversaw the summary execution of former PARMEHUTU dignitaries from 
Gitarama (Kayibanda’s home region).319 
On July 5, 1973, the day he staged the coup, Habyarimana declared “we 
can no longer tolerate ethnic discrimination.”320 He declared the day one of “peace 
and reconciliation”321 and claimed the coup was a ‘moral revolution.’322 
Habyarimana’s coup was seen with relief by Tutsis and many Hutus within the 
country, as he promised peace, unity and industry.  After months of turmoil and, 
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for Tutsis, years of living in fear of physical harm or murder, the idea of peace and 
unity was a godsend. Habyarimana promised an end to the violence against Tutsis 
in Rwanda and a focus on stabilizing the country’s precarious economic situation. 
From 1973 to 1990, Tutsis lived in relative peace. Progroms stopped and home 
burnings and lootings ended. However, Habyarimana’s idea of peace did not 
include political or economic security or participation for Tutsis in Rwanda. 
Instead, Habyarimana established a system of discrimination based on both 
ethnicity (Tutsis) and geography (partiality towards his home region in the north, 
discrimination against Kayibanda’s region in the south).323 
Upon declaring himself President, Habyarimana dissolved the National 
Assembly.324  He established a National Committee for Peace and Unity, which 
was comprised of civilians and military officials loyal to him.  The Committee had 
no real power; he appointed and removed all members and the committee was 
answerable to him.325 In June 1974, President Habyarimana established a court 
martial system and sentenced Kayibanda and seven other members of the First 
Republic’s regime to death.326 
Habyarimana ruled without a Parliament for three years, and in 1976 when 
he created a new legislative body, he called it the National Council for 
Development (rather than an Assembly or Parliament), to denote its focus on 
economic development, and granted it very little legislative power.327 
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Habyarimana’s decision to abolish the Parliament and maintain total 
control over the state extended the First Republic’s state of exception. Notes 
Agamben, “One of the essential characteristics of the state of exception – the 
provisional abolition of the distinction among legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers – here shows its tendency to become a lasting practice of government.”328 
Although power changed hands violently between the First and Second Republic, 
the lasting practice of the state of exception held steady. 
Habyarimana regime and legal changes (state of exception cont’d) 
 Habyarimana promised an end to killings and to bring unity and peace to 
the country. Under his reign, pogroms against the Tutsi minority did cease. 
Systematic discrimination against Tutsi, however, continued in a different form. 
While Rwandan Tutsis could live free from random physical persecution and 
killings, they were subject to political and civil exclusion in society.  Habyarimana 
continued Kayibanda’s policy of preventing Tutsi from biopolitical participation 
in Rwandan life; they remained people in the Second Republic. Habyarimana 
included only one Tutsi in his nineteen-member cabinet; only one prefect in the 
country was Tutsi; not a single burgomaster was Tutsi; only one ambassador was 
Tutsi; and only two deputies in the national assembly (out of 70) were Tutsi. 
Tutsis were not allowed to serve as officers in the army, and Hutu army members 
were not allowed to marry Tutsi women.329 
Umuganda 
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In February 1974, President Habyarimana established umuganda, a 
program that required every Rwandan to engage in forced labor on Saturdays to 
benefit the state. This compulsory labor usually meant that Rwandans had an 
individual duty to assist the state in creating public projects like reforestation, 
bridge building, and agricultural measures to stop erosion. The President explained 
the compulsory work to Europeans by saying “First the population must get 
down to work – the Government and myself want to emphasize the value of work 
on the land. Thus we shall devote each Saturday to tilling the soil with hoes in our 
hands.”330 In practice, Hutu elite were exempt from the practice, but the work was 
exacted from the poor Hutu and the petit Tutsi who had no political say in 
governance, state or local. 
Amnesty for Hutu extremists 
 Like Kayibanda, Habyarimana granted amnesty to Hutus who had engaged 
in violent massacres against Tutsis. On November 22, 1974, the President issued 
amnesty to those engaged in violence on September 18-19, 1968.331 The President 
would continue to periodically grant amnesty to perpetrators of murders against 
Tutsis in Rwanda. Regardless of Rwandan law that called for legal punishment of 
crimes enacted by Hutu extremists, the law was once again suspended for Hutus 
engaging in extralegal activities on behalf of the Republic and the regime. Repeated 
incidents of murder, arson, theft, robbery, assault and other crimes were 
acceptable under the state of exception. 
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Camps, continued 
 The President carried on Kayibanda’s requirement that Rwandans gain 
approval from local commune leaders prior to moving within the country. 
Generally, Rwandans were only allowed to move within the country to attend a 
secondary school or university, or if they had been hired at a job in another area 
within the country. Rwandan identity cards continued to list a person’s home 
address, so that Rwandans would not travel far or often.332 This practice allowed 
the President to ‘keep tabs’ on Tutsis (largely located in the south and southwest, 
and northwest) and Kayibanda’s Hutu elite (in the Gitarama region). 
 Commune leaders were required to submit monthly reports of births, 
deaths, and lists of who moved in and out of the commune between reports. Local 
leaders informed superiors about ‘suspicious’ people within the district, and high 
ranking government officials were required to take military training courses in 
order to better report information about Rwandans to the central government.333 
The Second Republic expanded Kayibanda’s camps to include even greater control 
over the subjects within. 
Education, Government and Civil Life 
 In 1975, Habyarimana revised and applied the Rwandan policy of ethnic 
equilibrium. He also revised the policy to enact what he called regional 
equilibrium.334 What this meant, in effect, was that the discrimination against 
Tutsis in the civil service, government, and educational systems remained in place, 
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but that additional discrimination was also carried out against southern Hutus who 
were loyal to the Kayibanda regime. 
In 1985, Habyarimana revised the Rwandan educational policy.  Under the 
new law, at least 85% of all educational slots available in the country were 
reserved for Hutu, between 10 and 14 percent were reserved for Tutsi, and one 
percent reserved for the Twa.335 That same year, the President revised quota 
policies for civil service positions.  Contrary to Kayibanda’s regime, where the 
official policies discriminated against the Tutsis alone, Habyarimana’s policies 
discriminated between northerners and southerners first, then between Tutsi and 
Hutu.  For example, the new policy reserved 60 percent of civil service positions 
for northerners and 40 percent for southerners.  Within these populations, the 
positions were further divided between Hutus earning 90 percent of positions and 
the Tutsi and Twa splitting the remaining 10 percent.336 The practical result of 
this stratified quota system was that Tutsi in the south (where most Tutsi lived) 
would have access to only 4 percent of civil service positions.337 
Total Control of the Sovereign 
 In July 1975, Habyarimana created a new political party, the MRND. 
From the time he took office in July 1973 to the summer of 1975, there were no 
political parties in Rwanda. With the establishment of the MRND, there was one. 
Other political parties were not permitted to form.338 In 1976, Habyarimana 
created a new constitution declaring all Rwandans were, upon birth, members of 
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the MRND.339 Under the revised Rwandan Constitution, prefects and 
burgomasters were appointed directly by the President.  In Kayibanda’s regime, 
these positions had been ones of popular local elections.340 Several days later, 
President Habyarimana held national elections for the office of President.  He was 
the only candidate to stand for election, and he was overwhelmingly re-elected. 341 
The state of exception continued, well after the coup had settled. It had become 
the norm, the standard practice in Rwanda. 
 In 1980, one of Habyarimana’s former staffers, Major Lizinde, was 
arrested along with thirty other northern Hutus, and accused of plotting a coup 
against the President. Lizinde, who had served as the Rwandan head of security, 
was tried along with 46 other individuals in 1981 of conspiracy to overthrow the 
government. He was sentenced to death. Some seven months later, President 
Habyarimana pardoned Lizinde and commuted his sentence from death to life in 
prison. While in prison, Lizinde was brought on new charges, accused of 
murdering patriots of the First Republic under Kayibanda, and was once against 
sentenced to death.342 Habyarimana exacted total control and decision-making 
power over the courts, implementation of laws, and the power of life and death of 
the citizens of Rwanda. 
Habyarimana was re-elected to a third term in December 1988 with 
99.98% of the vote.343 Once again, he was the only candidate on the ballot. The 
constitution remained unchanged, and Habyarimana’s micromanaged control over 
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local government continued unabated. And In 1989, Habyarimana granted amnesty 
to approximately 3,000 individuals imprisoned throughout the country.  On 
September 7, 1990, he granted additional decrees of amnesty to individuals 
accused of engaging in massacres of Tutsi civilians.344 
State of Siege 
Just weeks after his last grant of amnesty to Hutu government officials and 
civilians who had previously attacked and killed Tutsis, the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front launched its October 1990 attack.  President Habyarimana responded by 
declaring a state of siege and suspending law within the country.345 The state of 
siege was sustained in Rwanda from the fall of 1990 through the three month 
genocide in spring 1994. The state of siege created military rule of law in the 
country and permitted military officers to arrest civilians for historically domestic 
infractions, such as setting items on fire, destroying objects, trees, plants, 
monuments, and more.346 While the Second Republic had implemented the state of 
exception from 1973 through 1990, the formal declaration of the state of siege 
removed all remaining vestiges of the rule of law in Rwanda. 
The Akazu 
 Habyarimana descended from a Hutu family of questionable lineage – 
rumors persisted that his grandfather had immigrated to Rwanda from either Zaire 
or Uganda. Regardless of the truth of the rumor, it was well established that his 
ancestry was neither large nor powerful. In order to rule Rwanda closely and 
  140 
tightly, the President needed a network of supporters. Accordingly, he relied 
heavily on his wife’s family and friends to cement support and wield power in the 
country.347 President Habyarimana’s wife, Agathe Kanziga, was a powerful 
woman from a lineage of northern Hutus who had long resisted efforts of pre-
colonial Tutsi kings to corral the north within their circle of  control and influence. 
Her family resided in Bushiru, in the northeastern region of the country. Many in 
Rwanda nicknamed her ‘Kanjogera’ after the Rwandan King Musinga’s powerful 
and scheming mother.348 
 It is said that Madame Agathe created a small, powerful shadow group of 
decision-makers who controlled President Habyarimana and much of the 
country’s political, economic, and power dynamics.  The akazu, meaning ‘little 
house’ was headed by the First Lady and her family members: her three brothers 
Colonel Pierre-Cèlestin Rwagafilita, Sèraphin Rwabukumba (owned La Centrale, a 
major business in the country), and Protais Zigiranyirazo (prefect of Ruhengeri); 
cousin Elie Sagatwa (Habyarimana’s personal secretary), and colleagues Noël 
Mbonabaryi and Colonel Laurent Serubuga.349 Individuals who would prove to be 
responsible for the genocide in later years were also involved in the akazu; Colonel 
Thèoneste Bagosora, Major Leonard Nkundiye, and Captain Pascal 
Simbikangwa.350 
 The akazu ensured that power rested almost exclusively in the hands of 
northern Hutus; Hutus from Gisenyi and Ruhengeri made up a disproportionately 
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large percentage of the leaders established in government posts. Nearly a third of 
the most important posts within Rwanda’s government were held by Hutus from 
one prefecture – Gisenyi.351 
The akazu was reportedly also responsible for a death squad in the 
country, called ‘Zero Network’ – this network was exposed in 1992 by a former 
member, Christophe Mfizi, in an open letter to the President.352 The Zero 
Network included high-ranking officials in the Habyarimana government, including 
Lieutenant Colonel Tharchisse Renzaho, Kigali prefect; Lieutenant Colonel 
Anatole Nsengiyumva, head of army intelligence; François Karera, Kigali deputy 
prefect; Zigiranyirazo, Ruhengeri prefect and Habyarimana’s brother-in-law; and 
Sagatwa, Habyarimana’s secretary and head of the President’s security system.353 
The Zero Network orchestrated massacres of the Bagogwe Tutsi people in 1991, 
over 300 Tutsi civilians in Bugesera in 1992, then shortly thereafter committed 
another round of massacres in Kibuye.354 
The akazu was responsible for ensuring that the country’s power remain 
vested in the hands of the President, his wife, and her family and friends. At one 
point in the late 1980s, President Habyarimana appeared to be grooming a friend, 
Colonel Stanislas Mayuya, as a potential presidential successor. The akazu 
orchestrated the murder of Mayuya in April 1988. Shortly thereafter, the sergeant 
who shot Mayuya was killed while in jail, and the prosecutor assigned to the case 
was also murdered.355 Journalists in the country who attempted to write about the 
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government’s abusive practices or to expose the akazu’s illegal activity were also 
arrested and sometimes killed.356  
Drought, famine, coffee collapse 
 Famine, which hit Rwanda in the late 1980s, was not a new phenomenon. 
In 1916-17, around the time the Belgians wrested control of the region from the 
Germans, the country faced a great famine.  Famine hit again in 1928-29, but the 
worst famine in Rwanda’s colonial history occurred in 1943-44, when nearly 
300,000 Rwandans died of starvation.357 For over 40 years after the 1940s famine, 
Rwanda struggled with massive poverty and poor health outcomes for its 
residents, but famine was staved off.  That changed in 1989. 
In 1989, global coffee prices plummeted by 50% when the International 
Coffee Agreement dissolved.358 Around the same time, coffee trees in Rwanda 
were afflicted with disease, radically decreasing production. Rwandan farmers 
responded to the diseased trees by cutting down some 300,000 of them, without 
replacement.  Overnight, the coffee export industry, which made up 75 percent of 
Rwanda’s export income, fell dramatically. Income from coffee exports dropped 
over $110 million in a handful of years, from over $144 million in 1985 to $30 
million in the early 1990s.359 Drought and famine in the south and southwestern 
parts of Rwanda increased during this time, the famine increasing in severity as the 
coffee crisis hit the national market.360 Between 1988 and 1989, roughly 300 
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Rwandans died of famine, while many others fled to Tanzania searching for 
food.361 
 Tin prices also collapsed in the late 1980s, leading to the shut down of 
Rwanda’s tin mining industry. In earlier years when coffee was struggling, tin 
exports had increased to pick up the share lost by coffee. When the tin industry 
collapsed, Rwanda was left with virtually no export income.362 
At the same time, the international community implemented a Structural 
Adjustment Programme through the International Monetary Fund. This devalued 
Rwandan currency by two-thirds in 1990, and put coffee farmers in an even 
tighter squeeze.  The national deficit increased from 12 to 18 percent in just three 
years. The IMF required the government to end any subsidization of coffee 
production in the country; doing so would have caused farmers to endure even 
greater privations and poverty. The Rwandan government enacted some 
subsidization of the farmers, and quickly faced the wrath of the IMF. The 
international community refused to give Rwanda its second installation of aid, 
pointing out that the deficit had increased, not reduced as required, and that the 
government continued to aid coffee growers.  The IMF failed to note the absurdity 
of requiring Rwanda to stabilize its deficit and economy while simultaneously 
allowing its greatest export to fail. As a result of the lost aid, Rwanda’s GDP fell 
by over 40%, and more of the population fell into extreme poverty.363 
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Meanwhile, the Second Republic began diverting international aid money 
to purchase weapons for the civil war instead of utilizing those dollars to increase 
the standard of living for Rwandans, or to feed hungry families. Between 1989 and 
1992, Rwanda increased its spending on weapons to nearly 8 percent of GDP.364 
This diversionary spending increased the poverty rates in the country, squeezing 
families out of food, access to land, and sustainability. 
International pressure – threats to Hutu Power 
 In late 1989, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) began to flourish in 
Rwanda. These organizations were almost all international organizations, funded 
by European efforts. It is estimated that, “by the beginning of the 1990s, Rwanda 
had one of Africa’s highest density of NGOs.” One European NGO administrator 
commented at the time that “there was approximately one farmer’s organization 
per 35 households, one cooperative per 350 households, and one development 
NGO per 3,500 households.”365 
 Foreign aid made up a growing percentage of Rwanda’s annual GNP. By 
1986, it was 11% of NGP and in 1991 was up to 22%.366 Along with this aid 
came some measure of international pressure on Habyarimana to enact democratic 
reforms. In 1990, while attending a summit in France, President Habyarimana was 
urged by French President Mitterand to allow a multi-party system in Rwanda.367 
Less than a month later, the President declared his commitment to establishing a 
multi-party system in the country.  
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One year later, in June 1991, President Habyarimana introduced a new 
constitution that permitted political parties to form.368 Despite this, the new 
government formed in December 1991 was made up almost exclusively of MRND 
officials and those loyal to President Habyarimana.369 As civil war continued in 
Rwanda, international bodies became more and more involved. By August 1992, 
the Habyarimana government and the RPF rebels had met on several occasions and 
signed a draft agreement establishing a new rule of law for Rwanda. Yet signs were 
clear that the Hutu extremists in Rwanda had no intention of sharing power with 
Tutsi rebels. In January 1993, Bagosora, who was negotiating on behalf of the 
Rwandan government, stormed out of negotiations and headed to Rwanda to 
continue preparations for a war and genocide.370 While negotiations continued, 
there was great tension within the country about the peace agreement. Not only 
did the agreement require power sharing, it did not grant amnesty to part 
perpetrators of crimes against Tutsi people, as all former administrations from 
Belgian Logiest to Kayibanda to Habyarimana had previously granted.371 The 
pressure was intensifying on Rwandan President Habyarimana to accede to power 
sharing while the pressure from the akazu and the Hutu Power factions within the 
Rwandan government increasingly feared a loss of power and potentially damning 
repercussions for committing past atrocities. 
By the time United Nations forces were deployed to Kigali with a mandate 
to assist in the implementation of the August 1993 Arusha peace agreement, Hutu 
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extremists in the Rwandan government had laid all the groundwork necessary to 
enact a swift and organized genocide of the Tutsi people. For many of them, they 
saw genocide as a natural extension of the oppression committed against Tutsi 
over the last several generations, and a reasonable solution to the presenting 
possibility of loss of power.
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Chapter 5 
GENOCIDE 
The start of the genocide on the evening of April 6th was a temporary shock to the 
nation; while rumors of the President’s demise had been circulating on hate radio 
and in popular hate magazines for months, most Rwandans were surprised to 
learn of the President’s death. It is clear by the actions of Hutu Power extremists 
in the minutes, hours, and days following the President’s assassination, however, 
that his demise was not a surprise to all. Within moments of Habyarimana’s 
death, the state of exception was expanded within Rwanda. From the suspension 
of the implementation of the Arusha Accords, to the establishment of an Interim 
Government, to the execution of a well-planned and efficiently executed genocide 
of over three quarters of the country’s minority Tutsi, the Hutu Power extremists 
in Rwanda created a total state of exception in Rwanda. 
Plane Crash 
 On the morning of April 6, President Habyarimana left Kigali for Dar es 
Salaam to attend a regional summit. While the summit was intended to cover a 
number of regional topics, the main focus was in actuality the Rwandan peace 
process and regional leaders’ concerns about the impact that the growing tensions 
would have on regional stability. The President’s plan was to return to Kigali that 
evening via plane, then hold a nighttime meeting with leaders of the major political 
parties in the country. The President took the both head of the Presidential Guard 
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and the Army Chief of Staff with him to the summit – many believe that he did 
this for his own security, as rumors of his demise had swirled on RTLM radio and 
hate propaganda magazines for months. That morning, before leaving, the 
President had given instructions to his staff to prepare a swearing-in ceremony for 
the transitional government on April 8.372 This ceremony had already been 
postponed a number of times since late 1993. 
 The regional summit included Rwandan President Habyarimana; the 
President of Tanzania, Ali Hassan Mwinyi; Burundian President Cyprien 
Ntariyamira; Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni; Kenyan vice-president George 
Saitoti; and the Organization of African Unity’s Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed 
Salim.373 The meeting was tense; the regional leaders pushed Habyarimana to 
move forward with the Arusha Accords and the peace process for the region’s 
stability and security. The meeting ended late, and as Habyarimana left, he offered 
a ride home to Burundian President Ntariyamira.374 Ntariyamira accepted; 
Habyarimana’s plane was newer, faster, and more comfortable. 
 The President’s plane was full as it approached Kigali. In addition to 
giving a ride home to Burundian President Ntariyamira, President Habyarimana 
also brought his private secretary, Colonel Elie Sagatwa; Major General Dèogratias 
Nsabimana, the army chief of staff; Major Thaddèe Bagaragaza, the Presidential 
Guard commander; Dr. Emmanuel Akingeneye, the President’s personal doctor; 
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and Juvènal Renzaho, his political advisor. Additionally, the Burundian President 
brought two of his cabinet ministers on the plane.375 
 Sometime around 8:20 pm, the President’s plane neared the Kigali 
International Airport. As the plane headed towards the runway, a missile was 
launched towards the plane, hitting one of the wings. Immediately after, a second 
missile hit the rear of the plane, engulfing the plane in flames. The plane hit down 
the presidential palace garden grounds, missing the runway entirely.376 
 At 9 pm that night, Colonel Bagosora and others convened a so-
called Crisis Committee at the Rwanda Government Forces headquarters. The 
Crisis Committee included all the top military leaders in the country still alive. 
The Committee had no legal authority in the country; neither the constitution nor 
the Arusha Accords provided for a Crisis Committee to obtain control in an 
emergency.377 Recognizing this, the Committee invited UNAMIR Force 
Commander Romèo Dallaire to the meeting, in order to assure both him and the 
international community that the meeting and establishment of a Crisis Committee 
was not a coup.378  
The Committee chose Colonel Lèonidas Gatsinzi, who was not present at 
the meeting, as the Chief of Staff of the Crisis Committee, after rejecting 
Bagosora’s proposal that the military take control of the country. UNAMIR 
Force Commander Dallaire had warned the Crisis Committee that the UN force 
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would withdraw entirely if the military claimed control of the country; that would 
have constituted a coup and was a direct violation of the Arusha Accords.379 
According to Rwandan law, interim Prime Minister Agathe 
Uwilingiyimana should have assumed power as the temporary head of state. 
However, the military leaders in the Crisis Committee refused to grant her control 
of the state. They claimed she lacked credibility with the Rwandan people.380 
Later that evening, Bagosora had a meeting with the UN Special Representative to 
Rwanda, Jacques Booh-Booh and Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, the 
UNAMIR mission chief. During this meeting, Booh-Booh reminded Bagosora to 
respect the Arusha Accords and acknowledge Agathe Uwilingiyimana as the 
interim Prime Minister. Bagosora refused, claiming that the “military would not 
accept this” and that she had been “rejected by the members of our government 
and by the Rwandan people.”381 
 During the Crisis Committee meeting, Bagosora received a phone call from 
Lieutenant Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, the commander of military operations 
in the Gisenyi sector. Within minutes of that phone call, Nsengiyumva had given 
orders to begin massacres of Tutsis in Gisenyi.382 
By 9:15 pm, roadblocks had been established by the National Guard 
around the perimeter of Kigali, beyond those normally put in place for the 
President’s customary travel from the aiport to the presidential palace. United 
Nations peacekeepers who left headquarters to head towards the site of the crash 
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were stopped by Presidential Guard members at a roadblock and taken captive to 
the airport. The Presidential Guards took the UN soldiers’ weapons from them.383 
Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana planned to address the Rwandan 
people via Radio Rwanda on the morning of April 7. UNAMIR troops were 
scheduled to escort her to the radio station in the morning, and UNAMIR troops 
were providing her with protection at her home the night of April 6. However, 
Bagosora had instructed a battalion of soldiers to travel to the Prime Minister’s 
house in the middle of night, and had made it clear to them that no one was to 
make it to Radio Rwanda. Agathe never made it out of her home; she was killed 
the next morning around 8:40 am while trying to escape via her backyard. 
Presidential Guards had surrounded her home, prevented her from going to Radio 
Rwanda, and eventually entered the compound and killed her.384 
 By this time, the Presidential Guard and the interahamwe, at Bagosora’s 
direction, were fanning out through Kigali. The genocide had begun, and it would 
continue relentlessly for the next ninety days. 
The Arusha Pressure Cooker 
The genocide was well-planned and executed in an orderly fashion, with 
military, army, militia members, local government leaders, and community leaders 
all working in an efficient, organized manner to kill opposition leaders and Tutsis 
throughout the country. As seen in earlier chapters, the climate was ripe for 
genocide thanks to years of colonial rule followed by two governments dominated 
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by the state of exception. Genocide is never inevitable; the choice of a government 
to kill its people is always a choice that can be made at any given moment in time. 
However, as seen in Rwanda, governments can take a series of actions over time 
that make a climate ripe for genocide to occur. The years of civil war in Rwanda 
and the development of the Arusha Accords to end that war exacerbated an 
already political taught situation. It was clear during the Arusha negotiations that 
the state of exception, which had become the rule in Rwanda, was not tolerated by 
international bodies or by the RPF rebel forces. 
While there is no one starting moment to point to in the Arusha process, 
one could start with the first major ‘request’ from a western power to President 
Habyarimana. For years, Rwanda had been the beneficiary of western aid; this aid 
came with economic and structural change requirements but no requirements for 
liberalization of political policy. Rwanda failed to accede to a number of the 
structural adjustment programs’ socioeconomic change requirements, and the 
response from the international community was tepid.385  It appeared that 
Rwanda could continue its programs of economic discrimination without much 
threat of outside interference.  
However, France’s President Mitterand approached President 
Habyarimana in early July 1990 and told him that future aid and assistance would 
require a liberalization of political policy; namely, the institution of a multi-party 
democratic system. In response to this pressure from France, President 
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Habyiramana announced on July 5, 1990 that he would separate the state and 
party structures from each other and that a multi-party system would be 
implemented in Rwanda.386 
The first significant invasion by the RPF into Rwanda occurred on 
October 1, 1990. The Rwandan government’s response was brutal and swift; the 
RPF retreated quickly once the Rwandan troops (RAF) were mobilized. Heavy 
losses were incurred by the RPF.  On March 29, 1991, the RPF and RAF signed a 
ceasefire agreement.  By this time, the fighting had quieted down, but reprisal 
attacks against Tutsis in Rwanda had been frequent and brutal.387 
Rwanda implemented a new constitution in June 1991 that permitted the 
creation of multiple political parties. Since 1975, only the President’s MRND 
party had existed, and all Rwandans were, upon birth, registered as party 
members.  With the advent of multiple parties, three major oppositions parties 
quickly formed. The MDR (Republican Democratic Movement) party, started by 
First Republic President Kayibanda’s son-in-law Faustin Twagiramungu, was a 
moderate Hutu-dominated party. The PSD (Social Democratic Party) and PL 
(Liberal Party) parties were both somewhat liberal parties, with membership of 
both Hutu and Tutsi included. All three opposition parties were interested in 
creating a future broad-based government that excluded Hutu Power extremists.388 
Transitional Governments 
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Three transitional governments were created in succession over the next 
several years. The first transitional government took office in December 1991.  
The newly created position of Prime Minister was held by Sylvestre Nsanzimana. 
However, the MRND retained control of all but one cabinet position, and the 
PDC (Christian Democratic Party) held that seat. The PDC was a party closely 
connected to the MRND.389 It was clear that this transitional government did not 
change much, if anything, about the power structure in Rwanda or the 
concentration of control held by Habyarimana. 
After heavy opposition from minor parties was voices and major protests 
were held in Kigali, on February 11, 1992, the Rwandan government and the 
opposition parties opened negotiations regarding the formation of a new transition 
government. An agreement was signed on March 13, 1992 and Dismas 
Nsengiyaremye was named the new Prime Minister on April 2. Nsengiyaremye 
was a member of the MDR, the chief opposition party. As a result of the second 
transitional government agreement, the MRND was granted nine cabinet positions 
and the opposition parties ten between them.390 
Just as the negotiations began, a new political party was created, the CDR 
(Coalition for the Defense of the Republic). This party was an extreme Hutu 
Power party, even farther to the right than the President’s power-wielding party, 
the MRND.391 It is believed that the party was formed to provide rightward 
pressure on the MRND to keep it from acceding too much to the more moderate 
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parties and factions within the country. The CDR was openly against any 
reconciliation with the RPF rebel forces and avowedly anti-Tutsi. Within a month, 
the Rwandan government and the RPF began negotiations and set a time-table for 
a peace agreement negotiation. By August 1, 1992, the RPF rebels and the 
government had agreed to implement the cease-fire that had been signed on July 12 
that year.392  
The Accords 
On August 18, the Rwandan government and RPF representatives signed 
the first Accord at Arusha, the accord establishing the rule of law. At this point, 
Hutu extremists within Rwanda became even more hostile to the peace agreement. 
The President’s Chief of Staff was so upset by the government’s actions in 
Arusha that he wrote a letter requesting that the Rwandan government 
representatives be recalled from Arusha to Kigali.393 The rule of law portion of the 
accords did not grant amnesty for past atrocities; it also established a legal order 
that would have prevented and/or punished future acts such as the ones 
committed by Hutu Power activists over the past forty years. 
By October 30, 1992, the first portion of the power sharing agreement was 
signed in Arusha.394 Two weeks later, under significant pressure from the akazu 
and the extremists elements within his government, President Habyarimana 
described the Arusha Accords as ‘shreds of paper’ and congratulated the 
interahamwe for their recent (illegal) activity.395 The Prime Minister, a moderate 
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Hutu, responded to the President’s statement by noting that “such a declaration, 
on the part of an official of your rank, casting doubt on the government’s 
commitments, constitutes a barely disguised repudiation of the Accords and opens 
the way for the relaunch of hostilities.”396 It was clear that the Arusha Accords 
were on shaky grounds; the portion of the Accords that called for power sharing 
would have greatly diminished the power of the President, the akazu, and the 
existing government power structure altogether. After the Prime Minister 
submitted his letter to the President, Habyarimana dismissed Nsengiyaremye from 
his position as Prime Minister. Nsengiyaremye later fled the country, in fear of 
his life. 
 On January 9, 1993, the second part of the power sharing agreement was 
signed – this portion included the protocol for power sharing and a timetable for 
the transition of government authority. On January 25, President Habyarimana 
denounced the Accords which his government had just signed. 397 The President 
saw himself squeezed into an ever-tightening vice grip – on the one side, 
international pressure to sign the Accords and accede to peace, which would 
surely reduce the akazu’s hold on power and subject them all to criminal 
punishment for past atrocities, and on the other side, the increasingly intense 
pressure from the akazu, the CDR, elements of the MRND party, and all those 
enjoying the spoils of the Second Republic who had no intention of letting that 
power and control slip away. The President had few choices. 
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He continued to move forward in a schizophrenic manner; his 
administration negotiated and signed provisions of the peace agreement, while he 
renounced them back in Kigali. Thus, on June 9, the government and RPF signed 
the portion of the Accords that governed the right of return for refugees and 
displaced persons.398 
On July 18, 1993, President Habyarimana agreed to allow Agathe 
Uwilingiyimana to become the Prime Minister until the Arusha Accords were 
completed and implemented. Uwilingiyimana had been nominated as the interim 
Prime Minister by the president of the MDR party, Faustin Twagiramungu.399 
Both were subsequently banned from their own party, as the MDR believed they 
were too moderate and accomodationist towards the RPF. On August 3, the final 
portion of the Arusha Accords were signed, the protocol for the integration of the 
armed forces of the RAF and RPF.400 
On August 4, 1993, President Habyarimana and the RPF signed the 
complete Arusha Accords. The Accords included five major components:  
(1) Rule of law. This portion of the accords required all political parties 
represented in the accords and the new government to follow the rule of law and 
respect human rights. 
(2) Power sharing. This provision required that all elements of the 
government be reformed. A transitional government that included representation 
of all political parties (save the CDR, the extreme Hutu Power party) would be 
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established, pending elections. The President would become a less powerful 
position, with a true balance established between the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches of government. 
(3) Refugees and displaced persons. This section allowed all Rwandan 
refugees the right of return – something vigorously opposed by President 
Habyarimana since 1973. It also outlined the resettlement of internally displaced 
persons, mostly those who had fled the northern areas of Rwanda during the 
1990-1993 civil war. 
(4) Armed forces. This provision outlined the merger of the RPF (Tutsi 
rebel force) and the RAF (Rwandan Armed Forces) into one army. The provision 
required that forty percent of the ranks, and fifty percent of the officers be RPF 
members in both the army and the regular police force (Gendarmerie). The 
Presidential Guard, the lethal force that reported directly to President 
Habyarimara (considered responsible for many past atrocities), would be evenly 
split between the current force and RPF forces. This provision was very 
controversial, and many Hutu Power adherents in the Second Republic were just 
as concerned about this provision as they were about power sharing in 
government. 
(5) Final provisions. This portion included a variety of smaller agreements 
and wrapped up the accords.401 
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The Accords provided that the RPF begin to prepare for the transitional 
government. In order to provide security for the RPF political delegates, the RPF 
moved six hundred RPF soldiers into Kigali. The transitional government was 
scheduled to take office on September 10th, 1993 in Kigali.402  That date came and 
went, with no action. In fact, the United Nations was so slow to take action that 
the UNAMIR fact-finding mission had barely completed its first visit to Rwanda 
by that date. The United Nations Security Council did not approve the UNAMIR 
mandate until October 5, 1993. UNAMIR would not have boots on the ground for 
months.403 
Faustin Twagiramungu had been named as the Prime Minister of the new 
government, with Agathe Uwilingiyamana serving as the interim Prime Minister 
until the transition ceremony occurred. On January 4, 1994, President 
Habyarimana was sworn in for another term of office, but the installation of the 
new government and National Assembly was postponed. On March 18, 1994, the 
Prime Minister to-be, Faustin Twagiramungu announced the members of his 
government. Delay continued.404  
Time and time again, the members of the transitional government prepared 
for a swearing-in ceremony; time and time again, the ceremony was delayed.  
Finally, on April 3, President Habyarimana met with the ambassadors from 
Germany, France and Belgium. They urged immediate establishment of the 
transitional government. International monetary assistance had been blocked by 
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the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) since December 1993. 
The President had run out of places to turn; he had to accede control. The akazu’s 
absolute grip on power in Rwanda was coming to an end, whether or not the 
President was ready.405 
On the morning of the President’s assassination, he gave instructions to 
staff that morning to prepare for a transition ceremony on April 8. That evening, 
his plans were derailed and the genocide began instead. For the akazu and Hutu 
Power extremists, the prospect of power sharing and being held accountable for 
past atrocities committed against Tutsis in Rwanda were great threats posed by 
the implementation of the Arusha Accords. These provisions would upend the 
political power structure in Rwanda and end the reign of the state of exception in 
Rwanda. 
Power sharing as a threat to Hutu Power 
 During the Second Republic, Habyarimana maintained almost absolute 
control over governance in Rwanda. As detailed in Chapter 4, the President ruled 
without a national assembly for years, and once he established an assembly, he 
granted it very limited rights and powers. As President, Habyarimana appointed 
all prefects and burgomasters, and approved the selection of subprefects 
personally. Literally every government officer in the country was hand-picked by 
President Habyarimana. They served at his pleasure and could be removed at any 
time by him. The President appointed cabinet ministers, court officers, and 
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virtually every administrative position in the country. The Arusha Accords 
changed the entire structure, eviscerating President Habyarimana’s control over 
Rwanda and re-establishing a legal structure with checks and balances. The state of 
exception in the hands of Habyarimana was slated to end upon the 
implementation of the Accords. 
Under the Arusha Accords, Habyarimana would lose veto power over the 
National Assembly. He would lose the ability to stop Cabinet Council orders. He 
would retain the ability to declare war only upon the “decision of the Cabinet and 
after authorization by the National Assembly.” Declaration of war would require 
an unanimous vote by the Cabinet.406 
The Prime Minister, not the President, would be granted the power to 
select Cabinet members. The Prime Minister would have the power to appoint 
prefects, subprefects, and burgomasters. Importantly, under the Arusha Accords, 
it would be the Prime Minister who retained the ability to declare a state of siege 
or state of emergency.407 
Perhaps most threatening to the Hutu Power faction within the Second 
Republic, Article 46 of the power-sharing portion of the Arusha Accords stated 
As a matter of urgency and priority, the Broad-based Transitional 
Government shall rid the administrative apparatus of all 
incompetent elements as well as authorities who were involved in 
the social strife or whose activities are an obstacle to the 
democratic process and to national reconciliation.408 
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This article sounded as a death knell for the akazu extremists who had, for 
years, controlled Habyarimana and all of Rwanda’s governance. 
Under the agreement made in the Arusha Accords, the MRND would 
retain control of only five cabinet positions, including the Ministry of Defense. 
The President of the country would be a member of the MRND party. The RPF 
would hold an equal number of portfolios, including the Ministry of Interior and 
Communal Development. The Deputy Prime Minister would be a member of the 
RPF party. The MDR, the main Hutu opposition party, was granted control of 
four Ministries, including the position of Prime Minister and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. The other opposition parties split the remaining 
portfolios amongst themselves.409 The Ministry of Interior controlled the 
infrastructure of the administration and, under RPF control, would result in a 
serious loss of power for the central MRND members. Existing MRND members 
were slated to lose their jobs to RPF members under this arrangement.410 
The Transitional National Assembly would seat seventy members, with 
the MRND, RPF, MDR, PSD, and PL each maintaining 11 seats. The PDC was 
granted 4 seats, and the remaining 11 seats would be portioned out, one seat per 
minor opposition party.411 Until this agreement, the MRND had controlled every 
seat of the First Republic’s National Assembly and every seat of Habyarimana’s 
National Council of Development. 
  163 
The Arusha Accords split the MRND’s power into shards; under the 
power-sharing agreement, the akazu would have no more power than any of the 
major opposition parties, and in fact, could easily find itself as a minority in the 
new government if the opposition parties joined together in coalition against the 
MRND. The prospect of moving rapidly from a system in which one operated 
total control over the sovereign to a system in which no one party or group 
wielded a majority of the power spelled out the end of the Republic’s regime. 
It was clear that this agreement posed an unacceptable threat to the akazu 
and its allies. Near the end of March 1994, the intelligence chief of the Rwandan 
army told a group of Belgian military advisors that “if Arusha were implemented, 
they were ready to liquidate the Tutsi.”412 
Accountability for former atrocities 
 Many in the Habyarimana regime were concerned about the peace accords 
and the mandated transition to a broad-based coalition government for an 
additional reason – accountability.  Since 1959, and in particular between the years 
1990-1993, government agents had ordered, committed, witnessed, authorized, 
and presided over literally thousands of murders of Rwandan Tutsis. Recent 
international delegations had visited Rwanda to investigate these atrocities and 
submitted damning reports. The International Commission of Inquiry into Human 
Rights Violations in Rwanda since October 1990 published a report in March 
1993 that detailed great resp
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local leaders. This report listed names of those responsible for inciting and 
organizing the violence that occurred in various communities. It identified 
individuals involved in the actual killing of fellow Rwandans. The investigators 
even exhumed bodies from mass grave sites that were created after local massacres. 
The report was direct in assigning responsibility to Habyarimana’s government, 
concluding “The Rwandan government has killed or caused to be killed about two 
thousand of its citizens … . Authorities at the highest level, including the 
President of the Republic, have consented to these abuses.”413 
The United Nations Center for Human Rights also sent an investigator to 
Rwanda in 1993, and the report was equally damning. The Human Rights Watch 
published reports during this period noting the government’s increased 
expenditures on weaponry and local massacres of Tutsis at the hands of local 
Hutu leaders.414 As reports continued to detail human rights abuses, murders, and 
massacres at the hands of the government, President Habyarimana and the akazu 
tightened their grip on the country. Dissidents were jailed, killed, and driven to 
suicide.415 
In February 1994, as the transitional government once again prepared to 
take control, President Habyarimana proposed once again that past crimes and 
atrocities should go unpunished via an amnesty program. This time, however, he 
also proposed that similar crimes in the future, committed under the to-be-formed 
Unity government, also be granted amnesty.416 The United Nations did not agree. 
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When UNAMIR was formed in 1993 as part of the Arusha Accords, amnesty 
was not granted. In fact, the UNAMIR mandate included a directive that the UN 
mission investigate allegations of human rights abuses, murders, and politically-
motivated assassinations. The evidence was fairly easy to detect; the Presidential 
Guard was behind a number of the assassinations in question, and local leaders 
who oversaw massacres of Tutsis were acting at the behest of national government 
agents.417  
It was in the great interest of the existing leadership that they be granted 
amnesty for past crimes. Reports from international committees as well as the 
possibility of thousands of individuals providing first-hand testimony about past 
atrocities would not only mean that Hutu Power leaders would likely lose their 
comfortable and privileged positions in Rwandan government upon 
implementation of the Accords, but many of them would also face very serious 
criminal penalties, including the prospect of the death penalty for some. For a 
group of elites who had escaped responsibility for so many years, the reality of a 
future in prison or state-sponsored death was anathema. Thus, eliminating the 
entire Tutsi population was considered by many of these Rwandans to be a 
realistic alternative to their own day of reckoning. 
Genocide 
Starting about 90 minutes after the President’s death, the Presidential 
Guard began evacuating prominent MRND cabinet members and government 
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officials from their homes, moving them to party and military headquarters and 
safe houses. Surviving members of the opposition reported that the Presidential 
Guard came to the homes of the MRND members in the Kimihurura neighborhood 
and evacuated their families to Presidential Guard’s compound all throughout the 
night of April 6. At the same time, the Presidential Guard was approaching homes 
of opposition ministers and requesting that the ministers ‘evacuate’ with the 
Guard. By 3:30 am on April 7th, three ministers who were members of opposition 
parties had been killed by the Presidential Guard during and after such 
‘evacuations.’ By 4:30 am, all MRND members had been safely evacuated from 
the neighborhood, and the Guard had completely surrounded the neighborhood. 
The remaining opposition leaders were trapped; the killings began in earnest. 418 
Beginning in the early hours of April 7th, opposition leaders were 
systematically killed in Kigali by Presidential Guard members and the 
Gendarmerie. The two candidates for National Assembly President, Fèlician 
Ngango and Landoald Ndasingwa were both executed. Soldiers also killed the 
president of the Constitutional Court, Joseph Kavaruganda. Kavaruganda was the 
officer of the court who would have sworn in all the transitional government 
appointees.419 Dèo Havugimana, a MDR official who worked in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, was killed in the middle of the night, along with three additional 
opposition ministers.420 Frederic Nzamurambago, the president of the PSD 
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opposition party and Minister of Agriculture, was killed along with his family in 
the early morning.421 
Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana was killed on April 8 by the 
Presidential Guard as she tried to flee from her backyard. The order to kill her was 
given by the Presidential Guard officer present; the Gendarmeries who had 
previously surrounded her house shot and killed her. The ten Belgian 
peacekeepers who had arrived at her home to escort her to Radio Rwanda that 
morning were disarmed, transported to Camp Kigali and killed by the Presidential 
Guard.422  
Tutsi massacres begin 
The members of the akazu met at 11 pm on the night of the President’s 
death; by 6 am the next morning, the para-commandos were sweeping Kigali 
neighborhoods near Camp Kanombe, with orders to kill anyone with a Tutsi 
identification card. According to the akazu, Tutsis were the natural accomplices of 
the RPF rebel fighters – the terms inyenzi (cockroach) and inkotanyi (fighter, 
warrior) had become interchangeable and encompassed both RPF rebels and the 
general Rwandan Tutsi population.423 
Years later, during the Military One trial at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, one of the para-commandos who participated in this earliest 
of killing missions noted that the first Kigali operation lasted until the early 
afternoon, and that the battalion killed upwards of 500 Tutsis in the neighborhood 
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closest to Camp Kanombe that day. He recalled that he and other commandos had 
been warned in 1993 of this possibility – the military’s plan to respond to an RPF 
invasion was to kill all the local Tutsis, since the RPF rebels would be invading 
from the north and be too far away to fight.424 
That morning, military commanders and officers from the Gendarmerie 
police force were called to a meeting by Bagosora. In that meeting, the group 
agreed to the formation of a Crisis Committee and Bagosora continued to lead the 
group in an unofficial capacity. After the meeting, Bagosora was overheard talking 
to a small group of officers: those who headed up the para-commando battalion, 
the reconnaissance battalion, the Presidential Guard, and head of military 
operations in northern Rwanda. It is said that Bagosora gave them instructions to 
‘go about it systematically from one place to another,’ a term in Rwanda often 
used to describe tilling the land or harvesting the crop.425 Throughout the genocide, 
agrarian terms would be used as euphemisms to describe the killing of Tutsi. 
Around 4:15 pm on the afternoon of April 7, the RPF soldiers who were 
living in a compound in Kigali broke out of their barracks and began an attack 
against the Presidential Guard headquarters and the police base in Remera (in 
Kigali) in response to the massacres the Presidential Guard and now the 
interahamwe were committing.426 By this time, a number of opposition leaders 
had been killed along with their families, and the attacks on local Tutsis numbered 
well over 500 deaths. 
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Jean-Pierre proved right 
UNAMIR Force Commander Dallaire had learned of the deaths of his 
Belgian peacekeepers when he passed by their bodies on the side of road while en 
route to the Military School. Bagosora was briefing military and police leaders 
around mid-morning on April 7 at the military school. Dallaire asked to stop and 
see about his soldiers whose bodies were lying on the side of the road, but his 
escorts refused to stop, citing safety concerns. Throughout the day, Dallaire was 
kept away from Camp Kigali, where his peacekeepers had been killed.  It wasn’t 
until late that evening that Dallaire saw the bodies of his ten Belgian peacekeepers. 
They had been killed shortly after the Prime Minister was murdered that 
morning.427  
Dallaire realized that ‘Jean-Pierre,’ the interahamwe leader who had 
warned UNAMIR of the coming genocide as early as January 10, had accurately 
predicted what would occur in Rwanda. Jean-Pierre, a senior leader in the 
itnerahamwe militia and elected leader within the MRND party, had previously 
been responsible for arming the militia and supervising the militia’s training in 
Kigali. He had armed men throughout the capitol, and in January he told 
UNAMIR that his cells (small groups of individuals organized by neighborhood) 
could each kill up to 1,000 people every twenty minutes. He managed nearly 30 
cells himself. Jean-Pierre told UNAMIR that he was comfortable with his 
position when he believed the work was intended to secure the country from RPF 
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invaders; however, in December 1993, he had been instructed to create lists of 
every Tutsi living in every cell under his control. When informed that the lists 
were intended to facilitate the extermination of all Tutsi in the country, he 
withdrew. His own mother was Tutsi.428 Jean-Pierre also told UNAMIR that a 
part of the gènocidaires’ strategy was to kill a number of Belgian soldiers early in 
the conflict, because the akazu believed that this would prompt the UN mission 
to withdraw. His information was on good authority – interim Prime Minister 
Agathe Uwilingiyimana had told a Belgian journalist in December 1993 that ten 
Belgian peacekeepers would be murdered to convince the UN to leave Rwanda.429 
Based on the UN’s behavior in Somalia in October 1993, the Hutu Power 
extremists had good reason to predict that the murder of a handful of Belgian 
peacekeepers would indeed end the UN’s presence in Rwanda, allowing the 
genocide to proceed without interference. 
Jean-Pierre’s claims and predictions were accurate: lists of Tutsi and 
opposition leaders had been made, opposition leaders were being killed, weapons 
had been distributed to the populace, innocent Tutsi were being massacred in the 
city, and now ten Belgian peacekeepers had been killed by the Presidential Guard. 
Interim Government 
 On April 8, Bagosora convened a meeting of party leaders to establish an 
interim government.  Opposition leaders slated to hold positions of power and 
authority in the transitional government had been executed according to plan; very 
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few moderate party leaders from any of the parties remained alive. Accordingly, 
the interim government was created via a coalition of the Hutu Power factions of 
the major political parties. Prior to the genocide, President Habyarimana and the 
akazu had worked to create divisions within the opposition parties, so that 
virtually every party contained a moderate faction and a Hutu Power faction. 
With the moderate faction’s leaders all massacred, the Hutu Power factions of 
each party now joined together in common cause to defeat the RPF and eliminate 
the Tutsi population within Rwanda.430 
 The group designated an elderly pediatrician, Thèodore Sindikubwabo, as 
interim President. He was a MRND figurehead, unlikely to interfere much in the 
activities already set in motion by Bagosora and the akazu. Jean Kambanda, a 
businessman from the southern city of Butare, was nominated as Prime Minister, 
even though he was not present at the meeting and was not a high ranked MDR 
official.431 The rest of the cabinet was filled with Hutu Power extremists, most of 
whom were loyal to Bagosora and none of whom were interested in a broad-based 
government that would seek peace with the RPF or implementation of the Arusha 
Accords. The Crisis Committee accepted the appointments of Hutu Power 
extremists to government positions, completed the meeting, and never met again. 
The work of the civil war and the genocide was more important than political 
infighting.432 
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 The interim government was sworn in on April 9. The state of exception, 
long at play in Rwanda, expanded to a greater extent than ever before. The rule of 
law, established by the Arusha Accords, was simply set aside. Absent any 
juridical authority, Bagosora and extremists within the Rwandan government set 
aside the existence of law and created the absence of law. Once this space opened 
up, the interim government set to work on necropolitics – the extermination of the 
Tutsi minority people in Rwanda. 
On April 12, the government evacuated Kigali and established its offices in 
Gitarama south of the capitol.433 The interim government did little more than give 
speeches in local communes to urge local Hutus to ‘continue the work.’ Bagosora 
and the members of the akazu directed the actions of local government leaders and 
militia. 
The killing spreads 
 On April 7, massacres of Tutsis were occurring in Kigali, Gisenyi 
(stronghold of the akazu), Murambi, Cyangugu, and other smaller communities 
throughout Rwanda.434 By April 11, nearly 20,000 Rwandans had been killed. 
This number included Hutu opposition leaders and those who dissented from the 
Hutu Power philosophy, but the vast majority of the dead were Tutsi civilians in 
Kigali and the northern Gisenyi region. Jean Kambanda, the interim Prime 
Minister, was instructed to hold a meeting with the country’s prefects, the 
regional leaders who had been appointed to their positions by President 
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Habyarimana. Five prefects attended the April 11 meeting – one had been killed 
by the RPF in Ruhengeri days before, several positions were vacant, and two 
prefects did not show at the meeting. While nothing conclusive happened at the 
meeting, it was clear that the government was to allow the killings to continue.435 
 By April 12, party and interim government leaders were broadcasting 
messages of solidarity and support on RTLM and Radio Rwanda, exhorting local 
Hutus to join with the military and the government in killing their Tutsi neighbors. 
Hutu Power leaders within opposition parties sent messages to their party 
members to put aside political differences and instead focus on the task at hand – 
killing Tutsis. Frodauld Karimara from the MDR opposition party encouraged 
MDR listeners on Radio Rwanda to “not fight among themselves, but to Ö assist 
the armed forces to finish their work.”436 On that same day, Kigali prefect 
Renzaho urged Kigali Hutus to conduct patrols in their neighborhoods, but instead 
of the typical patrols, the exhortation now included murder: 
They must close ranks, remember how to use their usual tools and 
defend themselves … I would also ask that each neighborhood try 
to organize itself to do umuganda to clear the brush, to search 
houses, beginning with those that are abandoned, to search the 
marshes of the area to be sure that no inyenzi have slipped in to 
hide themselves there … so they should cut this brush, search the 
drains and ditches … put up barriers and guard them, choosing 
reliable people to do this, who have what they need Ö so that 
nothing can escape them.437 
 
 To more effectively execute large numbers of Tutsis, the local government 
began urging and even forcing Tutsi to evacuate to local ‘safe houses’ such as 
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churches, hospitals, schools, and universities during the week of April 11. In 
Kibuye and Cyangugu, local authorities directed Tutsis to the sports stadiums. In 
Kivumu, the burgomaster sent all Tutsi to the Nyange church. In Kigali, Tutsis 
were herded to the Technical College. In Butare, they were sent to the hospital 
and the university. In smaller communities, churches were the most common 
places of refuge and, later, massacre.438 
Once Tutsis were gathered in these enclosures, the local authorities would 
wait for the military or police officers to arrive, who would generally start the 
killings with grenades and gunfire. Local civilian self-defense teams and the 
interahamwe would follow up with individual massacres of those who had 
survived the first round of attacks. In this fashion, the gènocidaires could kill 
anywhere between 40-50 people in a small church to literally hundreds and even 
thousands assembled in large university and secondary school compounds.439 
Prèfecture by Prèfecture 
 Some prèfectures began killing Tutsi immediately, while others took action 
only later when pressured by the government to do so. In Kigali City and Greater 
Kigali, Prefects Tharcisse Renzaho and Francois Karera were actively engaged in 
the preparation for and execution of the genocide, starting as early as April 7.440 
The killings in Kigali were the earliest of the genocide, and most of the Tutsi killed 
in these two prèfectures had been killed within a week. 
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The Cyangugu prèfecture engaged in killings almost as quickly as Kigali; 
the prefect, Emmanuel Bagambiki, was close to Colonel Bagosora. Killings in this 
prefecture were swift and brutal. The prefect sealed the border on the morning of 
April 7 to prevent Tutsis from fleeing to safety. Most of the killings occurred 
rapidly at the beginning of the genocide, but a large massacre at the Cyangugu 
stadium on April 27th killed about 5,000 people who believed they were protected 
by international law in the center of refuge. It is estimated that as many as ninety 
percent of Tutsis in this region were killed.441 
 In Byumba, the interim prefect Aloys Muhire began the massacres on 
April 9. The local community already had a well-established local militia, formed 
as early as 1991 in response to former RPF incursions. For two days following 
the President’s plane crash, local militia and government leaders marked Tutsi 
homes for murder. Then the work started, but didn’t last long. Because of its 
proximity to the border, the RPF quickly overwhelmed the interhamwe in this 
area and took control of the prefecture within a week and a half.442 
The killing in Gikongoro began immediately after the President’s plane 
crashed. In fact, the massacres happened so quickly that most Tutsi did not have 
time to run or even congregate together in churches or schools. Damien Binga, the 
sub-prefect of Gikongoro, was actively involved in orchestrating local killings and 
is believed to have committed a number of murders himself. 443 
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 Massacres in Kibungo started on April 7th, with interahamwe 
systematically going from house to house to kill Tutsi.  Larger scale massacres 
were organized between April 9 and 12 in churches, seminaries, and schools. 
Group massacres ranged from several hundred to over five thousand murdered at 
one time. The majority of killing in this prefecture was completed by April 13, 
less than one week after it began.444 
The Kibuye prefecture was home to some of the largest mass killings in 
the country. The prefect, Clèment Kayishema, gathered tens of thousands of 
Tutsis at the local stadium and in churches in the town of Kibuye before bringing 
in the interahamwe to begin the massacres. Kayishema started holding meetings 
with burgomasters in the local communes to prepare the Hutu population to join 
in the killings; those who resisted were also killed. The killing started on April 9 
and continued through April 17th. A French officer stationed in Kibuye during 
Operation Turquoise investigated the killings at Kibuye stadium and surrounding 
churches and concluded that “between eighty and ninety-five percent of the Tutsi 
population [was] destroyed in this area.”445 
Gitarama was a stronghold of MDR opposition to the MRND ruling 
party, and the local community resisted the genocide. It wasn’t until Callixte 
Nzabonimana, the Youth Minister, visited the prefecture and admonished the local 
population for not doing its ‘work.’ In a meeting organized to mobilize the 
community, the Minister (who hailed from Gitarama) asked those in attendance 
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“why were the people of Gitarama sitting with their arms crossed while elsewhere 
others had already eaten the cows of Tutsis?”446 Eventually, local burgomasters 
fled and were replaced by more active local officials. The government trucked in 
military and militia members to carry out the mass executions of Tutsi. Locals 
began to participate, under pressure from burgomasters and national political and 
military figures.447 
In the Butare prèfecture, killings did not begin immediately. The prefect of 
Butare, Jean Baptiste Habyalimana, had refused to participate in killings and 
refused to direct his burgomasters to organize local massacres. In fact, he 
welcomed internally displaced people fleeing neighboring prefectures and provided 
them with safe harbor for nearly two weeks. Habyalimana was the only Tutsi 
prefect in the country. He was removed from his position on April 18 because of 
his refusal to orchestrate killings of Tutsi in his prèfecture; he was replaced by 
Sylvain Nsabimana. The massacres began in earnest on April 19 and were some of 
the most rapidly executed in the country. Habyalimana was subsequently 
murdered.448 
The national daily death rate was over 11,500 per day for the first two 
months of the genocide. On some days, the death rate was as high as 45,000. This 
averaged one murder every two seconds.449 The total estimate of Rwandans 
murdered is around 800,000 Tutsi and 10,000 Hutu. 
Camps 
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 Camps were established throughout the ninety-day genocide. Most camps 
were created by local burgomasters, who rounded up Tutsi and brought them to 
churches, seminaries, schools, and stadiums. In these instances, Tutsi were kept in 
the camps for no more than several days, while local leaders waited for the 
military or interahamwe militia to arrive and start the mass execution. In these 
camps, most Tutsi anticipated death, but hoped for rescue.  In some cases, the 
local population was told that the death camp was actually a sanctuary, a place of 
refuge. In a few instances, the Tutsi population believed their local government 
officials. 
 The Hutu Power extremists formed these temporary camps as holding 
cells to allow mass execution to occur quickly and cheaply. Agamben noted that 
ìthe camp is the space that opens up when the state of exception starts to become 
the rule.î450 In Rwanda, camps were established in almost every part of the 
country – some for hours, others for several days, and a few camps existed for 
months. 
 The Hotel des Milles Collines is a famous example of a camp that existed 
for almost the entire duration of the genocide. Wealthy Tutsi, Hutu opposition 
survivors, and Tutsi orphans lived inside the Mille Collines for months, existing at 
one point on the water in the pool at the luxury hotel. While there had been 
several attempts for some to leave the Mille Collines and travel to safety, RTLM 
radio had alerted interahamwe to the convoy and the Tutsi had all been returned to 
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the hotel under threat of death.451 The Milles Collines was a camp; the Tutsi 
inside had been reduced by the government to people devoid of political or social 
capital, subject to physical death at any time the Hutu Power extremists and 
interahamwe chose to impose that death. 
 Another notable camp during the genocide included the Amahoro Stadium 
in Kigali, which was protected by UNAMIR soldiers. While gÈnocidaires could 
not get into the stadium to kill Tutsis, they arrived on a regular basis with 
execution lists and would extract targeted Tutsis for selected killings. Within the 
stadium, many people died of disease and starvation, for they could not leave to 
get food or medical attention.452 
 While some survived the camps at Milles Collines, Amahoro Stadium, and 
churches like St. Famille, St. Croixe, and St. Paul, other camps were abandoned 
early by UN protectors. In those instances, military and militia entered the camps 
almost at the same time as the UN left, killing every person inside. One example is 
the Official Technical School in the Gatenga neighborhood of Kigali.  Over 2,000 
Tutsis were sheltered at the school when Belgian peacekeepers left to assist 
Europeans evacuate the country on April 11.  As the UN peacekeepers left, 
interahamwe entered and killed every person in the compound.453 
 Agamben claims that “it is only because the camps constitute a space of 
exception – a space in which the law is completely suspended – that everything is 
truly possible in them.”454 During the Rwandan genocide, Tutsis in camps were 
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shot, clubbed, burned, raped, cut, and mutilated. The Hutu Power extremists had 
stripped the Tutsi of all their power; only their bodies remained. The camps 
represent the ultimate transformation of People into people in Rwanda. 
Organization in the Execution 
 Many westerners believe that the genocide was a surprise ‘descent into 
hell,’ a chaotic setting in which frenzied killers attacked victims based on old 
hatreds and ethnic strife. This picture of the genocide is based on western racist 
notions of African communities, and displays a profound lack of understanding of 
the highly organized structure within Rwandan society both before and during the 
genocide. The Rwandan genocide was carefully planned and prepared for, and the 
speed and efficiency with which it was executed serves as chilling truth. 
On April 4, just two days before the start of the genocide, Thèoneste 
Bagosora stated to Lt. General Romeo Dallaire and others gathered at an UN 
reception, “the only plausible solution for Rwanda would be the extermination of 
the Tutsi.”455 This statement was one of many that foreshadowed what was to 
come. It came as no accident. Within 45 minutes of the President’s death, 
roadblocks had been established around the city. Executions of those on the death 
lists began shortly thereafter. 456 
Priority Death Lists  
Beginning as early as September 1992, and continuing through the fall of 
1993, local burgomasters compiled lists of suspected inkotanyi457 from their local 
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communities. Prefects instructed local burgomasters to create lists of all young 
males who had left the community recently without permission. At this time, it 
was still impermissible for Rwandans to move from one area of the country to 
another without notification to and permission from the local authorities in both 
the region of residence and the new location one wished to move towards. As 
numbers of young Tutsi men left communities, their names were added to local 
government lists, their registration cards pulled from the large community file and 
held in a separate area, and the ‘security’ lists were sent back to prefects and 
ultimately to the central government in Kigali.458 These lists were referenced by 
Lèon Mugesera in a speech he gave in November 1992 in Gisenyi.  Mugesera was 
the vice-chair of the MRND party in Gisenyi, a hotbed of violence against the 
minority Tutsi. Mugesera said of the lists 
Why do we not arrest these parents who have sent their children 
away and why do we not exterminate them? … I would like to tell 
you that we are now asking for those people to be put on a list and 
for them to be brought to court so that they can be judged before 
us. If [the judges] refuse … we should do it ourselves by 
exterminating this scum.459 
 
In the fall of 1992, the army began creating lists of all suspected 
accomplices of the RPF.  Although the Prime Minister protested against this 
action and issued a decree that all lists created to date be turned over to the 
Ministry of Justice, his request was ignored.460 The former Governor of the 
Central Bank of Rwanda declared during the genocide that he had personally seen 
lists of those slated for massacre prior to the start of the genocide. He noted that 
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one list he saw in April 1993 contained 500 names, but that the list had grown to 
over 1,500 for Kigali city alone by February 1994. He also reported that the lists 
continued to grow after that date.461 
Survivors and witnesses recall the use of the lists in the early days of the 
genocide. While lists were especially important in organizing the deaths of Hutu 
opponents and dissidents, they were also used when killing mass numbers of 
Tutsis. One survivor noted that, prior to one mass killing at a hospital in Kibuye, 
the gènocidaires first read out a list of prominent Tutsis over the loudspeaker to 
ensure that they were of the group killed that day.462 
Military Organization 
As the genocide began, there was confusion and dissension amongst 
military leaders in Rwanda. While most agreed that force should be used to defend 
the country against the RPF rebel forces when or if such an attack would occur, 
not everyone believed that military, police, and militia forces should be used to 
massacre local Tutsi in the community. However, the extremist forces within the 
government had for several years organized both youth militias such as the 
interahamwe and local civil-defense (sometimes called auto-dèfense) militias to 
prepare for just such an action. As military officers in Kigali debated the 
appropriate reaction to the President’s murder of April 6, the extremist elements 
within the government took action. 
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Bagosora had several thousand troops under his control. The Presidential 
Guard had previously reported to Colonel Elie Sagatwa, the President’s private 
secretary. Sagatwa was killed in the plane crash; Bagosora took control of the 
Guard after his death. Bagosora also controlled the paracommando battalion and 
the reconnaissance battalion, the two strongest and deadliest forces in the nation. 
Finally, he wielded great power over the interahamwe militia groups established 
through the MRND. While other officers controlled the Gendarmerie and regular 
RGF forces, their forces were less organized, poorly armed, and likely to join the 
more elite forces’ activities on the ground, regardless of the orders from 
superiors.463 
The driving force behind the organization of the genocide was Bagosora; he 
acted as the chief ideologue and informal commander of the organized massacre 
across the country. A number of military leaders followed Bagosora’s lead and 
organized their soldiers at his direction. These groups included the head of the 
Presidential Guard, Major Protais Mpiranya; Paracommando Battalion leader 
Aloys Ntabakuze; and Reconnaissance Battalion leader Major Francois-Xavier 
Nzuwonemye.464 While the Gendarmerie were not technically under Bagosora’s 
control, they often fell into step with the Presidential Guard and assisted in 
massacres rather than restoring order or protecting victims. The military, outfitted 
in uniforms and carrying a presence of state authority and control, were often the 
first to arrive in communes where large groups of Tutsi had been assembled. They 
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started the massacres with weapons such as rifles and grenades, then moved on to 
other areas, leaving the local militia and civilian self-defense teams to complete the 
‘work.’ 
Political Leaders and the Militias 
Robert Kajuga and George Rutaganda, leaders of the MRND-based 
Interahamwe, joined with the presidents of the two most extreme political parties, 
the MRND and the CDR. Mathieu Ngirumpatse and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, 
respectively, operated at the direction of Bagasora and directed local leaders to 
participate in rounding up and executing Tutsis throughout the countryside.465 
Prior to the President’s plane crash, militia membership numbered somewhere 
around two thousand strong in Kigali, with smaller groupings in other cities. After 
the genocide began, the militia’s ranks grew to between 20,000 and 30,000.466 
Prior to the genocide, the militia had been divided by party, with each 
party having trained its own youth wing. In the first several days of the genocide, 
the militias skirmished with each other, seeking to gain the upper hand and control 
of various communes. Once political leaders broadcast messages of unity on April 
12, however, the skirmishes ended at the militia groups essentially became one.467 
The militia acted at the behest of the government and military leaders. The 
Interahamwe leader Kajuga explained the hierarchy in this way: 
The government authorizes us. We go in behind the army. We 
watch them and learn … We have to defend our country. The 
government authorizes us to defend ourselves by taking up clubs, 
machetes, and whatever guns we could find.468 
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The militia traveled around the country, providing ‘assistance’ to 
local communities that were unable to kill their local Tutsi population 
quickly or easily. In some cases, the militia was bused in to kill Tutsis 
sequestered in churches and hospitals. In other cases, they were brought 
from across the country to deal with resistant Tutsi, like the case of the 
Bisesero Tutsi who hid on the hilltop and resisted massacre until nearly 
the end of the genocide.469 
Prefects and burgomasters, and local civilian self-defense teams 
Eventually, all prefects and burgomasters in the country but one 
participated in the organized killing. In some areas, local leaders were galvanized 
and acted quickly. In the north, in particular, local leaders were close to the akazu 
and began implementing the plan to massacre all Tutsi almost immediately. 
Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, head of the Gisenyi prefecture, began organizing 
the killing of Tutsi civilians the night of April 6th. Tharcisse Renzaho, Kigali 
prefect and colonel in the military, moved into action immediately, establishing 
roadblocks, distributing previously drawn up lists of Tutsis to subordinates, and 
encouraging the massacre of Tutsi civilians in the hours and days immediately 
following the President’s plane crash.470 
Prefects were responsible for setting the tone in their region; ensuring that 
burgomasters and local commune leaders attended ‘security’ meetings, requiring 
regular reports on the ‘security situation,’ and disseminating proclamations from 
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national leaders about doing the ‘work’ and encouraging the population to “track 
the enemy wherever he is to be found and wherever he hid his arms.”471 
Burgomasters, who reported to prefects, had been responsible for 
checkpoints and nighttime patrols prior to the genocide. Now they were 
responsible for mobilizing volunteers to man checkpoints, conduct sweeps to get 
Tutsi to report to central locations such as churches, hospitals, and schools, and 
sign up the local male population for ‘shifts’ to carry out the ‘work.’472 Those 
who refused to show up for their fair share of the ‘work’ were beaten and 
sometimes killed. Adult male Hutus were expected and required to participate in 
the killing of their friends, neighbors and family members. No Tutsi were spared, 
and ‘weak-hearted’ Hutu were punished if they attempted to avoid or resist the 
killings. 
Much of the citizen mobilization had been done well in advance. Many 
Hutus in Rwanda were primed to kill. For years, the government had been forming 
civilian self-defense groups throughout the country, providing some minor training 
and distributing traditional weapons like machetes, spears and clubs. Local 
prefects were required to report on their recruits and training progress in the self-
defense program. On March 30, just one week before the start of the genocide, 
Tharcisse Renzaho, prefect of Kigali sent a letter to the Chief of Staff Major 
General of the Army Dèogratis Nsabimana detailing a list by cell, sector, and 
commune, all the reservists prepared to fight for the civil defense force.473 
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Burgomasters permitted local Hutus to loot the homes of Tutsi victims, 
and divided up Tutsi land amongst those who had done the ‘work’ to ‘earn’ that 
land. They were also responsible for the disposal of bodies. Finally, burgomasters 
were often the last line of hope for those wishing to avoid death – the burgomaster 
determined who was Hutu and who was Tutsi in situations where identity cards 
were lost or challenged.474 
Many have wondered how ordinary Rwandans could take up machetes 
and clubs to kill their neighbors. In some cases, Hutus were compelled to do so 
under threat of their own demise. More often, however, Hutus had been exposed 
to such a deep level of dehumanization of the Tutsi people in Rwanda that, for 
them, Tutsis were no longer People. Tutsis were considered a threat to the very 
existence of the Hutu people, and therefore, must be stopped at all costs. In this 
way, the government and the propaganda machine of the Hutu Power elite 
transformed the Tutsi minority into people, mere bodies without human, social or 
political value. 
Finally, Rwandan Hutus were convinced that the Tutsi planned to 
exterminate them entirely and reassert complete authority over Rwanda. The Hutu 
Power extremists in Rwanda told an age-old story, one explained by Foucault: “if 
you want to live, the other must die.” This story, along with a promise that the 
extermination of the enemy actually improves one’s own life, was an attractive 
promise to many Rwandan Hutus. As Foucault stated, “the fact that the other 
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dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his death guarantees my 
safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race … is 
something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer.”475 
RTLM and Radio Rwanda as Genocidal Guides 
Chapter 2 details the propaganda strategies utilized by the Hutu Power 
extremists in the four years leading up to the genocide. Radio played an integral 
part in the process of dehumanization of the Tutsi and preparation for massacre; 
as most Rwandans were not literate and lacked access to newspaper and 
magazines, radio was the most popular and effective mode of communication. 
Radio as the principal mode of communication became even more important 
during the genocide – it was one of the most effective tools utilized to encourage, 
organize, and continue the genocide throughout the country. It was particularly 
useful in rural communities, where peasants had long-lasting relationships with 
their Tutsi neighbors and were presumably more hesitant to engage in killings.  
In the months leading up to the genocide, there were signs of what was to 
come in the media.  Kangura, the most popular and virulent publication in 
circulation at the time, published several op-ed articles from publisher and owner 
Hassan Ngeze in which he predicted that President Habyarimana would be killed 
in March 1994 by Hutus.476 The magazine also published hints of the coming 
genocide, such as this statement in January 1994, “Who will survive the March 
war? The masses will rise with the help of the army and the blood will flow 
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freely.”  And in Feburary 1994, a smaller but incredibly extreme publication, La 
Medaille Nyiramacibiri, ran a headline stating “By the way, the Tutsi race could 
be extinguished.”477 While these types of media foreshadowing comments were 
increasing in intensity in the weeks leading up to the genocide, they had existed 
since 1990. In March 1993, for example, a Kinywarwandan publication called 
Umuranga Mubangutsi reported “machetes are being sharpened in preparation for 
D-Day.”478 
RTLM, the so-called ‘independent’ radio station, owned by President 
Habyarimana and other Hutu Power government extremists, broadcast Lèon 
Mugesera’s infamous November 1992 MRND rally speech in the Gisenyi region. 
Mugesera said “the fatal mistake we made in 1959 was to let [the Tutsi] get out 
… .They belong in Ethiopia and we are going to find them a shortcut to get there 
by throwing them in to the Nyabarongo River. I must insist on this point.  We 
have to act. Wipe them all out!”479 
Moments later, he recounted a conversation with a Tutsi Rwandan in 
which he told the man “your home is in Ethiopia and we will dump you in the 
Nyabarongo [river] for you to arrive quickly.”480 While this type of inflammatory 
speech was typical between 1990 and April 1994 on RTLM and Radio Rwanda, 
the intensity of the broadcasts increased as the President’s death neared. 
In March 1994, just before the start of the genocide, Radio Rwanda 
broadcast a speech by Jerome Bicamumpaka, the foreign minister of the interim 
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government, in which he exhorted Rwandans to “support your government and 
your army. … Victory is very close. No one can fight seven million people. … A 
message for the RPF: Stop fighting this war if you do not want your supporters 
living inside Rwanda to be exterminated.”481 
Other government allies repeated this warning to the RPF and Tutsis 
within Rwanda in the days leading up to the genocide. Rafiki Nsengiyumva, the 
Minister of Public Works and Energy for the interim government, said during an 
interview with Radio Rwanda in March 1994 
The enemy is one, the RPF, that wants to take the fruit of the 1959 
revolution away. … These people are at the origin of it all, let them 
put their weapons down, talk to this government and see if the war 
foes not end. Otherwise, if they carry on attacking, their people 
will be exterminated and they themselves exterminated.482 
 
On April 3, RTLM Radio broadcast a foreshadowing of the genocide.  
Noheli Hitimana, one of the most popular RTLM broadcasters said “On the 3rd, 
4th, and 5th, heads will get heated up. On 6 April, there will be a respite, but ‘a 
little thing’ might happen. Then on the 7th and the 8th and the other days in April, 
you will see something.”483 During this same broadcast, Hitimana stated 
The people are the actual shield. They are the truly powerful army. 
… On the day when people rise up and don’t want you Tutsi 
anymore, when they hate you as one and from the bottom of their 
hearts, when you’ll make them feel sick, I wonder how you will 
escape.484 
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Other previous broadcasts had hinted at the President’s coming demise as 
well, as a trigger to a larger conflict with the RPF and Tutsis living in Rwanda. 
These hints grew in frequency as the President’s plane crash drew nearer. 
On the night of the President’s plane crash, RTLM was in the middle of a 
broadcast, informing listeners that the President’s plane was approaching the 
runway. Suddenly, the broadcast was interrupted and classical music began 
playing.485 Within hours, the station was back on the air, announcing the 
President’s death at the hand of Tutsi rebels, and urging Rwandans to first stay 
where they were.486  Later, the radio began issuing exhortations and directives to 
join roadblocks, kill Tutsis at specific locations, or generally to ‘continue the 
work.’ 
Within hours, the radio had transformed from a tool of propaganda to a 
very practical tool of the genocide. At first, RTLM and Radio Rwanda taught 
Rwandans the euphemistic language of genocide. As an agrarian society, the 
stories told about the genocide were almost all based on farming and the land. 
Hutus were told to ‘cut down the tall trees’ and ‘do the work,’ referencing the age-
old practice of communal work, umuganda. 
One broadcast typical of the time said 
Fight the iyenzi, pound them. Stand up. Keep away from lies and 
rumors. If they pound you with heavy artillery, bombs, go into 
bunkers. Then after that you take your spears, clubs, guns, swords, 
stones, everything, sharpen them, hack them, those enemies, those 
cockroaches, those enemies of democracy, show that you can 
defend yourselves – support your soldiers.487 
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 Perhaps the most famous phrase from the RTLM broadcasts during the 
genocide was “the graves are only half full – who will help us fill them?” In the 
same vein, RTLM spent time celebrating the massacres committed by Hutus 
throughout the country. In one broadcast, the commentators openly discuss filling 
graves with Tutsis: 
There is however a thing [the RPF] did not foresee. What they had 
not foreseen was very obvious. They thought that by the time they 
entered the city, they would see their supporters here and there, etc. 
… [But] the population reacted swiftly in communes, prefectures 
and the Inkotanyi brigades were overrun.  Those who had dug holes 
to bury Hutus in were the same people to be buried in them. That is 
how things went – fast!488 
 
 During the genocide, popular broadcasters and journalists, both those 
working at RTLM and Radio Rwanda, and those running other publications, 
would often give long soliloquies on the radio exhorting the Hutu population to 
kill the Tutsi, and providing lengthy, historically-based justifications for doing so. 
One example was Gaspard Karemera, the editor of Imbaga, a Kinyarwandan 
circular. In one interview, he identified all Tutsi Rwandans as accomplices of the 
RPF and therefore a danger to the security of the country. He would remind Hutu 
Rwandans to ‘clear up’ the villages by killing all the remaining Tutsi.489 
 Radio Rwanda, which in 1992 had incited Hutu civilians to engage in 
massacres against Tutsis in Bagogwe, now invited political leaders and government 
officials to speak on the radio program during the genocide. These leaders utilized 
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the radio pulpit to encourage Hutus to continue the massacres in their 
communities.  
One leader said that the Tutsi were intending to “exterminate you until 
they are the only ones left in the country so that they can keep for a thousand 
years the power that their fathers kept for four hundred years … You must not let 
up in your efforts.”490 The interim President of Rwanda, Jean Kambanda, 
appeared on Radio Rwanda encouraging Hutus to kill Tutsis as part of their 
responsibility at Rwandans, arguing that those not willing to do their ‘work’ 
should be killed by other patriotic Hutus, the ‘good workers who want to work’ 
for Rwanda.491 
RTLM broadcaster Hitimana used the radio as a means to encourage 
reluctant Hutu to join their more enthusiastic Hutu neighbors who were actively 
engaged in the killings by congratulating those who did the ‘work’: 
… the population is very vigilant, except in certain sectors ... 
where people are still downcast; otherwise, everywhere else, they 
have sacked all the houses, the rooms, the kitchens, everywhere! 
They have even torn out all the doors and windows in all the 
uninhabited houses, and in general they find inkotanyi hidden 
inside. They have searched everywhere! … If the [inkotanyi] get 
hungry, they’ll all come out before you arrive.  That is why you 
must act very fast! Force them to come out! Find them at whatever 
cost!492 
 
The radio stations were used to target specific individuals and groups for 
massacre. Both RTLM and Radio Rwanda acted as guides for Rwandan 
gè
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Tutsis at a church or other building for shelter, and encourage listeners to go to the 
location and ‘clear the brush’of the Tutsis hiding there. One example is the 
Nyamirambo massacre in a mosque, sheltering over 300 Tutsis. Within minutes of 
the broadcast, the displaced persons seeking refuge there were killed.493 
 In other instances, RTLM announced the names and addresses of targets 
to be killed. In Kigali, this tactic was used in the early days of the genocide to 
eliminate political enemies of the Hutu Power regime. An April 8 broadcast 
directed listeners to the homes of Joseph Kahabaye and Antoine Sebera. Both men 
and their families were killed that day. Additional broadcasts identified Tutsi 
hideouts and Tutsi traveling in vehicles near Kigali checkpoints. One famous 
broadcast was the alert that Tutsis leaving the Hotel des Milles Collines were 
escorted by UNAMIR officers in a convoy. The convoy was ambushed on the 
road and barely made its way back to the hotel.494 
 Radio Rwanda was utilized to send messages to military personnel and 
interahamwe militiamen to travel to cities in Rwanda, attend meetings, or convene 
at stated locations. The radio station was used to solicit volunteer drivers to drive 
dump trucks and bulldozers to dig mass graves and to bury dead left on the sides 
of checkpoints and roads.495 
 From the early days of the genocide throughout the three month-long 
massacre, RTLM continued to legitimize the killings of Tutsi by government 
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actors, and portrayed killings by Hutu residents as part of one’s duty or work, 
and inevitable. In mid-May, RTLM broadcast  
The Tutsi are very few. They were estimated at 10 percent. The 
war must have brought them down to 8 percent. Will these people 
really continue to kill themselves? Do they not risk extermination if 
they persist in this suicidal behavior of throwing themselves 
against far more numerous people?496 
 
Rural gènocidaires, who participated in the massacres in their local 
communities day after day, later reported that RTLM utilized agrarian metaphors 
to encourage farmers to kill their Tutsi neighbors and relatives. Examples of 
common euphemisms include: ‘clear the bushes;’ ‘separate the grass from the 
millet;’ and ‘pull out the poison ivy together with its roots.’497 
By early June, it was common to hear RTLM broadcasters discussing the 
completion of the extermination of the Tutsi people. One RTLM announcer called 
for the total extermination of the Tutsi on June 3, stating “the cruelty of the 
inyenzi can be cured only by their total extermination.”498 RTLM commentator 
Habimana said in a June 4 broadcast, “The proof that we will exterminate them is 
that they represent only one ethnic group. Look at one person, at his height and 
physical features, look closely at his cute little nose and then break it.”499 During 
that same time, another RTLM broadcaster predicted that the effort “would 
exterminate the Tutsi from the globe … make them disappear once and for all.”500 
During the middle of the genocide, in May 1994, the United Nations sent 
out a commissioner for human rights to evaluate the massacres on the ground. 
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Prior to the arrival of the UN team, RTLM Radio asked Hutus to stop killing 
Tutsis while the UN commissioner visited. After the visit concluded, the radio let 
Rwandans know to begin their ‘work’ again. Towards the end of the genocide, 
when the French government was considering providing additional assistance to 
the interim government (it ultimately chose instead to provide save haven to the 
gÈnocidaires via Operation Turquoise), RTLM took to the airwaves to ask Hutu 
gÈnocidaires to behave in a more ‘civilized’ manner by hiding dead bodies away 
from the roads and roadblocks, and to avoid the appearance of enjoying massacres 
at roadblocks.501 The public listened, as they had for years earlier. Radio was 
indeed a powerful tool in both preparing the populace to commit genocide, and 
later to guide them in the commission of genocide itself. 
State of Exception Fully Realized 
The years of planning and preparation from 1990-1993, the repeated 
small-scale massacres carried out during those years, the mass training and arming 
of the rural population, the increased military preparation in terms of soldiers and 
arms, the effective use of propaganda to prepare ordinary Rwandans for mass 
violence against the Tutsi, and the effective dehumanization of Tutsis via years of 
discriminatory laws and policies allowed the extremist elements of the government 
to create the ultimate state of exception – where not only was there no 
government law or policy prohibiting the mass murder of one’s Tutsi neighbors, 
friends, and even spouses, but there was a directive from government and 
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government-controlled outlets to engage in necropolitics (deciding who lives and 
who dies). 
 In genocidal Rwanda, the exception to the rule – murder with impunity – 
became the norm. For years, certain Rwandans had engaged in targeted killings and 
pogroms with impunity because of their privileged status in the Hutu Power elite 
or akazu, and because the target of their killings were Tutsi, regarded as less than 
human. Now during the genocide, the killings were planned and executed by the 
government, military, militia, and supported by the local population.  
In Rwanda, Tutsi had been transformed from People to people – mere 
bodies without agency or political power. The necropolitics of the sovereign 
expanded to include every corner of the country during the genocide – and the 
power of the state to determine who would live and who would die expanded to 
include not just government operatives, but the militia, the clergy, the farmer in 
Kibuye, and the teenager in Kigali. The power to determine who would live and 
who would die was the ultimate power during the summer of 1994 in Rwanda; it 
was exercised at the rate of nearly one time every two seconds. 
Schmitt stated that, “in the state of exception, the state continues to exist, 
while law recedes.”502 In Rwanda, the state committed a genocide while law 
disappeared. 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION  
Over the course of just ninety days, extremists in the Rwandan 
government executed a highly organized plan to exterminate the country’s entire 
Tutsi minority population. They very nearly succeeded; it is estimated that over 
three-fourths of all Tutsis living in Rwanda in 1994, roughly 800,000 people, were 
killed before the end of the summer.503 The genocide was successfully executed 
not simply because a large portion of the Hutu population participated – but 
because the political groundwork had been laid out carefully over the course of 
many years to create a unique political climate in which extremists in government 
and a large portion of the population agreed that the elimination of an entire 
minority population was an acceptable answer to a political problem. 
Prior to colonialism, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa lived together in Rwanda via a 
complex social order. While the community was not strictly egalitarian, Hutu and 
Tutsi shared much together, including language, religion, family, land, and food. 
German and the Belgian colonizers create false and ever-more calcified distinctions 
between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Using race science theory and a self-serving 
method of discrimination, the Belgians created an ethnic divide between Hutu and 
Tutsi, then elevated the Tutsi to privilege while oppressing the Hutu population. 
Over time, oppressed Hutus sought to end the colonial structure that had 
created such an imbalanced system of governance and life. However, during the 
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Hutu Revolution of 1959, Hutu elite fought not to upend the colonial power 
structure, but to simply reverse it.  They did so successfully, and the independent 
First Republic established Hutu rule over the minority Tutsi. During two 
successive Hutu regimes, the Hutu elite instituted the state of exception in 
Rwanda to create a sovereign that created permanent permission to avoid the rule 
of law, and in that space, abuse the minority Tutsi with impunity. 
During both the Kayibanda and Habyarimana regimes, the Tutsi people 
were marginalized and legally prohibited from participating in legal, social, and 
political life in Rwanda. Hutu elite and government agents routinely engaged in 
unlawful murders and pogroms of Tutsi people with impunity. Presidential 
decrees and laws were promulgated to ensure the continued marginalization and 
dehumanization of Tutsis. The ethnicization of the designations Tutsi and Hutu 
created a superrace of the Hutu, and a subrace of the Tutsi. As such, the superrace 
sought continued oppression and destruction of the subrace, who they perceived 
as a threat to their existence and dominance. 
President Habyarimana refused refugees the right of return to their 
homeland. Those within the country’s boundaries lost their land and livelihoods, 
and were forcibly displaced within the country to less habitable locations, both so 
that favored Hutus could have their mineral-rich land, but also to control their 
movement within the country.  
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As Tutsis in the diaspora began to prepare for a civil war in order to return 
to their homeland, Hutu Power factions within the Habyarimana regime utilized 
propaganda to effectively dehumanize the Tutsi minority. Once dehumanized, the 
idea of extermination of the subrace threat, that already lived as people without 
social or political rights in the community, was not difficult to imagine. And as the 
international community agitated for a peaceful solution to the civil war rocking 
Rwanda in the early 1990s, the options facing the Hutu Power elite were grim 
indeed. In order to pacify the international community, the sovereign would be 
required to submit to a great loss of power, an establishment of the rule of law and 
the end to the state of exception. 
The idea that extermination of an entire portion of one’s population as a 
solution to the problems a sovereign faces is rooted in Agamben’s concept that the 
state of exception creates an atmosphere wherein a sovereign (government) strips 
its citizens of their sociopolitical being – where People are reduced to people, 
‘naked people’ devoid of social political capital or value. For the Hutu Power 
faction in Rwanda, Tutsi were not People. They were simply a threat to the 
existing power structure, a structure that had operated since independence without 
regard to the juridical order. 
 The powerful Hutu in Rwanda chose genocide over the restoration of law. 
The very thought that the state of exception – which had become the rule in 
Rwanda – was to be eliminated and the sovereign returned to a juridical order 
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answerable to the people of the sovereign was too threatening for the akazu. The 
price was simply too high. And so, the genocide ensued. 
 The Rwandan genocide is notable for its swiftness, brutality, and intense 
efficiency. Nearly one million people were killed in less than 100 days. No other 
genocide in modern history has been as effective in attaining its goal of 
extermination of a minority people. And yet, the world stood by and took no 
action. Westerners largely ignored the genocide, or, if they noticed it, commented 
that ‘Africans will have their tribal wars.’ These facile assessments of the 
Rwandan genocide fail to recognize the pattern – the very long pattern – of the 
state of exception at play in Rwanda. The Rwandan genocide was not inevitable, 
but it certainly was predictable. 
After a genocide, bystanders and observers often note with disgust and 
horror that seemingly ordinary people picked up weapons and killed their fellow 
human beings. They wonder aloud how such a thing could have happened? How 
could someone do such a thing to another? Agamben posited that  
The correct question regarding the horrors committed …, therefore, 
is not the question that asks hypocritically how it could have been 
possible to commit such atrocious horrors against other human 
beings; it would be more honest, and above all more useful, to 
investigate carefully how – that is, thanks to what juridical 
procedures and political devices – human beings could have been so 
completely deprived of their rights and prerogatives to the point 
that committing any act toward them would no longer appear as a 
crime.504 
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 The government’s long history of necropolitics, started during colonial 
times and continuing until 1994, laid out a clear picture of how genocide occurred. 
In a society where the state of exception is the norm, where a minority people are 
considered people without biopolitical power, where necropolitics is the preferred 
solution for the sovereign’s troubles, genocide is no surprise. What is concerning is 
that we choose not to notice. 
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